The following is a brief paper I wrote for a presentation in a moral philosophy class. Enjoy (or not!). :)
The
logical problem of evil (LPE), in contemporary analytic philosophy, has been
taken as the attempt to show that an all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good
being cannot possibly exist with instances of evil in the world. The understood
reasoning is that an all-good God would desire to eliminate all evil as far as
he can; an all-powerful God could eliminate evil altogether; and an all-knowing
God would know how to do so. Thus, if there is such a being as God, then there
would be no evil. However, there is evil. Therefore, there is no such God.
Epicurus is often taken to be the initiator of LPE (although this is possibly
misattributed). He said, “Is God willing to prevent
evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able, but not willing?
Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is
he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?”
This paper will refer to this as Epicurus’ Quadrilemma. First, the Quadrilemma
will be explained, followed by a brief discussion of the possibilities for
defeating such a Quadrilemma. Next, two solutions will be proposed. It is the
contention of this paper that Epicurus’ Quadrilemma fails to defeat the idea of
the Christian God.
As was
seemingly typical for the time, Epicurus analyzed all four logical options for
God’s willingness and ability to remove evil (God’s knowledge of how to do so
is not entertained, but included in discussions since, for the orthodox
Christian, God is all-knowing). In order to understand the Quadrilemma, we must
first admit that Epicurus was responding to perceived evil in the world. If
there was no evil, then there would be no problem to discuss. Thus, four
options present themselves: Either
God is willing but unable to prevent evil, able but not willing, both able and
willing, or neither able nor willing.
One
should consider each of these options in turn, as does Epicurus. If God is
willing and unable, then he is not omnipotent. J. L. Mackie concurs with this
assessment when he writes, “There are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can
do.”
This, many suppose, is the straightforward definition of what it means to be
omnipotent; anything less is quasi-omnipotence, at best. Mackie admits that
this option will not be an issue for those who conceive of God in non-standard
ways (such as those who are willing to divest God of omnipotence), but for the
majority of theists (and all orthodox Christians), such a move is not an
option.
The
second option Epicurus considers is that God is able to do so, but unwilling.
This, says he, means that God is malevolent. Mackie agrees, claiming that, “a
good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can.”
The third option, though concluded with a question, is just the claim that if
God were to be both willing and able to eliminate evil, then there simply would
not be evil. However, the initial postulate is that there is real evil in the
world, and thus this entails that the conjunction of God’s being both willing
and able to eliminate evil is false. Finally, if God is neither able nor
willing, then he is not worthy to be called God.
There
are three major ways that someone can defeat a proposed dilemma (regardless of
the number of options presented). First, one may show other options than those
presented. So, if the Quadrilemma gives the Christian four paths to take, this
would involve showing there is a fifth option. This does not seem to be
available, since Epicurus exhausts the logical possibilities. Second, one can
show that the consequences do not follow. So, for example, this would mean
showing that if God were both willing and able to prevent evil, that evil could
still be around. Finally, one can “bite the bullet” and accept that the
proposed paths do show the
consequences they claim, but that such consequences are not absurd or otherwise
undesirable after all. This last option does not seem to be available to
Christians either, since none of these conceptions of God (or of evil’s
non-existence) are adequate for Christianity. Thus, if the Christian is to
overcome the Quadrilemma, it is to the second way he must look.
There
are actually two ways to go about this kind of a solution; first, from the
standpoint that God is willing but unable to prevent evil given certain other
facts, and second, from the standpoint that God is both able and willing to
prevent evil, but that certain other facts interfere. If either of these
solutions is even possible, then the LPE fails.
While
Epicurus devoted equal writing time in his brief formulation of the LPE to each
side, he nonetheless focuses on the idea of omnipotence. This is because the
power to control was the key to providence. If this was not compatible with
evil, then it showed, for Epicurus, that whether or not such a being as a God
existed, he would not be provident in the affairs of men.
The first possible solution is to attack
the premise that, “If God is willing and unable, then he is not omnipotent.”
This is because God is willing that there be no evil, but given libertarian
freedom, this places only a logical limit on God’s power, and thus omnipotence
is preserved. Most philosophers, atheist, theist, and otherwise, accept that
God’s omnipotence does not entail the ability to do the logically impossible,
inasmuch as these are not activities to be done. Therefore, if it were to turn
out that, given some other fact, God would not be able to eliminate evil by
logic, it would not count against his omnipotence.
