Review of Craig-Wielenberg Debate on Morality

There was a debate held tonight at N.C. State University in Raleigh, NC, between Christian philosopher William Lane Craig and Eric Wielenberg, an academic philosopher at DePaul (not 100% sure about which school). The debate format featured an opening, two responses, and a closing, followed by a Q-and-A. Two responses felt like a bit much, as the participants ended up repeating each other somewhat. The question was something like: What is the most plausible foundation for objective moral values and duties? Craig offered the theistic solution, while Wielenberg argued for what he called “godless normative realism.” What follows is my scattered and only slightly cleaned-up notes, plus some concluding evaluation.

Craig opening: Godless normative realism is just Moral Platonism (akin to mathematical Platonism); conceptual reality for most, but Platonists must say there are real abstract objects. When the right physical situations occur, these abstract objects supervene on the situations. What this means is that moral duties are superveniences on physical objects and situations. What Wielenberg needs is a rationally compelling argument against the presumption against Platonism (or a knockdown argument for Platonism). No rationally compelling arguments against the presumption against Platonism exist. Theists do not face such a problem, since God is a concrete, not abstract, object. Supervenience account seems unintelligible. Wielenberg claims physical objects cause the abstract objects to supervene on physical situations; Craig says this is super-duper-venience (utterly mysterious). How can this happen? Wielenberg appeals to theistic causation as an example; this won’t work due to the difference of concrete objects, as listed above. Another problem is as-follows: What if these physical objects pick out some other abstract object instead of the right one? Some are only contingently caused. That is, what if the physical object, when one is a brain-state like love, picks out the abstract object of the square root of 4? What accounts for the correct physical-abstract pairing? Wielenberg appeals to divine concurrence as an example.. This fails due to God’s being a personal agent. Wielenberg does not have agency here. He postulates decisive moral reasons for acting constitutes obligations. However, this eliminates supererogation (moral heroes going above and beyond the call of duty). This also is only for instrumental actions (or conditional obligation, “If you want to act morally, then do this”). In other words, godless normative realism can only get you that such-and-such is moral and that if you want tobe moral, do such-and-such; it cannot get you the further fact that you ought to do such-and-such. This view also subverts moral duties by undermining freedom of the will, according to Craig. Mental supervenes on the physical; you are a machine; machines are not obligated to do anything. There is no enduring self. Thus no one can be held accountable for particular acts. Moral knowledge is also impossible, due to Plantinga’s EAAN. The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, in brief, states that if naturalism and evolution were true, then our cognitive faculties are aimed at survival, not necessarily truth. If this is the case, then, probably, we have a defeater for every belief we hold (this is because, for all we would know, our entire belief set is held for survival purposes only, and only incidentally gets at the truth rarely, if at all. But if you have a defeater for every belief, then you have a defeater for evolutionary naturalism. This also applies to knowledge from evolutionary naturalism about morality!

Wielenberg opening: He gives a story about a suffering child and one’s obligation to save them. He claims that moral features of things are fundamental features of reality. Craig’s view has all the same problems as his does, so why should these problems count against Wielenberg? First, the causal connection problem attends to theistic causal views. Second, what explains why there is a necessary connection between an act commanded by God and an obligation to do that thing? Third, how to the possible worlds know how to generate God? Fourth, dualism posits things not accounted for in physics. Fifth, no argument by Craig for no self. Sixth, it could be that mental states and physical states are identical and thus accounted for. Seventh, physical and immaterial interactions are also problematic. Eighth, as to moral supererogation, Christianity has the same problem (e.g., love one another). His view can be tweaked by having exclusionary permission. This is the view that there is value in performing our own goals for our lives (if they are moral); in these cases, acting on moral reasons anyway is supererogatory. It is implausible that God’s commands are what constitute moral obligations, since we can just see that someone in need ought to be helped, for example. Next, people must be aware of the commands and of the authority of the one giving the commandment. Craig’s view makes moral obligations inexplicable.

