What Am I up to?

So what am I going to be up to this semester? Well, quite a bit, actually. First, this is hopefully my final semester of my Master of Arts in Philosophy of Religion from SEBTS. I am taking nine hours of coursework and six hours of thesis work. My topic is on Dean Zimmerman’s anti-Molinist argument, and I am excited to get to work on it. That goes on top of my 40-hours-per-week job of faculty support and instructional design in SEBTS’ Distance Learning office.

Next, I’m also trying to apply for various PhD programs. That involves, in some cases, preparing to take the MAT and GRE tests, procuring letters of reference, and obtaining transcripts; in others, it’s these things and/or a research proposal for a dissertation. Much prayer is requested for wisdom in my research for PhD programs.

I’m also slated to teach two classes online for Trinity Baptist College this Fall. One of them is on Johannine Writings, and the other is on Bible Doctrines 2. Both classes are fun, and have quite a few signed up. At church, I should be on the rotation for our life class to teach, and I enjoy that too.

I need to do some additional research and book reviews at some point, while possibly attending EPS in Atlanta this November. I say all this to say that as busy as I have been this past summer, it’s about to take off for the Fall. Please pray for me that I find time to conduct this ministry, both to believers and unbelievers alike. God bless!

Book Review: Miracles

Summary

Miracles is perhaps the deepest book of Lewis’ that I have yet read. This is because it challenges philosophical presuppositions and explains particulars of certain Christian doctrines in ways that both stay true to traditional teachings and, where possible, accord with the way we know things work in nature. In the first two chapters he sets the tone by explaining that he’s not attempting to prove the miracles of the Christian faith actually occurred; he is not attempting to assess the actual historical evidence. However, he does split the camps into naturalists and supernaturalists by defining a naturalist as one who believes that nature is all there is (305). Further, he defines a miracle as an “interference with Nature by supernatural power” (305). Thus, if Nature is all there is, then plainly miracles do not occur, whereas Lewis sets out to show that if it is possible that supernaturalism is true, then miracles cannot be ruled out as a possibility.

The next step in Lewis’ argument is to show that naturalism has a serious problem. This problem concerns the seed of what is closely related to the argument from reason (cf. Victor Reppert’s C.S. Lewis’ Dangerous Idea and Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism). First, he argues that all of human knowledge relies necessarily on reasoning being correct, or at least generally true (313). Here’s how he summarizes his thinking: “A theory which explained everything else in the whole universe but which made it impossible to believe that our thinking was valid, would be utterly out of court” (313). Due to this, it seems naturalism cannot account for bringing rational thought from the sub-rational; it is always possible that naturalism should have made it to where we only reasoned to the pragmatic truth of survival rather than truth itself (318). If that is so, then naturalism undercuts the entire basis for reasoning, and thus is self-refuting.

Lewis then deals with a few red herrings to the whole argument, including that early Christians accepted miracles like the virgin birth because they simply did not scientifically know better—a thought which Lewis takes to be ludicrous (342). He then moves to more serious objections, including the idea that miracles are violations of the necessary laws of nature, and so cannot occur. His argument is that the laws describe what happens in nature—all else being equal. Of course, whether or not all things really are equal depend on whether or not something intervenes from the outside; essentially, it depends on whether or not miracles are possible (352). Thus, this objection does not succeed.

Lewis then moves to a couple of chapters where he argues that even if early Christians did not have perfect understanding of particular truths, it does not follow that the core truth of what they defended was inaccurate (370-71). Once having laid this foundation, he attempts to adjudicate between different types of religion (after all, if he only establishes that miracles are possible, but not which religion or type of religion is most plausible, the question does not fully resolve). In the end, he decides that we can at least know some of what God positively is, and if that is so, miracles cannot be ruled out (384).

Lewis then moves to a discussion on probability. If, after all, miracles are improbable, then they should not be believed (according to Lewis). But what is it that makes it improbable? If naturalism is true, then one cannot say that it is probable that nature is uniform (i.e., actually obeys laws and will not suddenly change in the future); this suggests that naturalism is not true (395)! He finishes the work with a few chapters on the important miracle of the Incarnation and Virgin Birth, and helpful appendices on the soul and providence.