Alvin Plantinga suggests that there are
some good states of affairs that God cannot bring about without thereby
allowing for evil. He takes man’s having libertarian freedom of the will to be
one of these states of affairs. He claims, “If a person is free with respect to
a given action, then he is free to perform that action and free to refrain from
performing it.” If this is the case, then
God is both willing that evil should not be (given that he is all-good) and
also willing that man should have such libertarian freedom. However, this
freedom, by definition, means God cannot guarantee that free creatures will
always go right; given their freedom to refrain from performing good actions
(and thus also to perform evil ones). Therefore, there is a very real sense in
which God is willing that evil should not exist, and unable to prevent it,
given the fact of libertarian freedom.
However, it may be objected, per Mackie,
that God could simply have created beings who always freely choose the right.
That is to say, if God is able to create such beings and willing to do so,
there should not be any evil. This leads to the second possible solution to the
Quadrilemma: God is both able and willing to prevent evil (since he could force man to act a certain way), but
there is evil because he is also willing to allow man libertarian freedom, and
this accounts for God and evil. This may sound like the same solution as
before, but there are two major differences. First, this is being applied to
another horn of the Quadrilemma: the one that assumes God is both willing and
able to prevent evil. Second, it will introduce another facet of Plantinga’s
thought.
His idea of transworld depravity (TWD) is
crucial to understanding the solution. TWD depends on counterfactuals of
creaturely freedom (CCFs). The idea is that there are truths about what any
free creature would do in any set of
circumstances. Plantinga’s example is that if Curley were offered a bribe for
$20,000, he either would or would not take it.
Suppose that Curley would not have taken such a bribe, but that in the exact
same set of circumstances, he would have accepted the bribe at $35,000. This
means that such a world containing the exact same set of circumstances as the
$35,000 bribe where Curley freely accepts the $20,000 bribe is not feasible for
God, by simple logic. God could force Curley to do it, but he could not force
Curley to do it freely.
Plantinga’s argument is that it is at
least possible, for all we know, that the relevant CCFs are such that for every
libertarianly free creature (who is non-divine and enjoys morally significant
freedom), they would ultimately go wrong with respect to at least one action in
every feasible world in which they are instantiated. If this malady (TWD)
affects Curley, then Plantinga concludes, “Every world that God can actualize
is such that if Curley is significantly free in it, he takes at least one wrong
action.”
This is where Plantinga tightens the
rope. After establishing this basic case, he refers to the possibility that,
for all we know, every “creaturely essence” is afflicted with TWD.
That is, left to themselves, human free creatures will always ultimately go
wrong at least once. If this is the case, then, while God is willing that evil
be prevented, and is able to do so (say, by causing
or forcing man not to go wrong),
given libertarian freedom and complete TWD, Mackie’s claim that it is feasible
for God to instantiate free creatures who only and always do the good is
possibly false. This conclusion may seem weak, but it is important to remember
the LPE is purporting that the existence of God is logically impossible to
square with evil, and Epicurus’ Quadrilemma is purporting to discuss all of the
relevant logical facts and consequences. If these two solutions are even
possible, then the Quadrilemma’s consequences are avoided.
In order to understand where Epicurus
went wrong, one must understand his underlying moral philosophy. A complete
undertaking of that is out of the scope of this paper. However, it should
suffice to note that, for Epicurus, the most important thing in life was
pleasure. He had a nuanced approach that was more than basic hedonism. By
focusing on the life of the mind, the end goal of Epicurus was to lead people
to “a transformative experience that altered one’s daily life and led to
genuine satisfaction and happiness.”
But this was Epicurus’ mistake: his entire Quadrilemma and preceding philosophy
presupposes that the point of man’s existence is his own happiness.
William Lane Craig disputes this philosophy entirely. In
commenting on the modern objections to evil and suffering in the world, he
writes,
One
reason that the problem of evil seems so puzzling is that we tend to think that
if God exists, then His goal for human life is happiness in this world. God’s
role is to provide [a] comfortable environment for His human pets. But on the
Christian view this is false. We are not God’s pets, and man’s end is not
happiness in this world, but the knowledge of God, which will ultimately bring
true and everlasting human fulfillment. Many evils occur in life which maybe [sic]
utterly pointless with respect to the goal of producing human happiness in this
world, but they may not be unjustified with respect to producing the knowledge
of God.
Thus,
there is a great good to be had in creating free creatures capable of entering
into love relationships with God. While there may be other versions of the
problem of evil, LPE as applied by Epicurus’ Quadrilemma fails. This is because
God may be willing to eliminate evil, but given his instantiation of free
creatures, such a thing is not feasible, nor does it count against his
omnipotence due to logical concerns. It may also be that God is able and
willing (given he could force creatures never to do evil), but that given the
point of free creatures existing and the possibility of TWD affecting all
non-divine beings, evil nonetheless exists, as solely the fault of mankind.