The Flexibility of Middle Knowledge

Middle knowledge is, roughly, the thesis that God has knowledge of what his free creatures would freely do in any set of freedom-permitting circumstances in which they might find themselves, and this knowledge is pre-volitional; that is to say, it comes logically prior to God’s decree to create the world, so that God is not causing them to do it. This doctrine is most often found in the context of Molinism, but there are many Molinists who are all over the theological spectrum when it comes to various topics, including soteriology (the study of salvation). There are Arminian-Molinists and Calvinist-Molinists, interestingly. It is my brief burden to show that middle knowledge can be applied not only to more Arminian-leaning teachings (of libertarian free will, for example), but also some Calvinist teachings (though there are obviously some that are off-limits for the Molinist—for just one, divine causal determinism being compatible with free actions).

First, middle knowledge is compatible with regeneration preceding faith.

One of the classic debates in soteriology is whether regeneration comes as a result of faith, or faith comes as a result of regeneration. On the former, proponents emphasize that God saves only because the person responds; a person who has not responded is not regenerate. On the latter, advocates contend that only a regenerate person can respond, so that it is necessary for faith in the first place. Which is right? For middle knowledge proponents, it may not matter. Suppose God uses his middle knowledge, logically prior to his decree, and knows each and every person who would freely place their trust in him if given a new heart. Suppose also, for the sake of argument, that regeneration prior to faith is necessary. God could then regenerate just these persons who would then libertarianly come to him. What about irresistible grace? The Synod of Dordt does seem to make this difficult. Hey, I didn’t say you’d fit in at Presbyterian potlucks!

Second, middle knowledge is compatible with limited atonement.

This may surprise some people, again, especially since very few Molinists accept limited atonement. Limited atonement is the thesis that Christ died for all of the sins of a specific group of people, all of whom will be saved (nearly word-for-word from Dr. John Hammett’s definition). The issue again is the same: God could use his middle knowledge to know precisely which people would believe in appropriate divinely selected circumstances, and only have Christ’s death atone for these sins.

Third, middle knowledge is compatible with unconditional election.

This is, admittedly, fudging a little. That is to say, you might have to ignore a pretty major definition of unconditional election that most Calvinists use ubiquitously. Instead, you’ll have to view unconditional election more along the lines of God getting the precise set of the saved that he wants. A better way to comport with the Westminster Confession’s definition is to emphasize God’s sovereign choice and omnipotence. So, suppose God can work circumstances such that anyone can freely (in the libertarian sense) come to him (say, because regeneration infallibly works to produce a new heart, and that new heart will always libertarianly choose God); in this case, God isn’t decreeing that the set of the saved will be so because of foreseen faith; indeed, they will have faith because they were chosen to be redeemed (it just so happens redemption always accomplishes this libertarian goal non-causally). In that case, you still have an unconditional election of sorts.

What does this all mean? Does it mean I’m a Calvinist now? No. In fact, I still reject these Calvinist teachings myself. My point is two-fold: 1. Sometimes the reasons people have for rejecting middle knowledge are not as good as they think they are; middle knowledge is flexible! 2. This means the debate on these Calvinist doctrines lies along lines not identical to middle knowledge. In other words, I believe God’s giving a well-meant offer precludes limited atonement (as well as the biblical evidence); I believe if God would have a world similar to this one in which everyone would freely be saved, then that’s the world we would have, etc. Something to think about!

Hypocrisy and Fallacies

When is an appeal to hypocrisy fallacious? Specifically, I’m talking about the claim, “If you argue that someone is hypocritical, therefore their view is false, that is fallacious.”

And there is something about this that is definitely right. Consider the pro-life movement. Suppose I support the outlawing of abortion in most, or even all, circumstances. Suppose further that I have never adopted any of these children whose abortions have been prevented. Suppose finally that I have never even so much as helped someone in need. “You’re a hypocrite!” the charge is levelled; and so I would be if I did nothing for anyone, ever. But what is supposed to follow from this? Surely not that abortions are permissible (the falsehood of my view). Something similar follows when people accuse liberals of being hypocrites because of immigration policies/executive order policies not opposed; nothing of relevance to the issue at hand follows from this.

But perhaps people don’t always mean to argue this way. Perhaps, instead, they mean something like the following: You didn’t hold to principle X last week, and now you do. Thus, either you have to admit that you were wrong last week, or wrong today—or else you’re being logically inconsistent.

What follows from this line of reasoning is that in cases where the opponent does not concede being wrong in the past—if this is really such a case as outlined above, and not a mistake in fact—then it follows they are wrong today. Thus, there is a kind of logical hypocrisy that, when pressed, can result in the establishment of the falsehood of a view. This is due to the law of noncontradiction; no two contradicting propositions can be true of the same thing at the same time and in the same sense.

So let’s apply this attempt at a correct appeal to hypocrisy to both test cases above. In the case of the pro-life movement, it might go like this: “You claim that God commands that life is sacred, but you seem uninterested in the poor and destitute. Are you wrong to be uninterested (since if life is sacred, one ought to be interested in the well-being of the less fortunate) or is life not sacred?”