Craig response: Frames the issues of Wielenberg’s responses to Craig: 1. Craig’s view arbitrarily singles out divine commands: Craig denies this; there can be multiple sources, but commands are the highest in the order. God issues general commands to all of humanity; in any specific situation it is up to us to apply that general principle. 2. Craig’s view implies non-believers have no obligations since they are not aware. On Christianity, God has written the law on their hearts, so that they do have such obligations. 3. Craig’s view makes morally wrong acts inexplicable, since God commands them to do what he knows they won’t do. Didn’t catch fully his response here. No powerful objections by Wielenberg to first contention. Second: So’s-your-old-man response. The alleged problem with the view of Wielenberg is unresolved. Second, if opponent can show any relevant difference, then the strategy collapses. Next, even given moral Platonism, there are still formidable objections: first, the account of supervenience seems unintelligible; Wielenberg says it is also obscure how non-physical entities can be causally connected to physical entities. It’s not as obscure though! We have experience of our own causal connection, even if we don’t know how it works. Craig can’t know why God’s commanding gives us a powerful reason to do it, Wielenberg claims. Theists are not naturalists, so this is not relevant. After all, on Wielenberg’s view, obtaining reasons that direct one to a moral action is the naturalistic one. Craig responds that possible worlds do not instantiate God, so something of a category error has been committed. Supererogation: the tweak contradicts his own view; it is no longer godless natural realism accounting for morality, but this new principle. Freedom of the will: reductionism has been largely rejected by philosophers of mind. Moral knowledge is impossible: EAAN: needs to be addressed.

Wielenberg’s response: Craig’s view needs to make sense of morality as well or better than Wielenberg’s view, and it’s not clear he has. So the tu quoque is relevant, says Wielenberg. He doubles down on lack of theory being the equalizer. Great-making properties: how do these actually cause God to be great? Mental states are not brain states according to Craig. Wielenberg claims this is inaccurate; that philosophers of mind don’t reject the view as Craig says. We don’t know how souls can possess agency, so there’s no special problem for Wielenberg. EAAN: unguided evolution has made rational creatures, so EAAN is doubtful. Be perfect is a Christian obligation to show there is no supererogation. As for Craig’s intuitive remarks, psychopaths refute this. Wielenberg discusses, basically, Molinism. Craig’s idea: I deserve punishment, so God commands me to help; if I can be punished, then command is not needed; if command is violated, then that can’t be a reason for the command (deserving of punishment). The million Holocausts objection to God’s presence needed: if you could lift a finger and prevent a million Holocausts, it is evident, morally, you should do it, even if you receive no command.

Craig’s second: Craig’s view is arbitrary; we do experience duties, but this doesn’t reveal to us the ultimate source. Psychopaths: if they don’t know the difference for real, they are not culpable. Craig did not say by issuing commands God is able to hold those who do wrong responsible; rather, able to those who do evil acts, so no circularity. A problem with Wielenberg’s account is the kind of causal connection, not primarily how it works. Great-making properties: this is a misconceived objection, same as possible worlds, since great-making properties are just things it’s better for a perfect being to have than to lack, not things that “generate” God. “Christianity has no supererogation”: perfect obedience does not entail there are no supererogatory acts. Freedom of the will: mental states and brain states have different properties, meaning mental states are not reducible. Mental states cannot cause anything not already determined by brain states. Causal agency is necessary for free will. Physical states do not have brain states. Wielenberg denies initial premise of EAAN. This is question-begging.

Wielenberg second: Craig’s great-making God must just be so, which is a tu quoque. Supererogation: Craig didn’t address this. Craig’s phil of mind claims are controversial. Craig appealed to Plantinga’s EAAN, which solves nothing. Consider that the lighter is reliable. In the same way, unguided evolution produces mostly true beliefs. The million Holocausts objection again. Craig says an order is needed. Reiterating evil act circularity objection. Psychopaths objection pressed again. Combined with Craig’s evil/wrong distinction, so that psychopaths should be punished, but if they don’t perceive the wrong, they shouldn’t be.

Craig closing: First, theism provides sound foundation of objective moral values (God as concrete object). Second, it provides for objective moral duties. Objections have been morphing throughout, not consistent. Several powerful objections to godless normative realism. Correction on EAAN.

Wielenberg closing: Million Holocausts again. Craig’s view predicts no morally wrong actions. Now introduces pointless evil; evildoing merits punishment. Psychopaths are plausible exceptions to what Craig says, which means they don’t have obligations; however they are evildoers; Craig’s view requires that psychopaths then do have moral obligations.

Evaluation: I will try to keep this brief. I thought Wielenberg did well; better, in fact, than the average Craig opponent. However, I thought his criticisms of Craig were more often than not based on misunderstandings, and what was perhaps his best critique of Craig wasn’t fully articulated until the closing statement, which was unfortunate. Craig seemed to get the best of Wielenberg several times—especially with respect to the EAAN. I will say, before going back to earlier points in the debate, Wielenberg’s handling of the EAAN was his poorest aspect. In response to the EAAN, Wielenberg claims we can just look around at the kind of things naturalism has produced, to see if they have regularly true beliefs. This is both question-begging and circular! Question-begging because he assumes naturalism is true—which is the very thing under question! The whole point of the EAAN is to figure out if it’s true—you can’t very well respond to an argument for its falsehood by saying, “Well, since naturalism is true, we know that evolution and naturalism do yield true beliefs on a good enough scale!” It’s circular because it turns out that one would have to be using his cognitive faculties to know that the cognitive faculties around him were functioning toward truth, in general.

