Mailbag: The Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Kalam

Today’s question is from Jon!

Jon writes: “Hi Randy,


I have a question I hope you could help me with regarding the first premise of the kalam argument. In his typical defense of the argument William Lane Craig often argues that if one denies the first premise and believes that the universe actually came in to being out of nothing, then it becomes inexplicable as to why anything and everything does not come in to being in this way.

It seems to me that Dr. Craig's argument rests on the assumption of Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason (PSR), that “no fact can be real or existent, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise” because we are asking what is the sufficient reason as to why only the universe came in to being from nothing. My question is the following: How can Dr. Craig consistently argue the point given that he doesn't accept Leibniz's own version of the PSR?

God bless,

Jon”

Randy responds:

Hi Jon,

This is an interesting question! It seems to me that, at worst, it turns out the causal principle behind the kalam entails the strong version of the PSR, but it is not itself the reason for affirming it. One must look at Craig's reasons for affirming "Whatever begins to exist had a cause." (It's also worth noting his current formulation is "if the universe began to exist, then it had a transcendent cause.")

Craig often argues that, first, "It is based on the metaphysical intuition that something cannot come out of nothing. Hence, any argument for the principle is apt to be less obvious than the principle itself," which is metaphysical intuition. The second reason is that it would be inexplicable why it is not the case that just anything and everything comes into being uncaused. Thus, we see two reasons that are not themselves just identical to Leibniz's PSR; metaphysical intuition of being ("out of nothing, nothing comes") and "the way of negation" objection of observation of things not popping into being uncaused (as far as we know).

Now, you're certainly right that some kind of PSR is in use or otherwise entailed, but it's not quite Leibniz's version. The version Leibniz used extended even to statements and propositions, whereas Craig has a more modest PSR that claims that "anything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or an external cause." This focus on existence works with propositions, even if they do exist, because their mere existence does not dictate their truth value, nor in virtue of what they are true.

The causal principle in the kalam, I think you can see, only addresses existence, and not the conditions for truth-value of propositions.

So, in short, I think Craig's reasons for affirming the causal premise are slightly different, and the PSR to which he is committed by the kalam is not identical to Leibniz's. Hope this helps! 

For more, I recommend checking out what Craig says on the PSR and on the kalam to clear it up!

Mailbag: An Objection to the Kalam

Jon writes:

Hi Randy,

I recently came across an objection to the kalam argument that I haven't been able to sufficiently answer. My question is this: How can we know that the cause of the universe still exists without appealing to any sort of external arguments from natural theology that would enable us to prove this?

God bless,

Jon

Randy:

Hi Jon,

Thanks for this question! Technically speaking, this isn’t an objection to the “bare-bones” version of the kalam. Here’s how you can tell: ask yourself which of the two major premises (or the major and the minor, technically) does this objection undercut our warrant for or otherwise refute? Certainly not the causal principle, and not that the universe had a beginning. Thus, it’s irrelevant to the conclusion, which is that the universe had a cause.

Notice this isn’t even quibbling with Craig’s extended version of the argument, where he argues for the personal nature of the First Cause. Rather, at best what’s going on is that this is an attempt to undercut the warrant for saying that this First Cause still exists.[1] And that is important, for if we have no good reason to think the First Cause still exists, then we have no good reason to think God still exists (inasmuch as God is identified with the First Cause).

I have a number of responses. First, why restrict our knowledge of the First Cause’s continued existence to the kalam? At first blush, one might think the objector is arguing that if other theistic arguments are imported in order to establish God’s continued existence, then it will be these arguments doing all the work, and not the kalam. And to that I say—why think a thing like that? The kalam is not about arguing God’s mode of existence, or length of existence into the future, or God’s subsequent actions. Instead, the kalam is all about the universe’s having had a cause that brought it into existence. Complaining that it doesn’t establish something further about God than it does is like complaining that the historian of the Revolutionary War doesn’t discuss when George Washington died or lived forever. It’s not, strictly speaking, relevant to the causes or characters of the Revolutionary War. Thus, the objection isn’t really objecting to much, or else is irrelevant.

