Some Positions I Hold on Issues

The following is a list, in no particular order, of various positions I hold within philosophy and theology. I don’t really explain these positions as follows. I also hold these positions to varying degrees ranging from “fairly certain” all the way down to “leaning this way,” and I don’t provide any way to distinguish these degrees in this list. I encourage you to comment on some of my positions, whether you want clarifying questions (I’m happy to explain both the question and the answer) or want to know the degree to which I hold these things. I am also willing to answer questions about positions I forgot to include!

Theism: Theistic personalism

Worldview: Christianity

Human constitution: Cartesian dualism, dichotomy

Modal actualism/modal realism: Modal actualism

Omniscience: Yes, full omniscience

Providence: Molinism (middle knowledge)

Soteriology: Corporate election and individual election

Eschatology: Premillennial, pre-tribulational

Dispensational/Covenant: Progressive dispensationalism

Sign gifts: Moderate cessationalist

Science, realism/anti-realism: Realism

A priori knowledge: Yes, intuitionism

Justification: Basic foundationalism

Epistemology: Reformed epistemology, proper functionalism

Perception: Direct realism (adverbial theory)

Abstract objects: Nominalism-Divine conceptualism (tie)

Internalism/Externalism: Externalism

Natural Theology: Yes

Ontological argument: Yes, including original and modal formulations

Apologetic method: Cumulative case

Free will: Soft libertarianism

Ethics: Objective morality, deontological, divine command theory

Coherence of moral law: non-conflicting absolutism

Truth: Correspondence theory

Knowledge: warranted true belief

Time: A-theory

Bible: Inspired, inerrant

Trinity: Trinity Monotheism model of Social Trinitarianism

Impeccability/Peccability of Christ: Impeccability

Original sin/Original guilt: Original sin

Atonement: Kaleidoscope theory

Eternal security: Yes

Creation/Evolution: Creation

Genesis 6, fallen angels or godly/ungodly lines: Lines

Rahab: sin/innocence: Innocence

Logical Problem of Evil: Free will defense

Probabilistic Problem of Evil: Skeptical theism

Theodicy: Kaleidoscope theodicy approach

Substance Dualism, Life after Death, and the Intermediate State

This essay concerns my view of post-mortem survival and whether or not there is an intermediate state. Being a Christian, I do believe in post-mortem survival (as all of us do, considering the resurrection). In this essay, I provide an account and support for what I believe, and defend against a few philosophical and theological objections.

Despite the fact that all Christians believe in a post-mortem survival, many Christians disagree over the nature of that survival. I believe in a resurrected body at the end of this particular time; once Christ has returned, he does so to judge the earth. At the resurrection, a new kind of body will be given to us, as foretold by the apostle Paul in 1 Corinthians 15, and confirmed in Revelation 20:5-6. This is an embodied state, joining soul and body together in a harmony not to be divided for the rest of time; it is the final, permanent, and eternal state with God. Those who do not believe are also resurrected. However, their resurrection is not to be with God, but to be without him in conscious and everlasting punishment.

What happens when one dies? It is my view that an A-theory of time is correct. If this is so, then when one dies, one is not removed from time in any real sense. Instead, moments pass and time moves forward for all. 2 Corinthians 5:8 suggests that “To be absent from the body . . . [is] to be present with the Lord” (KJV). If this is so, then upon death, the soul is separated from the body and goes to Heaven for the intermediate state. If one is an unbeliever, then he goes to an intermediate state of punishment (cf. Luke 16, possibly). This soul just is the person, as a real existence is needed in this eternal state. If the soul is not identical to the person, then the person does not exist in the intermediate state, which seems contrary to what Paul is saying here. Further, while one may argue that consciousness takes place even if a person is not technically in existence, it seems natural to assign consciousness to personhood; there just is not the kind of self-aware consciousness natural to humans without personhood associated with it. Thus, in order for a person to be absent from the body and to be present with the Lord, the person must be, at least in principle, separable from his body, and so enters the intermediate state.

There are a number of objections that can be lodged against my position. First, one can argue that either there is no intermediate state, or else that the biblical evidence for such a state can be undercut. For example, earlier in 2 Corinthians 5, Paul seems to be stating that we would be “naked” without a body, and we will not be found that way. Another interesting point is that the chapter does not seem to be speaking about the intermediate state at all, but rather connects this absence from the body with the judgment seat of Christ (cf. v. 10). If this is so, and Paul is concerned with the eschaton, then this passage refers not to any intermediate state whatsoever.

