When I want to
view a critique of Molinism and give it a critique itself, it’s often very
difficult for me not to analyze and critique the entire piece, bit-by-bit.
However, for this
particular piece about rejecting Molinism, I will try to restrain myself. I
hope this critique comes off as loving a fellow brother, and not too
adversarial.
While there are
a couple of questionable statements/claims made in the first paragraph, I will
move on to his actual discussion on Molinism. He lays out the three logical
moments, but I can’t help but notice his discussion on natural knowledge is
incorrect. He writes of the content of natural knowledge: “facts that are
simply true, like 2+2=4.” But this is not quite right. They’re not “simply”
true: they’re necessarily true. It’s
also vitally important to note that two of the three logical moments are
utilized by every scholarly faction from the Aquinas-era onward (natural and
free) and are largely non-controversial. It was only middle knowledge that
served a controversy. Thus, in rejecting natural knowledge (if that crops up
again) one is only rejecting Molinism insofar as one is rejecting, well,
virtually everyone but William of Ockham.
Another potential
issue—and this is one that many lay-Molinists have not done a good job on—is
that there isn’t, at this juncture, any discussion on why it is called “natural
knowledge.” It’s called natural knowledge because it relates to what is known
in God’s nature itself. Many theologians and most Molinists take this to mean
that God’s nature is the ground of or is the content of these truths (which
include truths of objective moral values, mathematical truths, and other
necessary truths, including all possibilities, since whatever is possible is necessarily possible). This may become
vitally important later on.
He then lists
middle knowledge and says a discussion shall be had on it later, and does not
offer anything on free knowledge at this point. While giving a slightly
malformed first definition of middle knowledge, he does get the second one
right by discussing God’s knowledge of what anyone would do if they were placed
into a set of circumstances. There is, however, a bit of ambiguity in his initial summary statement. “And God
didn’t get to decide these things.” Which things? The truth-values of
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (hereafter CCFs)? The Molinist will
agree. Whether or not a world obtains where some specific CCFs come into play?
The Molinist will disagree. It is up to God which world is actual.
In his first passing
critique of Molinism, he overstates his case a bit. I think this is plausibly
more due to careless wording than an actual implication he was trying to make.
He said that if one gives forth “enough mental effort,” then one will see
Molinism is self-contradictory. But that’s plainly false: plenty of people have
put in vast amounts of mental effort, and they’re not lacking in intellectual
ability. So the best of what he could mean is that some people believe Molinism
is self-contradictory, and he offers no reasons why.
It turns out
that the natural knowledge critique comes back after all, when the author
insists that there are facts that are “simply true” and God has nothing to do
with them. But we’ve already seen that’s just a misunderstanding of Molinism,
probably due to unfamiliarity with more academic sources. However, another
problem that plagues this critique is that it seems to import notions into
theological terms that many Christians may not agree with. For example, by
“coming from God,” and “sovereignty,” he seems to mean something like “God’s
will.” Thus, if there are things that are not up to God’s will, then it is
outside of his sovereignty, and thus is denying God’s sovereignty. If this is
not what is meant, it’s just not clear what the critique is supposed to be.
However, this is
a misunderstanding of his own tradition (assuming he is either Calvinist or
otherwise Reformed), as well as most Christian thought. Christians have not
generally supposed, nor argued, that God should do the logically impossible;
that is, logical “limits” have not traditionally actually been considered
limits. In fact, as was mentioned, if God’s nature is identified with logic,
it’s just consistent with the Biblical witness: it explains why God cannot lie,
why he cannot deny himself, etc. If one wants to say God could create his own
nature, we’ll be talking gibberish before the end of the first paragraph (since
in order to create his own nature, he must first have the ability to create his
own nature, which property will itself be part of his own nature). So it is, I
take it, almost obvious that logical “limits” are really just God being who he
is, and none other.
Now let’s apply
this to discussions on CCFs. Who actually gives man libertarian freedom, on
Molinism? God did. He sovereignly chose to give man his freedom. Why can God
not do that, again? Next, we must consider the truths of CCFs. Consider worlds
W and W-1, where Randy exists in a particular set of circumstances in both. Now
it is either true or false that, if Randy were in those circumstances, then he
would either freely do X or not do X. Suppose that Randy would not freely do X
in W-1, and further suppose God wants Randy to do X in precisely those exact
same set of circumstances. Well, God could force Randy to do X in exactly those
circumstances. Or he could allow Randy to act freely, and Randy won’t do it (or
he could alter the circumstances if relevant CCFs are true such that he could
accomplish the goal of Randy doing X, but that’s not germane to this particular
point). But notice what logic tells us cannot be the case: God cannot both
bring about that exact set of circumstances and
have Randy act freely and get world W. What he will get is—again, by
logic—world W-1. This is huge, for it is clear there is no non-logical limit,
and thus is just an expression of who God is, not a factor against him.