And this makes some sense to me. Either life is or is not sacred, and unless I answer that I was wrong to be uninterested, then I affirm that life is not sacred (unless, of course, I challenge the facts of the matter). But this is not a particularly amazing strategy, since, of course, I can simply admit the error of my ways and hold to the sanctity of life. And while it’s true that if suddenly I were to claim that life is not sacred, I would not be right about this (truth isn’t up to me), it is true that if both of us in the debate agreed that life is not sacred, then there would be no more debate. What about the second case?

“You didn’t seem worried about executive orders when the last president was doing them. Either executive orders are worrisome or they are not. Either you were wrong to be not worried, or you are wrong to be critical of the current president merely for using them.”

This also strikes me as correct. Much of the analysis is the same as above; I can get out of this by admitting I was wrong. However, if I don’t challenge the facts of the matter, and I don’t admit I was wrong, then it follows I cannot criticize the president on this matter alone.

People don’t always mean this when they have an appeal to hypocrisy. Sometimes, perhaps even most of the time, they mean “X is a hypocrite; he’s wrong!” But sometimes they do—maybe—have this other style of argumentation in mind.

Omniscience, Omnipotence, and God

Suppose that omniscience is God’s knowing all true propositions and believing no false ones. Suppose further that omnipotence is God’s being such that he is able to perform any logically possible action. Now suppose that it is within my power (that is, it is up to me) to know what happened in the world yesterday (via a newspaper or website) or not—that is, it is within my power to know or to refrain from knowing. Suppose finally that God is essentially omniscient (that is, it is a property God must have in order to be who he is). The following paradox is said to hold for these claims:

1.     God is essentially omniscient.

2.     God is omnipotent.

3.     It is logically possible for me to know or to refrain from knowing x about yesterday.

4.     So God is able to know or to refrain from knowing x about yesterday (from 2-3).

5.     So God is not able to refrain from knowing x about yesterday (from 1).

(4) and (5) obviously contradict, and the critic of these attributes can point either to (1) or (2) as the culprit. What are we to do? Should we get rid of omniscience or omnipotence?

I think we should jettison the account given of omnipotence as too simplistic. I’m not saying we should give up omnipotence. Rather, I’m saying the definition doesn’t capture what it needs to; it’s too simplistic. Here’s an example:

6.     It is logically possible for me to know I am Randy.

7.     So, given (2), it is logically possible for God to know he is Randy.

8.     But God is not possibly Randy.

9.     So (2) is false.

(6) seems correct. I am identical to the referent of Randy, after all. (7) is an entailment of the definition we gave. (8) is a consequence of the fact that I am not even possibly God. (9) is just the entailment of (2) joined with (6-8). I find this argument far less objectionable in conclusion than the one above. So what is omnipotence? I don’t have the full account here in a short blog post, but the suggestion is that it’s maximal power (Flint and Freddoso). In this case, logical possibility is a necessary but not sufficient condition in the analysis of omnipotence. It at least has to be curtailed to something like “God can do what it is logically possible for him to do” (even if this can’t be the whole story—there could be other beings who can do everything it is logically possible for them to do, and they would fail spectacularly on the omnipotence scale).

So my final conclusion is to expand the analysis of “omnipotence” so that it captures the biblical data and works within our traditional theology. It then easily avoids the absurd conclusion that omnipotence requires God to know he is me!

Some Kinds of Thinking

In this post, I am going to examine five kinds of thinking that I believe people engage in. I’d love to hear some of your thoughts on how this might be expanded, applied, or even corrected!

1.     No thinking.

This is what happens when people simply repeat things, like campaign slogans, one-liners, and other things. People aren’t always revealing a lack of thinking when they engage in such things, but they frequently are. It sounds good, so they repeat it, so they can move on. This is dangerous for the church, for it opens the door to cults and cult-like movements that can be unbiblical.

2.     Simplistic thinking.

This occurs often at the “one-liner” level. The person who engages in simplistic thinking often approaches an issue and is willing to engage with it, but only as far and as quickly as it takes to espouse a position. This is not always (or even usually) done maliciously. An example is found in politics, when Democrats accuse Republicans of lacking education (as a catch-all explanation; as an alternative see “evil”), or when Republicans accuse Democrats of wanting to control your every move (again, as a catch-all). Simplistic thinking can be harmful since, on the “defensive” side, it easily lends itself to misrepresentation of one’s opponents, and on the “offensive” side, it reflects very little contemplation of an issue (e.g., “Something bad happened to you; therefore, you must be in sin!”).

3.     Confirmatory thinking.

This goes beyond simplistic thinking, but perhaps not by much. It allows the person to think just so far as it makes her position stronger, and no farther. It’s a lot like confirmation bias in this respect. It’s damaging to the church at large since it allows believers to stay within their tradition, whether or not that tradition is even remotely correct. Questions are answered only as far as it takes to confirm the pre-conceived idea. It’s not wrong to investigate an issue and find out you were right the whole time, or even to defend what you believe to be biblical truth. However, it is wrong to short-change the issue by refusing to entertain contrary objections or evidences.