Critical Evaluation

            Lewis, I think, accomplishes his stated goal when he establishes serious problems for naturalism and suggesting miracles are at least possible. His goal is not to show that the historic details of Christian miracle stories are true, but even still, he takes pains to show that the Incarnation, Resurrection, and Ascension of Jesus Christ are all quite interrelated and plausible. One may not leave the book convinced that the claims of Christianity are true, but neither can he honestly leave convinced miracles are impossible—not without dealing thoroughly with this work.

Strengths

            There are many strengths to be found in this work, both on “offense” and on “defense.” On the offensive side, the argument from reason against naturalism is powerful. If any theory we think up results in the invalidity of thinking, then that theory counts as self-refuting (313). This important (and I think self-evident) principle guides Lewis in his argument. He showed, successfully, that materialistic versions of naturalism (which are the most prominent versions) entail this kind of self-refutation. This is because if everything is nothing but material, and this material obeys fixed laws, then reasoning is nothing more than how the material in our brains is acting and reacting, and is not true reasoning (312-13). But Lewis does not stop here, showing that even other forms of naturalism can suffer from this type of malady. Beliefs are merely “psychological events” (315), and simply because they are caused is no guarantee that they have any justification (we are asked to consider the madman whose mental condition surely has a cause, but his delusions are certainly ungrounded or unjustified). So these psychological events have causes, but seem to lack the ability to have sufficient grounds for thinking them to be rational.

            On another offensive move, Lewis takes pains to defend the idea that we have what Plantinga would later call “properly basic beliefs.” These beliefs cannot be justified by any further beliefs, and just seem to us to be true. Lewis uses the uniformity of nature and the problem of induction to talk about this, and thus solves this problem with properly basic beliefs. He writes, “In advance of experience, in the teeth of many experiences, we are already enlisted on the side of uniformity” (394). For Lewis, if these properly basic beliefs are trustworthy, it remains hard to see how so on naturalism (but quite easy on supernaturalism—we were designed to have such beliefs!).

            On the defensive side, Lewis defends the possibility of miracles against common objections. The first kind of objection has already been mentioned: that the early Christians were simply ignorant, and this is why they accepted the accounts of miracles. However, as Lewis points out, Joseph certainly knew the normal course of the births of babies, even if he could not articulate precisely why. As he writes, “St. Joseph obviously knew that” (342). The second kind of objection was the a priori ruling out of miracles due to the necessity of the physical laws. Interestingly, Lewis did not argue much against the necessity of the laws. This is a strength because it is the natural place to go. However, if one grants the contention of his opponent, but shows it does not entail the desired result, one has a much stronger position.

Weaknesses

            Despite the fact that I just praised Lewis for granting the discussion on the necessity of physical laws, it does seem that he should have pushed back more against it. For instance, why should any Christian (or even non-naturalist) grant that the physical laws are necessary (and hence any violation is “self-contradictory,” cf. 351)? There does not seem to be the same type of incoherence (if any) going on in the statement “Something exceeds the speed of light” as in the statement “There are married bachelors.” While Lewis’ approach can be applauded, the Christian need not grant a logical necessity condition attached to the natural laws. This is especially true when it is considered that the laws are empirically oriented (that is, they are not the result of pure, a priori reasoning with inescapable conclusions).

            Another potential weakness was in the area of historical investigation. While it is true Lewis was not concerned to investigate the historical claims of miracles (which was entirely correct, in my view), it seemed he overstated his case. He thought it impossible for history to adjudicate miracle claims, since in order to do so, one must decide “whether miracles are possible, and if so, how probable they are” (304). Incidentally, this is why his discussion of probability comes far too late in the book (his concept of probability plays such a crucial role in what follows that its absence at the beginning was notable).

            It is not clear to me that one must know (or, at any rate, be able to show) that miracles are possible in order to know that one has occurred. At least, one must know that miracles are not a priori ruled out, and to that extent Lewis is right. But it seems that Lewis also seems to think there is an intrinsic probability assigned to miraculous events, and that historical evidence does not serve to discuss probability with respect to miracle claims. It seems to me this is not correct. Mike Licona, for an example, maintains that one ought to adopt a stance of credulity with respect to historical claims, and then assess the evidence according to various criteria (cf. The Resurrection of Jesus). If this is right, and if one has done the spadework to defend against allegations of impossibility, then one can proceed even if for any given miraculous event E, E is highly improbable with respect to enumerative probability. For on the basis of historical evidence, one may find that E is not only probable, but the highest probable explanation of the facts of the matter there is!