The answer to this objection is not definitive, and yet I still believe my view can survive. Consider the chapter itself, and a careful reading of the text will show that the heavenly house referred to in v. 2 is not necessarily the resurrected body. Instead, while it may very well include this information, it seems to be fitting in with Paul’s contrast between the temporal (or temporary) and the eternal (or everlasting) coming from the end of chapter 4. If this is so, the point is to show the distinction between the two competing things. The deeds done in the body do matter, but they matter precisely because of the judgment and because of who God is (and what he has designed us to do and to be). Further, there is a not-implausible interpretation of the text that suggests judgment occurs for the believer at death (cf. Hebrews 9:27, NASB). If this is so, then the intermediate state comes for the believer at death and upon the judgment seat of Christ.

Another objection could be that one should not even believe in an intermediate state (or at least not this version of it), because hylomorphic dualism is true. In this family of objections, you either need your numerically identical body or else some body that is yours; given the lack of a resurrection and the disembodied nature of the intermediate state, “you” do not exist in Heaven at all. Thus, either the intermediate state should be abandoned, or this particular view should, in favor of a diminished or otherwise-embodied existence.

I am not sure how much it makes sense to have a diminished existence where my soul is present but not me. To illustrate: what if it were reversed, and my body was present, but not me? I can only picture a zombie-like mass, without me there. With my soul, I could see responses to basic stimuli, but again, nothing like a person without me there. The point is only to say that diminished existence seems to be nothing like personal existence at all. Second, while one could receive a loaned body, it does not seem to be indicated anywhere in Scripture; it is only required philosophically on a particular form of hylomorphism.

Philosophically and theologically, one could also object that this is a kind of Gnosticism, where one places a higher value on the soul than on the body. But this need not be the case. First, the body should be valued due to stewardship concerns. God gave us these bodies and they should be taken care of well. Second, the judgment concerns our actions, all of which are done in the body. Thus, what we do here is of eternal significance, even on this view of SD. The view that states either the body is necessary to existence or else Gnosticism follows is making an error in evaluation.

Finally, a materialist could insist that there is no intermediate state since there is no evidence that such a state obtains. One could respond that there seem to have been credible near-death experiences (NDEs), and if there is even one accurate NDE, then dualism follows. While one could not draw many conclusions from NDEs, as they contain competing religious or metaphysical claims, all of them have a baseline agreement: there is a soul, and it survives the death of the body. NDEs warrant more, and careful, discussion and consideration. I believe the SD view of post-mortem survival is an accurate one, but I am open to having my mind changed on these issues.

My Basic Position on the Nature of Man

The position I hold can best be described as Cartesian substance dualism (hereafter SD). While I do not take on everything Descartes did, I do take on the basic thesis that the “I” of personhood is identical to the “soul,” and that there are two kinds of substances, immaterial and material. In this essay, I give a brief positive argument for and account of SD, while attempting to address philosophical and theological objections against it.

            While there are arguments for a broad kind of dualism, there is at least one argument for SD specifically that I take to be successful, and this is the modal argument. Briefly, it states:

1.                    The law of identity is true: If x is identical to y, then whatever is true of x is true of y and vice versa.

2.                    I can strongly conceive of myself as existing disembodied.

3.                    If I can strongly conceive of some state of affairs S that S possibly obtains, then I have good grounds for believing that S is possible.

4.                    Therefore, I have good grounds for believing of myself that it is possible for me to exist and be disembodied.

5.                    If some entity x is such that it is possible for x to exist without y, then (i) x is not identical to y, and (ii) y is not essential to x.

6.                    My body (or brain) is not such that it is possible to exist disembodied, i.e., my body (or brain) is essentially physical.

7.                    Therefore, I have good grounds for believing of myself that I am not identical to my body (or brain) and that my physical body is not essential to me.[1]

My account of SD is that the mind affects the brain, and the brain affects the mind. The mind does so at the level of agent-causation of intentions; it is the way the mind interacts with the physical world. The brain and body do so at the level of physical ability; if the body is injured such that it cannot physically function correctly or is otherwise diminished, then the soul’s (mind’s) ability to interact with the physical world is diminished as well.