It seems to me Craig was pretty right on in his critique of Wielenberg’s account. Additionally, he did fairly well against Wielenberg’s critiques. I wanted to address a couple. First, Wielenberg didn’t seem to appreciate fully the distinction between objective moral values and duties. If you do evil (value), you should be punished. But God’s commands constitute your duties, so God gives a command (duty). Thus, evildoers are punished. But what about non-believers? These people do not recognize God’s authority and do not know about God’s commands. Craig’s intended meaning becomes clear: he means normally functioning people do receive God’s commands in the form of general moral knowledge on the heart. So what about psychopaths?

The psychopath objection ultimately was Wielenberg’s best, in my opinion. Eventually, the idea is this: Craig says that evildoers have commands by God that give them an obligation that they flout—otherwise, they would get away with murder. Psychopaths do evil, so on Craig’s view, they get a command and now have an obligation not to do it. But, plausibly, psychopaths do not know the difference between right and wrong and so, on Craig’s view, do not have an obligation. So now psychopaths both do and do not have an obligation, and anything that generates a contradiction is absurd.

The answer to this for Craig came out in the Q-and-A: Craig means this as a normally functioning thing. He doesn’t mean this for the mentally disabled, or infants, or psychopaths (if indeed they truly do not perceive right and wrong at all). Thus they simply have no moral obligation, and no contradiction is generated.

As for the “Million Holocaust” objection, I think this is answered by asking a single question. Recall the objection is that if you could stop a million Holocausts by raising a single finger, you would have an obligation to do so, even in the absence of a command by God. Since God’s commands are what constitute moral obligation, there must be something wrong with Craig’s view.

It seems to me the answer is clear: ask the question, “Why?” Why is it we would be obligated to help? Suppose Wielenberg answers, “Because if you can help prevent people from dying then, all things being equal, you should,” then Craig can plausibly claim this just is what is meant by general commands from God. Preserve life. Love people. These two general commands clearly find application here.

What about, finally, Wielenberg’s claim that in order to be obligated by an authority one must recognize that authority? Craig quite accurately pointed out this isn’t true. He appealed to an example by Matt Flannagan that I will paraphrase loosely here: suppose you are walking along a large farm and come to a gate. This gate is closed, and has a sign that says “No admittance. Violators will be punished.” You don’t know who placed the sign, but you are aware that there is a rule and there is a rule-giver, and this is plausibly enough to place an obligation on you not to enter (it would be disingenuous to enter on the grounds that you weren’t familiar with the authority who wrote it, and so didn’t find the sign to be conveying obligatory acts). The same goes for morality.

In the final analysis, I found Wielenberg to be a nice guy who has some interesting thoughts, and he did better than your average Craig opponent. With the exception of the EAAN (where he appeared to be dealing with it for the first time, at places), he appeared to be familiar with Craig’s arguments and responses. However, Craig countered almost every single objection, and provided devastating (I think) objections of his own. He further shared the Gospel message in the Q-and-A portion! I enjoyed it, and I hope others did, too!

A Simple Test for Atheists

I was thinking this morning about a single question for people who announce they are atheists with four possible responses. This is not a trap question, but it could be an interesting and non-threatening way to start a dialogue. The question would go something like this:

On a scale of 1-4, how confident are you that there is no God?

By “God,” we mean the God of perfect being theology.[1] The responses would look something like this:

1.     Not confident, but there is enough evidence against God to justify my unbelief.

2.     Somewhat confident; there is enough evidence to justify my unbelief and to make theists seriously consider giving up belief in God, too.

3.     Very confident; there is enough evidence such that everyone lacks justification for belief in God.

4.     Extremely confident; near certainty; there is enough evidence such that it is irrational to hold belief in God.

Assuming the atheist answers honestly, you now have a starting point to question them. Too often, the theist (and Christian) is instantly put on the defensive. Instead of that, this helps atheists to see they are making some kind of claim, and a burden of proof rests upon them to show why others should agree with them. There is also an interesting psychology that can go along with this. For example, while (4) has the biggest payoff (you get to say all believers are irrational!), it also has the largest burden (just consider: (4) as a position is invalidated just in case there is not enough evidence such that every last theist in the entire world is irrational for being a theist!). On the other end of the scale, while (1) has the smallest payoff (you can’t even guarantee that any theists are even so much as slightly unjustified in being so), it also shoulders a relatively small burden of proof—and even places one on the theist who insists that the atheist is not justified.

