It has come to my attention that there
is a newer, recent article from Matt Slick on prevenient grace and Molinism.
In it, he attempts to argue that total depravity rules out prevenient grace (he
applies this reasoning to two versions of prevenient grace, but since it relies
on the same foundational reasoning it will be sufficient to deal with that).
This is what I take to be his argument, in premise form:
1.
If total depravity is true,
then man cannot come to God freely.
2.
If prevenient grace is true,
then unregenerate man is still totally depraved.
3.
Total depravity is true
(assumption of prevenient grace).
4.
Prevenient grace is true
(assumption of prevenient grace, by definition)
5.
Therefore, if prevenient grace
is true, then man still cannot come to God freely.
6.
Therefore, man still cannot
come to God freely.
I believe I have represented Slick fairly
and accurately here. However, there are some problems. First, he takes total depravity
to mean that there is no free choosing of God and that prevenient grace doesn’t
rectify this at all, since man is still totally depraved, and that prevenient
grace relies on total depravity (since otherwise it wouldn’t be necessary). But
this is just question-begging. After all, the advocate for prevenient grace can
just insist that he doesn’t accept (3) if this is what total depravity entails
(instead, call it “total depravity lite,” where the only difference is that
prevenient grace can restore such an ability as an act of divine grace); or she
can say she rejects (2), since, after all, prevenient grace is intended to
restore, and so restores to a condition of total depravity lite. Why can’t he
or she make this move?
Spelling it out more, this assumes
prevenient grace doesn’t accomplish what it intends to accomplish. Prevenient
grace agrees that man is totally depraved, but that any good that can be done
by man is due to God’s enabling grace, and that he can come to the Father on
the occasion of the Spirit’s moving work. But Slick simply claims that, in
premise 2, we can see it doesn’t accomplish this. Why should we think this?
Well, Slick quotes a few verses without doing any exegetical work. In other
words, he builds his conclusion into his argument; he begs the question.
In truth, why can Molinists not just reject
(2), and point out prevenient grace is meant to solve the ability problem? You
can’t very well reply that prevenient grace doesn’t solve the ability problem
because there is an ability problem!