There are objections both to this argument and SD in general. First, premises (2) and (3) may come into question. Several, such as Peter van Inwagen, question whether someone’s modal intuition can be such that he strongly conceives of himself as disembodied. Perhaps he merely has a lack of awareness that such a state of affairs is impossible (whether metaphysically or otherwise); but such a lack hardly constitutes a strong conceivability, but rather a weak one. However, it does seem that we can intuit that what we are is not this body; it seems we can have a positive conception after all. We do have such strong conceptions, modally, in other areas, so even if van Inwagen does not, why can I not do so?

Another potential objection comes to (3) in that perhaps it is the case that one can strongly conceive of something, and it may not be possible. The answer is to grant that this is so; however, the argument does not need a guarantee that the state of affairs is really possible; it only needs to be reliable such that one has justificatory grounds for thinking it is possible. It seems to me that this objection does not remove such justification; analogously, knowledge does not require certainty.

The most famous objection against SD is the interaction problem, which asks proponents how it is the immaterial can interact with the material. The first response is to note that everyone, save truly reductive materialists, has this problem (this is so when brain states give rise to mental properties, for example). Thus, a failure to have a definitive answer does not necessarily count decisively against it. Second, it should not affect Christians, as all orthodox Christians believe God, an immaterial being, created and acts on the material world. Third, it may be that the interaction is direct and immediate, and thus the question of the process that intervenes between the immaterial and material is a non-starter, and hence a category mistake. Fourth, we do not usually require that we know how something works in order to know that it works. It seems this may be an unfair requirement of proponents of SD in order to be justified in holding SD. Finally, it should be acknowledged that it is not clear precisely how the interaction between the soul and body takes place. Nonetheless, in showing what appears to be a coherent account, as explained above, proponents of SD can claim that while we are unsure of how it takes place, the way in which it may interact can be coherently discussed.

There are also theological objections to SD. Consider that if SD is correct, then the body is not necessary; if this is the case, then the resurrection in the eschaton is simply an added bonus. Yet this is not how the Bible seems to portray the resurrection: in fact, in 1 Corinthians 15, the resurrected body seems to be the primary goal. It is true that SD makes the resurrection unnecessary for a human person to be a person. Yet, even on SD, one can claim the resurrection is necessary in order for a human person to be what God designed him to be: embodied. This necessity, although colloquial, is nonetheless quite important. The endgame of Christianity is that God will restore what sin has damaged; God will have the victory. This includes the spiritual (e.g., the souls of men) as well as the physical (the earthly creation and physical universe). The kind of character God has is such that he will restore our bodies, either to judgment or reward. As such, the resurrection body we will have, although not metaphysically necessary to our mere existence, ensures we will have the quality of life we were meant to have.

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[1] J. P. Moreland, The Soul: How We Know It’s Real and Why It Matters (Chicago: Moody Publishers, 2014), 125-26.

The Modal Argument for Substance Dualism: A Spirited Defense, Part 1

Introduction

Within the philosophy of mind, there are several nuanced views that can be held concerning anthropology and the constitution of man. Even within views that allow for immaterial human souls, there are widely varying positions held. Particularly contentious has been the view of substance dualism (SD), also referred to as Cartesian dualism.[1] If SD is true, then, obviously, physicalist theories of mind are false; with it, likely, goes naturalism. Thus, SD can be a valuable tool in the arsenal of the Christian philosopher. Second, traditional Christian doctrine has been such that an immaterial soul is required for the intermediate state: SD can account for this, and in a way that seems intuitive and natural for the believer. Finally, we can have comfort in the death of loved ones knowing they are with the Lord. But are there any good arguments for SD? J.P. Moreland has proposed a particular version of a modal argument for SD for consideration. It is my contention that Moreland’s modal argument for SD can be justifiably held in the face of contemporary objections. First, I state the argument formally and explain the support behind each of the premises. Then, I consider three major objections to the argument and provide responses that, while not conclusive, provide reasons to think SD might survive. Finally, I give applications that may be applied for believers and the local church.

