CARM and Molinism (But Really Just Prevenient Grace)

It has come to my attention that there is a newer, recent article from Matt Slick on prevenient grace and Molinism. In it, he attempts to argue that total depravity rules out prevenient grace (he applies this reasoning to two versions of prevenient grace, but since it relies on the same foundational reasoning it will be sufficient to deal with that). This is what I take to be his argument, in premise form:

1.     If total depravity is true, then man cannot come to God freely.

2.     If prevenient grace is true, then unregenerate man is still totally depraved.

3.     Total depravity is true (assumption of prevenient grace).

4.     Prevenient grace is true (assumption of prevenient grace, by definition)

5.     Therefore, if prevenient grace is true, then man still cannot come to God freely.

6.     Therefore, man still cannot come to God freely.

I believe I have represented Slick fairly and accurately here. However, there are some problems. First, he takes total depravity to mean that there is no free choosing of God and that prevenient grace doesn’t rectify this at all, since man is still totally depraved, and that prevenient grace relies on total depravity (since otherwise it wouldn’t be necessary). But this is just question-begging. After all, the advocate for prevenient grace can just insist that he doesn’t accept (3) if this is what total depravity entails (instead, call it “total depravity lite,” where the only difference is that prevenient grace can restore such an ability as an act of divine grace); or she can say she rejects (2), since, after all, prevenient grace is intended to restore, and so restores to a condition of total depravity lite. Why can’t he or she make this move?

Spelling it out more, this assumes prevenient grace doesn’t accomplish what it intends to accomplish. Prevenient grace agrees that man is totally depraved, but that any good that can be done by man is due to God’s enabling grace, and that he can come to the Father on the occasion of the Spirit’s moving work. But Slick simply claims that, in premise 2, we can see it doesn’t accomplish this. Why should we think this? Well, Slick quotes a few verses without doing any exegetical work. In other words, he builds his conclusion into his argument; he begs the question.

In truth, why can Molinists not just reject (2), and point out prevenient grace is meant to solve the ability problem? You can’t very well reply that prevenient grace doesn’t solve the ability problem because there is an ability problem!

CARM is at it again!

It looks like CARM is discussing Molinism again. From the first sentence, we find ambiguities that may affect the ability of a person to dissect the claims. Nonetheless, I will stipulate what I reasonably believe CARM to mean so we can move on (from here on out, I will refer to Matt Slick, since he is the one who wrote the article). First, he starts out with “Molinism fails as a philosophical position.” What does this mean? Does it mean that Molinism fails to be a philosophical position? Surely not. He probably means it fails to be a truthful philosophical position, where he takes it Molinism is false. Next, he claims it is “founded on two unbiblical assumptions.” Now before we unpack what these are, it’s telling he doesn’t here describe what “unbiblical” means. Notoriously, “unbiblical” can mean anything from “anti-biblical” to “not explicitly taught in Scripture.” But, let’s say that we think Slick means “anti-biblical.”

So what is his criticism, specifically? First, he senses a tension between MacGregor’s discussion of prevenient grace and the biblical witness. Unfortunately, all Slick does here is list verses, and then conclude, “He cannot receive them.  It does not say he can under the right circumstances. It does not say he can with prevenient grace that enables him to choose to receive Christ.” With no exegetical work done, we can safely ignore this, since it’s not as though Molinists are unfamiliar with the relevant texts. In fact, this isn’t even a uniquely Molinist “problem.” All you have to do is recognize that we affirm these same texts, and that they don’t inherently preclude prevenient grace. After all, the texts affirm that man in his natural state cannot receive God, and it’s only by God’s grace that anyone can. Even on Calvinism, man still chooses God (it’s just that God regenerates him first, or causally acts on him such that he chooses, etc.). So a work of grace on the heart of man by God is what occurs. This seems entirely consistent.

Slick offers this next criticism briefly: “Even with prevenient grace as an option, why does one person believe, and another does not?  Doesn't God know how to work prevenient grace around/within a person to get him to believe?  It still comes down to human ability.  This is another problem which Molinism cannot answer, but scripture does.”

This is confused for a variety of reasons. First, it does not “come down” to human ability. After all, we just got through stating it was prevenient grace. This would be like a Calvinist insisting that any actions done by an unregenerate person qualify as a person acting in human ability. No actions can be done outside of common grace, and prevenient grace is at least common grace (plus the ability to believe, as it turns out). Second, Slick seems completely unaware of the literature on this subject. Molinists such as William Lane Craig offer possible speculations on this (in terms of transworld damnation). Further, some Molinists offer these truths as “brute facts” about the creaturely essence. But even here, it doesn’t relate to ability.