Second, if we want to know whether or not God has continued existence, as that is important and relevant, then inasmuch as it is not the point of the kalam to discuss it, we’re welcome to bring in any point of knowledge that we might have. The ontological argument, the moral argument, the Bible, Christian theology, etc. all require God’s continued existence. Now an objector may protest, but so what? They don’t need to accept that God still exists in order to accept that he is the cause of the universe’s existence. Now if God as a First Cause existed, then naturalism is out the window and anything that we may know is admissible. If they want to give up naturalism and to know whether or not God still exists, we can discuss why we think it likely that if God ever existed, he still does (though I wouldn’t do this without a firm admission from them that naturalism is false—otherwise, they may just be doing this as a giant red herring). But they can’t simply say there is no reason to think God still exists if he ever did at all—at least not without argument.

Finally, in WLC’s and James Sinclair’s essay in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, the extended kalam does in fact suggest that God is metaphysically necessary. This is because he is plausibly (via simplicity considerations) both uncaused as the absolute first cause and beginningless. So, as Craig says, “If the universe has a cause, then an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless, and enormously powerful . . . This, as Thomas Aquinas was wont to remark, is what everybody means by ‘God.’”[2]

So we can see it’s not an objection to the kalam at all (it grants that God at one time existed) and so naturalism is false (or at least assumed false for the sake of argument); we are free to discuss any reasons we have for thinking if God existed at one time, he still does, including other theistic arguments, reasons for thinking that a powerful being like God is doesn’t have more powerful beings than himself (note: this need not be shown to be true—the objection is modest enough in saying that we don’t have a good reason for thinking God still exists if he ever did: so long as we have one good reason, that’s not irrational, the burden is met. It would then be up to the objector to tell us why this reason is not good for thinking that it’s probable God still exists.); and we are free to argue that an absolutely first cause that is uncaused and beginningless is very plausibly metaphysically necessary, and so we would need a reason to think that such a being has gone out of existence, which is more than what the objector has provided.

Typically, these kinds of objections are either based on misunderstandings or otherwise red herrings. If an atheist really is willing to give up naturalism (at least for the sake of argument), it’s worth it. Otherwise, it’s very likely a red herring. I hope this helped!

---

[1] Please also note that this isn’t even an argument that the First Cause does not still exist; it merely asks us how we know from the kalam.

[2] William Lane Craig and James D. Sinclair, The Kalam Cosmological Argument,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, eds. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2012), 194.

Mailbag: Is It Discrimination to be Against Gay 'Marriage'?

Hi Randy,

Question I hope you could help me with: There have been a few stories recently - both here in the UK and I think in the USA too - about bakers who refuse to bakes cakes for gay couples who wish to celebrate their weddings. What's your position on this? Some people say, "Well, it's freedom of religion, so the government shouldn't force Christian bakers to go against their consciences."  People on the other side, however, say "Well, you can't discriminate based on things like race , gender, and sexuality. After all, do we really think society should allow bakers to refuse to serve women and blacks?."  I also heard an atheist earlier say, "What about a baker refusing on religious grounds to bake a cake for a Bar Mitzvah or Holy Communion? Isn't that the same as refusing to bake a cake for a homosexual couple's wedding?."  I have a pretty good idea of how to answer this (e.g., the Bible condemns homosexual acts not orientation, so it's not the same as discriminating against race and gender which are in-born) but would appreciate your input.

God Bless,

James

Randy:

Hello James,

I certainly am not qualified to answer this from a legal perspective, particularly as it relates to UK law (I just don't have the faintest idea of how it works!). I can, however, philosophically evaluate the arguments as you've represented them. Specifically, I'd want to address the argument of whether or not those wanting to get married are analogous to gender or race.

As you have pointed out, there's a difference in what the Bible addresses: in point of fact, nowhere does the Bible address "orientations" where "orientation" is something like a disposition to be attracted to the same or multiple genders. But notice something even further: "race" and "gender" are taken to be things over which one has no control. Analogously, the argument is supposed to be that one's orientation is something over which one has no control. Thus, if it is unfair to discriminate based on factors outside of one's control, then certainly homosexuals apply here too. I have a number of responses.