The Argument Stated

In Moreland’s book The Soul, he offers several arguments for SD. The modal argument is a particularly interesting example in that it seems to establish strongly the conclusion of SD. This is notable since, typically, arguments that purport to establish SD in reality do little more than show that physicalism is false. While doing so is surely valuable, and leaves the door open for SD, it is also consistent with types of holistic dualism (and Moreland generally wants to do more than this). This modal argument is as follows:

1.                    The law of identity is true: If x is identical to y, then whatever is true of x is true of y and vice versa.

2.                    I can strongly conceive of myself as existing disembodied.

3.                    If I can strongly conceive of some state of affairs S that S possibly obtains, then I have good grounds for believing that S is possible.

4.                    Therefore, I have good grounds for believing of myself that it is possible for me to exist and be disembodied.

5.                    If some entity x is such that it is possible for x to exist without y, then (i) x is not identical to y, and (ii) y is not essential to x.

6.                    My body (or brain) is not such that it is possible to exist disembodied, i.e., my body (or brain) is essentially physical.

7.                    Therefore, I have good grounds for believing of myself that I am not identical to my body (or brain) and that my physical body is not essential to me.[2]

The initial premise, (1), is relatively uncontroversial—if interpreted in a very specific way. (1) is often referred to as Leibniz’ Law, named for Gottfried Leibniz. Much of the recent discussion has centered around the fact that (1) seems to preclude any idea of contingent identity.[3] Contingent identity is the idea that there may be two objects, x and y, that are identical objects despite the fact they have one or more differing contingent properties. For an example, consider Socrates. In this actual world (call it W), Socrates is, say, five-foot-four in height. However, consider a nearby world, W’, where Socrates is five-foot-five. We say that the Socrates in W is the same as (or identical to) the Socrates in W’. Yet, strictly speaking, on (1) above, this is false. This is because Socrates-in-W has a property that Socrates-in-W’ does not, namely being five-foot-four, and hence they are not identical.

There are two proposed solutions to this problem—one of which will require a slight adjustment to the wording of the premise, and the other an understanding of an underlying metaphysical concept. The first solution is to adjust the Law by accounting for worlds and times. This approach is taken by Thomas McCall. He lists his principle as follows: “For any objects x and y, if x and y are identical, then for any property P, any world W, and any time t, x has P in W at t if and only if y has P in W at t.”[4]

This solution is helpful for our Socrates problem, since the property of being five-foot-four at t in W would be had by both Socrates’, and the same thing goes for the property of being five-foot-five at t in W’. Another way to view the issue would be counterfactually: If it were the case that W were the actual world, then it would be the case that Socrates is five-foot-four.

The second solution, I think, spells out the underlying metaphysical reasoning behind the first solution. It relies on Alvin Plantinga’s theory of creaturely essences. For every concrete particular agent, such as human persons, there is an abstraction called a “creaturely essence” that contains all and only the essential properties of that essence. The creaturely essence is a set of essential properties that, for Plantinga, is itself a singular property (for Socrates, he calls it Socraeity).[5] This property has what he calls “world-indexed properties,” where such a property P is world-indexed just in case “an object x has the property having P in W in a world W* if and only if x exists in W* and W includes x’s having P.”[6] Essentially, world-indexed properties for creaturely essences accomplish the same thing as McCall’s solution, even while preserving the initial formulation of (1). This is because the properties discussed have their contingencies in the worlds in which they appear and all belong to the same creaturely essence. Either way, a relevant version of the law of identity stands, and this is crucial to Moreland’s argument.

Even more than (1), (2) will be the primary point of controversy in this modal argument for SD. For a reminder, (2) is: “I can strongly conceive of myself as existing disembodied.” This “strong” conception is needed, and not what Stewart Goetz would call “weak” conception. To weakly conceive of something is, as Goetz states, a “failure to be aware.”[7] Thus, if (2) were to be weak conceivability, it would express no more than that one does not see any reason to think he is identical to his body, or that there is nothing in his awareness such that disembodiment is impossible. Such weak conceivability will not yield the conclusion Moreland draws; hence, he employs a strong conceivability. This strong conceivability is a positive; it is the ability to be aware that one can exist disembodied.

What reasons does Moreland provide for thinking (2) really is true? First, he draws relevant analogies. We strongly conceive of ourselves in particular ways that present themselves to our reasoning all the time. For example, we know that we are not the type of thing that can be subject to gradation (we are a unified individual, and not something that can become two-thirds of a person). Similarly, I can persist through change and time, and I am not merely the collection of disparate temporal or property-divided parts.[8] If this is so, then while we do not have a knock-down argument supporting (2), we do have reason to think that we could justifiably hold (2), or that we really can conceive of how we are with respect to identity or constitution, through relevant modal intuitions.