He then writes that if prevenient grace and libertarian freedom were true, then God’s appointing would be totally unnecessary. Except this, once again, shows a relative ignorance of Molinism. By actualizing a world, God thereby appoints every event that takes place within it. Now it is true that if prevenient grace and libertarian freedom were to be possible, then God need not actualize any world in order for these to be possible. But if they are not only possible but describe the actual world then, by necessity, God has actualized this world. And if he actualized it, he appointed it. And if he appointed it, it is because he is the sovereign creator of the world!

He then goes back to the whole why doesn’t God get everyone to believe? objection. This, of course, assumes there are relevantly true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom that are compossibly true such that God gets precisely what he wants in a relevantly similar world. Slick doesn’t have any way of knowing this is the case. He then asks us to consider Scriptures that supposedly show that free will doesn’t enter into the equation with respect to salvation. Since he does no exegesis, I won’t either, but I will say that Molinists can happily affirm each of the biblical texts he has listed. Since this is his article claiming Molinism fails biblically, it is up to him to exegete the text in such a way that it is both persuasive and precludes Molinist exegeses.

I am only responding because CARM has a strong online presence. I would hope they would continue their focus on cults and non-Christian world religions, where they have seemingly done quite well. Molinism is not their cup of tea, and that is OK!

Why Didn't God Stop Satan?

I heard my niece repeat her question from the Bible study last night. Jodi and I were talking to her sister and their family over Skype (they’re serving as missionaries in another country). I didn’t think that now was the time to jump in with a response, especially because I didn’t know how the question and answer played out in the Bible study itself. But it’s a question that a lot of Christians, not just young people, have pondered. The question is this: If God is all-knowing, wouldn’t he know that Satan was going to be evil, and do something to prevent it? A good question, indeed!

Strictly speaking, this does not merely assume God’s omniscience. It also assumes his omnibenevolence, or all-goodness. It also assumes his omnipotence (or at least a faculty of powers such that he could overcome Satan’s intentions). This is fine, for these things are part and parcel of historic Christianity. But then why didn’t God do something about it?

I think the key lies in the concept of love. God wants his creatures to love him (those that are capable of loving). At some level, and at some time, it appears Lucifer (Satan’s angelic name) had the ability to love God (and perhaps most or even all of the angels have had such an opportunity also). But to be in a love relationship requires two or more participants and a response that freely chooses love.

This makes sense, at least intuitively, right? Consider a man who wanted a woman to love him. She didn’t seem to at first, so he breaks out his magic spell. The magic spell makes it to where she fawns all over him, and even causes her to desire only him.[1] But can she be really said to love him? At the very least, we recognize she lacks something crucially important to love relationships: that she at least should choose to want to love him (or at least should choose to want to choose, if such a thing be demanded). Instead, this was foisted upon her. Her response is no different from an automaton.

So then, love requires freedom of choice at some level. Now the reason God doesn’t intervene is because if a choice is to be successfully made, it must be free. If God mitigates the choice when Satan tries to reject him, then it’s not really a choice (that is, forcing Satan to choose God in the event that Satan tries to reject him[2]. So God allows his choice to be real, and have real consequences. But why would God, knowing that his world would go so wrong, still stick with it? For a few reasons: 1. The love relationship God deems to be worth it. That should be humbling! 2. God knows something we don’t.[3] It may be that only in this type of a world would we get the number of saved freely trusting in Christ and living in eternal bliss with him, with the low-balance to minimize the lost.

What do you think? Let me know in the comments!

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[1] Thanks to Jerry Walls for a relevantly similar example.

[2] Frankfurt examples are interesting here, but not directly relevant, since on this discussion it’s not the case that Satan chooses and God does not intervene. On this supposition, Satan does not choose God and God has to intervene. Frankfurt examples tend to lose their intuitive force on these situations.

[3] I once heard Tim McGrew say this.

The Flexibility of Middle Knowledge

Middle knowledge is, roughly, the thesis that God has knowledge of what his free creatures would freely do in any set of freedom-permitting circumstances in which they might find themselves, and this knowledge is pre-volitional; that is to say, it comes logically prior to God’s decree to create the world, so that God is not causing them to do it. This doctrine is most often found in the context of Molinism, but there are many Molinists who are all over the theological spectrum when it comes to various topics, including soteriology (the study of salvation). There are Arminian-Molinists and Calvinist-Molinists, interestingly. It is my brief burden to show that middle knowledge can be applied not only to more Arminian-leaning teachings (of libertarian free will, for example), but also some Calvinist teachings (though there are obviously some that are off-limits for the Molinist—for just one, divine causal determinism being compatible with free actions).

First, middle knowledge is compatible with regeneration preceding faith.