First, it's not clear that it's always wrong to discriminate against someone for a factor over which they have no control. Let me explain. Discriminate is one of those words that has come to take on an almost wholly negative use, but if all people mean by discriminate is "to eliminate by choice" or something equivalent then we all discriminate based on a variety of factors every single day; the vast majority of these are fairly innocuous. The WNBA presumably does not allow males to compete on the basis of their gender; high school locker rooms presumably are not co-ed, on the basis of gender (though who knows, that might begin to change!); scholarships made available for people of certain ethnic or racial origins are available to them based on their ethnicity or race, and are not available to others based on ethnicity or race; the examples can go on and on. And yet, most people don't take these to be negative examples of discrimination based on race or gender, factors over which people have no control. So if negative discrimination (the bad kind) is defined as choosing against someone for a factor over which they have no control, then all of these should be viewed as paradigmatic examples. Yet they are not. This tells us there is something over and above the standard use that makes it negative discrimination. That "over and above" factor is plausibly intent or the absence of good reasons for the discrimination. If one has good reasons for the discrimination, but intends to damage the one being chosen against, then I think negative discrimination is at work. If one has a good intent, but has no good reason for choosing against someone for a factor over which they have no control, then this is plausibly an example of negative discrimination.

Second, there is a marked difference between what one is and what one does; there is a difference between the orientation and the acting on that orientation. While the homosexual may not be able to control, and may not have caused, their same-sex attraction (though this is not at all clear, it's incidental), they do control their behavior. Thus, in the context of someone asking a Christian pastor, say, to perform a homosexual "wedding," saying "no" is not discriminating against them for a factor over which they have no control. The reasoning is plainly not, "You have a homosexual desire, therfore, I will not perform the ceremony." This is because, presumably, he wouldn't perform the ceremony even if the couple-to-be both had heterosexual desires. The factor that rules out the Christian pastor performing the "wedding" is the attempted marriage, a factor over which they have complete control. The only way to argue otherwise is to argue that no one has control over their behavior, in which case even the alleged negative discriminator has no control over his/her behavior, so that to place blame on the negative discriminator is itself negative discrimination, which seems crazy.

Third, notice that many people speak out of both sides of their mouth on this issue. For example, in contexts wholly unrelated to religious freedom and homosexual "marriages," people will use "gender" as a malleable term; that is, according to many of these same people, one can switch genders, and hence, so long as all else is equal (finances and availability of doctors, for example), gender is in fact a factor over which someone has control. Of course, I don't buy that gender as a concept is so malleable, but they do. If they do, then the prohibition on gender-based discrimination, at least in the majority of the Western world (US, Canada, UK), is based on a mistake: it is a factor over which someone has control. One must choose: either gender-based discrimination that otherwise would be marked as negative has warrant that is undercut, or else gender as a concept is not truly malleable.

Finally, I'd like to go back to the first point about negative discrimination. What is happening when the Christian, asked to provide a direct service for specifically homosexual behavior, refuses? Is it negative discrimination? Let's apply our criteria. First, does he or she have good intent? Of course, we cannot know: perhaps she does have negative intent. But it's not charitable (and it's question-begging) to assume this; it's more charitable to assume they are being sincere, unless evidence to the contrary surfaces. So she doesn't hate nor is she trying to prevent the behavior of the person; she simply intends not to be the one to perform the task (the legal status of gay "marriages" is an entirely different discussion). Second, does she exert discrimination against a person for a factor over which they have no control for no good reason? No, for at least two reasons. First, the gay "marriage" to be is a behavior, and hence a factor over which they do in fact have control. Second, she has a good overriding reason not to perform the task: her conscience, informed by her religious beliefs, preclude her from taking part in the task.

So, her reason for not performing the task is not, "You are homosexuals," but rather, "My religious beliefs preclude me from taking direct part in a homosexual 'wedding,' because marriage is between one man and one woman; and this is a homosexual 'wedding,' not between one man and one woman." Note the overarching reason has only implications for homosexual behavior; it is not itself about homosexual behavior. Her religious beliefs include that marriage is between one man and one woman, and thus the discrimination is not about homosexual behaviors, but rather is an implication from other religious beliefs. This can be seen in two aspects. Suppose the woman bakes cakes. In the first instance, a homosexual comes in and orders a cake for his partner's birthday. She disapproves of his lifestyle, but makes the cake. Why? Because she's not an active participant in something that violates her religious beliefs (assuming she thinks celebrating birthdays is OK); the actions that her religious beliefs would imply to be negative are not directly related to her actions in making the cake. In the second instance, a man walks in and announces he needs a wedding cake--five of them, in fact--one for each of the women he's marrying in a ceremony. She refuses, even though the man is a heterosexual involved in a heterosexual reason, for precisely the same reason she refuses to make the homosexual wedding cake! This last part is enough for me to believe that there's just no negative discrimination going on.