Second, Moreland argues directly from these modal intuitions. He and William Lane Craig write, “We are aware of our own self as being distinct from our bodies and from any particular mental experience we have. We simply have a basic, direct awareness of the fact that we are not identical to our bodies . . . rather, we are the selves that have a body and a conscious mental life.”[9] This direct modal acquaintance will provide the one who has such an awareness (that he can be distinct from his body) with prima facie justification for (2).

What about (3)? For a reminder, (3) is: “If I can strongly conceive of some state of affairs S that S possibly obtains, then I have good grounds for believing that S is possible.” This seems innocuous enough. This kind of move is made all the time in discussions on possible worlds or other imaginative alternate scenarios. Although he offers it in defense of (2), Moreland makes two points that apply to (3). First, he discusses near-death experiences.[10] While often dismissed without a second thought, Moreland’s point is that if people’s experiences are even possibly true, then a disembodied existence is possible (which is enough to establish his point). Second, Moreland uses other modal conceptual scenarios to support (3), including that alien life on other planets is at least possible (because he can conceive of it).[11]

(4) is an entailed conclusion, following from (2-3). (4) is stated as follows: “I have good grounds for believing of myself that it is possible for me to exist and be disembodied.” This seems fair enough, given Moreland’s argumentation so far.

(5) is stated as a nearly self-evident truth: “If some entity x is such that it is possible for x to exist without y, then (i) x is not identical to y, and (ii) y is not essential to x.” Conclusion (i) follows from the law of identity as stated in (1), and conclusion (ii) comes from an analysis of what it means to be essential. If y is essential to x, then in no possible state of affairs does x exist without y (since that is what it means to be essential).

(6) is just a definitional premise, and should not be questioned on physicalist grounds: “My body (or brain) is not such that it is possible to exist disembodied, i.e., my body (or brain) is essentially physical.”[12]

Of course, because of everything that has come before, (7) is the final conclusion of the argument for SD: “I have good grounds for believing of myself that I am not identical to my body (or brain) and that my physical body is not essential to me.” Notice Moreland needs both sides of (7) in order to establish the truth of SD. The first part of the conjunction establishes the falsehood of physicalism, while the second does away with views that require the body as essential to the person. Can Moreland’s argument survive various objections that can be lodged against it? In the next section, I explain and examine three major objections to this modal argument.

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[1] While it is true that any form of dualism that espouses more than one substance can on this basis qualify as a type of substance dualism, this paper will refer to Cartesian dualism as SD, and other forms of substance dualism (such as Thomistic hylomorphic dualism) as “holistic dualism” or some other nuanced term.

[2] J. P. Moreland, The Soul: How We Know It’s Real and Why It Matters (Chicago: Moody Publishers, 2014), 125-26.

[3] Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egre, David Ripley, et al., “Identity, Leibniz’s Law and Non-Transitive Reasoning,” Metaphysica, Vol. 14, No. 2 (October 2013:), 253-64.

[4] Thomas H. McCall, “‘I am my Body?,’” Philosophia Christi, Vol. 17, No. 1 (November 2015:), 208.

[5] Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (New York: Clarendon Press, 1974), 71-72.

[6] Ibid., 63.

[7] Stewart Goetz, “Substance Dualism,” In Search of the Soul, Joel B. Green and Stuart L. Palmer, eds. (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2005), 44.

[8] Moreland, 127.

[9] J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2003), 238. Of course, here it can be wondered why, then, there is any argument to be made at all. Perhaps one could respond that the modal intuition that leads to (2) entails we are souls, and the argument may be needed to expose this entailment in particular cases. As such, the argument is really meant to reveal implications of already-held beliefs or modal intuitions, and so falls in-between a knowing and showing style of argumentation.

[10] Moreland, The Soul, 127.

[11] Ibid., 125.

[12] It is true the monist who is an idealist could object to this, but a number of underlying assumptions made in this dialectic is that either some kind of physicalism is true, or some kind of dualism (holistic, SD, or otherwise). Thus, while interesting and worthy of attention, this paper will not deal with idealism.