One of the classic debates in soteriology is whether regeneration comes as a result of faith, or faith comes as a result of regeneration. On the former, proponents emphasize that God saves only because the person responds; a person who has not responded is not regenerate. On the latter, advocates contend that only a regenerate person can respond, so that it is necessary for faith in the first place. Which is right? For middle knowledge proponents, it may not matter. Suppose God uses his middle knowledge, logically prior to his decree, and knows each and every person who would freely place their trust in him if given a new heart. Suppose also, for the sake of argument, that regeneration prior to faith is necessary. God could then regenerate just these persons who would then libertarianly come to him. What about irresistible grace? The Synod of Dordt does seem to make this difficult. Hey, I didn’t say you’d fit in at Presbyterian potlucks!

Second, middle knowledge is compatible with limited atonement.

This may surprise some people, again, especially since very few Molinists accept limited atonement. Limited atonement is the thesis that Christ died for all of the sins of a specific group of people, all of whom will be saved (nearly word-for-word from Dr. John Hammett’s definition). The issue again is the same: God could use his middle knowledge to know precisely which people would believe in appropriate divinely selected circumstances, and only have Christ’s death atone for these sins.

Third, middle knowledge is compatible with unconditional election.

This is, admittedly, fudging a little. That is to say, you might have to ignore a pretty major definition of unconditional election that most Calvinists use ubiquitously. Instead, you’ll have to view unconditional election more along the lines of God getting the precise set of the saved that he wants. A better way to comport with the Westminster Confession’s definition is to emphasize God’s sovereign choice and omnipotence. So, suppose God can work circumstances such that anyone can freely (in the libertarian sense) come to him (say, because regeneration infallibly works to produce a new heart, and that new heart will always libertarianly choose God); in this case, God isn’t decreeing that the set of the saved will be so because of foreseen faith; indeed, they will have faith because they were chosen to be redeemed (it just so happens redemption always accomplishes this libertarian goal non-causally). In that case, you still have an unconditional election of sorts.

What does this all mean? Does it mean I’m a Calvinist now? No. In fact, I still reject these Calvinist teachings myself. My point is two-fold: 1. Sometimes the reasons people have for rejecting middle knowledge are not as good as they think they are; middle knowledge is flexible! 2. This means the debate on these Calvinist doctrines lies along lines not identical to middle knowledge. In other words, I believe God’s giving a well-meant offer precludes limited atonement (as well as the biblical evidence); I believe if God would have a world similar to this one in which everyone would freely be saved, then that’s the world we would have, etc. Something to think about!

Some Positions I Hold on Issues

The following is a list, in no particular order, of various positions I hold within philosophy and theology. I don’t really explain these positions as follows. I also hold these positions to varying degrees ranging from “fairly certain” all the way down to “leaning this way,” and I don’t provide any way to distinguish these degrees in this list. I encourage you to comment on some of my positions, whether you want clarifying questions (I’m happy to explain both the question and the answer) or want to know the degree to which I hold these things. I am also willing to answer questions about positions I forgot to include!

Theism: Theistic personalism

Worldview: Christianity

Human constitution: Cartesian dualism, dichotomy

Modal actualism/modal realism: Modal actualism

Omniscience: Yes, full omniscience

Providence: Molinism (middle knowledge)

Soteriology: Corporate election and individual election

Eschatology: Premillennial, pre-tribulational

Dispensational/Covenant: Progressive dispensationalism

Sign gifts: Moderate cessationalist

Science, realism/anti-realism: Realism

A priori knowledge: Yes, intuitionism

Justification: Basic foundationalism

Epistemology: Reformed epistemology, proper functionalism

Perception: Direct realism (adverbial theory)

Abstract objects: Nominalism-Divine conceptualism (tie)

Internalism/Externalism: Externalism

Natural Theology: Yes

Ontological argument: Yes, including original and modal formulations

Apologetic method: Cumulative case

Free will: Soft libertarianism

Ethics: Objective morality, deontological, divine command theory

Coherence of moral law: non-conflicting absolutism

Truth: Correspondence theory

Knowledge: warranted true belief

Time: A-theory

Bible: Inspired, inerrant

Trinity: Trinity Monotheism model of Social Trinitarianism

Impeccability/Peccability of Christ: Impeccability

Original sin/Original guilt: Original sin

Atonement: Kaleidoscope theory

Eternal security: Yes

Creation/Evolution: Creation

Genesis 6, fallen angels or godly/ungodly lines: Lines

Rahab: sin/innocence: Innocence

Logical Problem of Evil: Free will defense

Probabilistic Problem of Evil: Skeptical theism

Theodicy: Kaleidoscope theodicy approach