(2) is also a fairly moderate claim. It doesn’t even claim that theists are unjustified; simply that the evidence for atheism is strong enough to warrant a serious look, and of course that it warrants the justification of belief in atheism by the unbeliever. (3) is interesting, for it is a strong claim without being the kind of claim that (4) is. Well, it actually depends: some people tend not to make any kind of distinction between justification and rationality; if there is no such distinction, then (3) collapses into (4). What do you guys think?

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[1] While I am a Christian, and this is the most important thing about me, I’m interested in discovering if the atheist has ruled out the type of being we would call God, full stop, or if hers is mainly a complaint about Christianity or other major world religions.

Showing the Cost of Philosophical Views

In philosophical apologetics, the aim is often either to defend Christianity from objections or else construct arguments either for Christianity’s truth or for the falsehood of other worldviews. These are worthy goals—goals which I attempt to do from time to time on this blog. However, we often find ourselves unable to push (or to be pushed) past a certain point; at some point, our interlocutors are simply unwilling to accept our premises, or instead are willing to face the consequences of the views they hold. Why is this?

Instead of examining psychological factors, I plan to discuss one of the purposes of philosophy and accepting a particular position. Philosophy is about evaluating the various options on a given problem or question and seeing what problems are present. There are, inevitably, problems that arise with any philosophical position of any real consequence or involved in any controversy. Philosophy is about finding your favorite set of problems. That is, philosophy is about being able to live with some set of problems over another.

This leads to an interesting corollary: philosophy that attempts to critique a view also should not be primarily about proving, beyond any reasonable doubt, that you are correct and the other person’s view is wrong. Instead, it should be about setting the cost that one must pay in order to accept a view.

Here is an example: if God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist. That is to say, if there is no God, then we have no objective moral obligations. We may have things we like and don’t like, and we may have things society likes and doesn’t like, but in the end, nothing is really right or wrong. Now an atheist may shrug his shoulders and simply say, “Well, that’s why I say nothing is really wrong.” You may not convince him to believe in God, but you’ve shown the cost of accepting his view: it is not wrong to kill babies for fun, or to beat one’s spouse or significant other, or taunt someone for being different, etc.

And in philosophy, showing the costs and being willing to live with problems can be some of the best and most powerful tools in the apologist’s arsenal.

New Apologetics Class!

Trinity Baptist College students, are you looking for an elective credit online course this summer? The Intro to Apologetics class might be for you! It’s eight weeks, online, and involves watching brief lectures, discussion forums, reading, and a couple of writing assignments. The assignments and videos are all designed to help you understand how to defend the faith, and offer positive arguments both for God’s existence and Christianity as a whole.

We are also going to look at various ways the Christian can do apologetics, and practical ways you can engage in culture and the public square. The class starts May 9^th, so you’ll want to act fast!

There may be a possibility of auditing the course as well, even if you are not currently a TBC student. For that possibility, you’ll want to check with academicoffice@tbc.edu. TBC’s website can be found at http://www.tbc.edu. I look forward to seeing you there!

The Reductionist Worldview

Our culture is often a reductionistic one. That is, our culture is what I like to call a “nothing-but” culture. Marriage is nothing-but a legal contract; gender is nothing-but a social construct; sexual behavior is nothing-but legal constraints and social taboos; beauty is nothing-but superficiality; life is nothing-but aimless wandering and contrived purpose, and on and on it goes ad nauseam.

What has been the result of this purpose? The principle that has taken over is that life is for whatever brings the most pleasure to us. For some, this means a fully hedonistic lifestyle. For others, this means attempting philanthropy to feel better. For others still, this involves paralysis and despair (e.g., the existentialists). Finally, for some, this means bringing much pain and suffering to others.

In all cases, the principle behind it is the same: life is purposeless, senseless, meaningless, vacuous, valueless, hopeless, and cold. Make of it what you can. My duty today is not to tell you that such a principle always works itself out pragmatically in the way of Hitler. In fact, I’ve taken pains above to show even some ways where the behavior at least seems to be quite positive.

My main point is two-fold: first, such selfish or hateful actions are allowed by such a principled worldview. Second, it is desirable that such a worldview be false. A worldview answers at least four major kinds of questions:

1.     Metaphysics—What kinds of things exist?

2.     Epistemology—What can we know?

3.     Axiology/Aesthetics—What is the good, and the beautiful?

4.     Teleology—What is the purpose or meaning of life?

The nothing-but worldview that allows for suffering and despair as completely normal very nearly strikes most of us as absurd. We instinctively recognize that such despair and dysfunction ought not to be. But if it ought not to be, then the nothing-but worldview is false. Perhaps we cannot show it is false (we certainly have not shown it, as of yet); but at the very least, we have suggested it is desirable that it is. And that, my friends, should make you pause.