4.     Interactive thinking.

This is a decent level of thinking. It moves beyond initial answers to interact with objections, answers, and counter-answers. It weighs the arguments and evidences to see what the best answer might be. From a Christian perspective, it measures things against the biblical record. If what is at stake is a matter of biblical interpretation, interactive thinking seeks to resolve this from a wide variety of sources, arguments, and evidences.

5.     Exploratory thinking.

Not everyone is required to engage in exploratory thinking. This is the level that not only engages scholarship but also uses it to stimulate new ideas. These new ideas need not come at the expense of old ones; in fact, these new ideas just can be new ways to arrive at old conclusions. In politics, exploratory thinking can be applied to help solve governmental issues and meet societal needs. In Christianity, exploratory thinking can run from theology to culture to every area of life in solving problems, raising new questions, and answering old ones. It’s a very exciting area indeed!

            So, do you have anything to add? What do you think about these levels? Tell me in the comments below!

Video Blog: The Consequence Argument

This argument has implications on our philosophy, theology, and even hermeneutics! Check it out:

Pet Peeve Words

This brief post will be on a series of words used in theological and philosophical discussions that I think should be banished, or only used with great care. I will list the word, and then why I think it’s time for it to go. Let me know if you’d like to add any more words, and why, below in the comments!

1.     Clearly/Obviously

Example: “The Bible clearly teaches that God is in time,” or “It is obviously the case that God causes humans to will what they do.”

Why it’s a problem: If the issue is controversial, then chances are it’s not so obvious or clear. In fact, this is usually done with one of the most controversial premises in the entire discussion with the effect of overstating the case. After all, since this is so clear and obvious, why can’t you see it, debate opponent? Perhaps it’s because you’re unintelligent, or you don’t care to see it, or you’re not Spirit-led! There are definitely some things that are clear and obvious in life, and in the Scriptures, but if there’s a genuine disagreement, then it’s probably not so obvious. This can also be used to cover for a lack of in-depth knowledge about a subject. That is, when someone doesn’t really have a whole lot to say to a counter-assertion, coming back with “Well, it’s just…obvious!” is a good way to cover. Again, sometimes it really is just obvious. But look at it this way: if you want your discussion partner to believe you, then you should provide a reason.

2.     Sovereign

Example: “God is sovereign, and so no human will can ever overcome his!”

Why it’s a problem: OK, so I’m being a little dramatic in saying this term should “go.” Rather, this is where I think this term should also be used with great care. I’ve found that, typically, people have trouble articulating exactly what they think “sovereignty” means, and even more trouble with arguing for what it entails. Some use it to mean something like “God’s absolute right to rule the universe and everything therein,” while others seem to take it to be synonymous with “providence,” while others take it to mean causal determinism. Too often, it’s just a loaded theological term imposed on a text rather than drawn out from it (bonus points if “obviously” or “clearly” is used once the theological import has been done). If we aren’t careful to tell each other what we mean by our terms, we run the very real risk of talking past one another.

3.     Autonomous

Example: “Man’s attempts at proofs for God’s existence are examples of autonomous reasoning that gets him to a pagan god only.”

Why it should go: “Autonomous” means a law unto oneself, and thus the idea is that doing whatever it is autonomously is attempting to do something away from the authority or rule of God, and is ipso facto sinful. It’s basically an attempt to win inter-Christian debates by definition. After all, if even engaging in whatever discussion on whatever side you’re on is sinful, then you have no choice but to be in agreement with your discussion partner, right? Virtually nothing makes my eyes roll faster. The fact of the matter is that our rational faculties are not a result of the Fall. They have been impacted, sure, but one cannot extrapolate to a general skepticism about theological knowledge. I think, in order to be charitable, I should point out that usually people who say this are careful to preserve the Scriptures as our final rule of faith and practice. That is, if we have an idea, and we search the Scriptures, and we’re really sure the Scriptures are incompatible with the idea, then it’s the idea that should go. This process becomes very, very tricky, since none of us can come to the text without presuppositions, background knowledge, etc. Because of this difficulty, some people perceive an adversarial relationship between human reasoning processes and the text. Surely, we need the Bible as the final rule of faith and practice—but it is just not the only source of any knowledge about God, and taken literally is incoherent.[1] Anyway, people aren’t usually trying to live free of God and his law when trying to reason about him. It’s better that we all just engage in whatever discussion is being had about God, instead of judging the heart motives of the other person.

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[1] The nature of Sola Scriptura works only if we assume that humans are able to bring reasoning to bear on the text, and import that as part of the definition. If we cannot even reason about the text in order to derive its direct meaning, then we are forced to have an infallible interpreter, which none of us are, whom the Spirit acts on in revealing it specially to them. Since Protestants reject this, either Sola Scriptura is false or else it carries the idea of human reasoning with it. It’s also worth noting that God revealed himself in his act of creation prior to the Word of God, and also revealed himself specially to his creatures. Without God’s revelation, we would know nothing of him, but he has revealed himself!