His next
critique is that Molinism’s discussion of soteriology (which is really just
William Lane Craig appropriating Molinism, but whatever) is impossible to reconcile with Isaiah
46:9-10, which states that God is declaring the end from the beginning. But why
does he say this? He says the Bible does not portray God as knowing things.
Surely he is mistaken here. However, I think we can be more charitable on a
second glance: he probably means God is not portrayed as merely knowing, or being completely passive in the events of the
world. And a Molinist can easily agree. Remember free knowledge? It’s knowledge
of how God has ordered the world, based on his free choice (hence the name).
Truths of natural and middle knowledge help inform what worlds are feasibly
instantiated, and God freely chooses the world. But what is this world? Well,
it’s a maximal set of circumstances: or, in other words, it declares, from the beginning
to the end, precisely what will be the case. It is God’s purposing that every
proposition in such a world be true, and will come to pass. And the Molinist
can easily say “this is what Molinism teaches.” So what’s supposed to be the
problem? He doesn’t say, and while I have my speculations on what philosophical
ideas he has likely imported into his hermeneutic, I figure I’ll remain silent
for now.
Another critique
I have, and I hope he takes this well, is that he uses rhetoric that is not
claimed by the Molinist. For example, he suggests Molinists believe God is “not
up to snuff,” but no Molinist thinks that. Now an anti-Molinist may think that,
because it denies God’s sovereignty, but this is precisely the point they are
supposed to be proving by making this statement. Thus, it serves as a piece of
rhetoric only.
In his second
major critique, he claims Molinism views God and man as “autonomous” (able to
make unconstrained choices). This, however, is wholly inconsistent with his
earlier discussion that Molinism teaches that God is constrained. So which one
is it? Will he abandon his earlier critique, or this one? Surely, if Molinists
think that God is constrained, then so much the more for man. What he might
mean, however, is “uncaused” choices. He then claims, however, that salvation
is thereby “reduced” to a person’s response. But this conclusion doesn’t follow
from any of the premises; there’s just no reduction. Why would it follow from
libertarian freedom that salvation doesn’t entail Christ’s atoning work on the
cross, or prevenient grace, or corporate or individual election, etc.? He doesn’t
say.
However, there
is another interpretation: he just meant that the idea of man having faith unto
salvation is actually God having faith for them. He cites Ephesians 2:8, but he
has an implicit understanding of that verse that is highly controversial, to
say the least. Essentially, when it says “this is not of yourselves,” he is
taking it to mean the faith of the person is not of yourselves. Many see “this”
as referring to “saved;” this being saved
is not of yourselves. Interestingly, he did not quote verse 9, which says “not
of works, lest any man should boast.” This is interesting because everywhere,
when the New Testament refers to justifying, converting faith, it contrasts it
with works (James is not an exception—see how he is understanding “justified”).
Thus, it is the issue of salvation and grace that fits the context. Thus, if
faith is not a work, and we are exhorted to have justifying faith (numerous
examples abound), then it is a purely theological import into the text to argue
that faith must be from God.
His remark about
God’s success with respect to those he wants to have saved is truly odd in
light of the verse he chose. Philippians 1:6 only refers to believers, not unbelievers, and so has
no application to God’s “success” rate with respect to those for whom Christ
died. It’s an interesting term, “success.” He doesn’t really delve much into
it; I suspect the term has more rhetorical use than substance.
The final
prooftext is of the true fallacious variety. That is, it just quotes the verse
and runs away. Without delving into it, since he didn’t, it’s worth noting that
there are several exegeses of Romans 9 that do not agree with whatever
conclusion he’s offering. It’s also worth noting one can say that the idea that
people do not choose Hell contradicts Romans 9 itself: verses 31-32, which do
say someone is condemned due to their rejection of faith.
The last
critique is both rehashed and misguided. First, it is rehashed because it goes
back to the discussion on God doing all he pleases. The idea is that if
Molinists say God would like all to be saved, but can’t, then this contradicts
Scripture. But this tends to treat words like “purpose, will, desire, please”
as all perfectly synonymous, and that’s biblically dubious and philosophically
flatly false. Take “God does all he pleases.” Why is this inconsistent with
Molinism? By definition, God chose to instantiate this world over others, and
other none at all. By definition, he is doing what he has pleased to do. It by
no means follows that God is pleased by every event: that is biblically false
(see where God is angry with sinners many, many times—he’s not pleased by their
acts). So what’s supposed to be the problem?
Next, the
critique is misguided, because he claims Molinists think there’s no purpose
behind evil. Why he says this is mind-boggling. The only thing I can think of
is that he thinks God has no control over whatever world comes to pass or
something. But a simple reading of William Lane Craig and most Molinists will
show that they do think God has purposes for allowing evil. So, why think that
Molinists think God has no purpose in allowing evil?
I know this was
a long critique, but the examples of the confusion surrounding Molinism abound.
My personal belief is that it stems from a lack of theological and
philosophical education, and is borne on the wings of the Internet. May God
have mercy on us all! ;)