God Bless,

Randy Everist

Mailbag: Natural Theology and Atheism

Jonathan writes, “Hi Randy :). Having dealt with a lot of Presuppositionalists in my spare time, one common objection that I hear to arguments from natural theology is that these arguments are unnecessary since Romans 1 teaches that everyone already knows that God exists. My question is whether or not you agree with this assessment.”

There’s a certain sense in which I agree with the claim that everyone already knows that God exists, but no, I do not agree with using that as an assessment of natural theology. Romans 1 is fundamentally about the Gospel, and Paul delves into an excursus (as is often his custom) to describe the need for the Gospel. In v. 18 he speaks of those who “suppress the truth.” This is going to be crucial for an understanding of “know.” In v. 19, the Bible says God has made knowledge of him evident to them. He then also references creation as mediating this knowledge (v. 20). But notice something interesting in vs. 21 and 28: that knowledge they have is suppressed, and they don’t like to retain God in their knowledge. As such, their understanding is “darkened” and they now have a “depraved” mind. Rom. 2:14-15 speaks of Gentiles’ conscience either accusing or else excusing (or alternatively “defending”) them.

Paul’s point in Romans 1 is that their knowledge is suppressed and is meant to condemn. Thus, I totally don’t understand any objection that says, “Everyone already knows God exists,” since it means nothing like, “Everyone already has knowledge sufficient for the acceptance of the Gospel, so natural theology is redundant.” How bizarre! The arguments of natural theology can be viewed as evangelistic, albeit on an intellectual level, when given to unbelievers. Why think that because they have sufficient knowledge so that suppression is culpable, we shouldn’t make any further effort? Is culpable unbelief the goal of natural theology? Surely not!

Now it’s worth asking if every atheist is therefore a lying, dishonest person, or else functioning poorly according to their design plan. I’m sure that some of them are dishonest, and I’m sure that some of them might be functioning poorly, but I’ve got no way of knowing what kind of percentages those might run us. As a matter of charity, it might be best not to presume these things. So how might we make sense of this? Well, it seems to me that this suppression could come as more or less a psychological side effect of living as though the Creator does not exist: worshipping the creation (look at the borderline-religious obsession that the culture at large superficially has with science), not having a thankful attitude toward God, idol worship (whether explicit or implicit), sexual immorality, sinful behavior, etc. Any one or all of these could be sufficient for such a side effect as this. And then, it’s quite easy to see how someone might come to doubt, intellectually, the existence of God. After all, most all of us, including myself, have to fight the psychological temptation to agree/disagree with someone based on whether I like the person enough (or dislike them enough). You like the person, you find ways to defend them. You hold that a position is immoral and think people who do that are bad, then you find that a good friend engages in this behavior—suddenly, you come to doubt that it is bad. No intellectual change in the information or argument took place; instead, a psychological side effect brought about a change in one’s knowledge. If the knowledge previously held was strong enough, there could even be a suppression of that knowledge for the sake of psychology. I’m sure no atheist will take kindly to what I’ve said here, though I do think it’s closer to correct than to say that all of them are consciously lying.

Finally, and to wrap it all up, it seems the critique of natural theology in Romans 1 both is not taught by the passage and seems utterly bizarre. The point of natural theology is not to condemn the unbeliever, but to utilize all of the evangelistic tools in our arsenal, intellectual, emotional, and volitional, in hopes that the unbeliever will respond to the work of the Spirit in his heart and mind. What could be wrong with that?!

This also seems like a good place to provide a link to a podcast covering some of these same issues. In it, William Lane Craig refers to me as “Andy Everist,” probably because Stephen Law originally did. Here’s the link! http://www.reasonablefaith.org/does-reason-lead-to-atheism-or-theism