            A final note is not necessarily a weakness, but an implicit bias that runs throughout that may affect how a reader views some of Lewis’ contentions. He seems to be writing from at least a partially Thomistic perspective. He speaks of the form of the body, how the body is needed for the human person, how God is timeless, and even discusses more extreme forms of Thomism that speak of knowing God only by what he is not (in a critical sense). Being aware of this Thomistic influence will help the reader better understand where Lewis is coming from, and allow him to take what he will from it based on his experiences with Thomism.

            This book comes recommended for both naturalists and supernaturalists, though I would not recommend it for the average layman. It is more difficult to follow the overall argument than Mere Christianity, and some readers who do not understand the connections may give up. However, for those facing challenges to their faith, this is a highly recommended read.

Book Reviews: The Problem of Pain and A Grief Observed

Summary

The Problem of Pain (TPP) and A Grief Observed (AGO) are two very contrasting, but ultimately complimentary, views on the problem of pain and suffering. It is important to note that Lewis deals with both the emotional and physical aspects of suffering. He also is only addressing the traditional “problem of evil” as a part of his treatise on suffering; he is not speaking solely or even necessarily mostly about moral evil (and is almost leaving it to one side entirely in AGO).

In TPP, Lewis sets up the problem of pain quite well; he is not fond of the strawman argument. Essentially, the universe is a dark and cold place, that came from non-life, that treats life cruelly (with respect to disease, death, and extinction), and ultimately results in the heat death of the universe, where all things must end (552). He ends this section with the atheistic challenge: “Either there is no spirit behind the universe, or else a spirit indifferent to good and evil, or else an evil spirit” (552). The challenge for Christian theism should be evident.

Lewis responds, not by challenging the basic premises in the argument, but by instead bringing up a problem: the idea of morality (557). In a completely reductive universe, morality could not really be binding. Thus, he explains, “it is either inexplicable illusion, or else revelation” (557). The problem of pain still remains, but there is at least some reason to think that theism contains an answer.

Chapter Two begins with the classic formulation that if God were wholly omnipotent, then he would want to see his creatures as happy as possible (560). That obviously has not happened; thus, God must not be omnipotent (or not good). However, Lewis takes pains to argue that what is truly impossible is not a thing for omnipotence to do (560-61). Thus, if forcing a free creature is a truly impossible act, God cannot be blamed for not doing so. And yet this means that a truly free creature can bring about great suffering upon himself and others with poor moral choices. This truly free creature was meant to be in a love relationship with God at the center (574).

A central insight as to how much pain is brought about by man concerns his own perception of the evil man commits. Lewis writes, “As soon as we perceive our badness, it [God’s wrath] appears inevitable, a mere corollary of God’s goodness” (581). Thus, the wrath of God only seems unintelligible when we have failed to understand our own depravity. When it is fully understood, we recognize our characters need a radical transformation. This will form the basis of Lewis’ defense of the existence of human pain. In a world in which creatures interact, there is the possibility of pain. Further, since a man’s character (given sin, freely chosen of one’s own will) is such that he will not grow, pain is needed. Finally, a nature governed by general laws will need to be only rarely divinely interfered with (otherwise there is no point to nature at all).

Lewis then provides a defense of both Hell and Heaven, showing that God, in the end, leaves some people alone as they desire (627). He closes with a chapter on animal pain that a reader will find incredibly insightful, despite the fact he insists it is all speculation (629). He suspects that there may be animals in the eschaton who were joined in a human master, so that our resurrection involves theirs. There may be “soulish” animals (who have higher-order being) who experience resurrection. Finally, there may be types of animals who appear in the eschaton, even if the “original” animals do not live again (637).

AGO is a much shorter book, coming in at 42 pages. Here Lewis is not making an argument as much as a journal that chronicles his thoughts in the aftermath of his wife’s death. This edition begins with a great introduction from Lewis’ stepson, Douglas H. Gresham. The very first chapter is both raw and emotional. It comes within the very first weeks after his wife’s passing (the journaling nature of the work is revealed in that he only refers to his wife as “H”). He attempts to explain his pain by way both of asking questions (such as “why is God absent?”) and by the insight that his imagination cannot bring his wife’s face to mind (662).

The second chapter deals with Lewis’ apparent loss of faith. In these reflections, he looks like a man tossed back and forth between defeated doubt (665) and intellectual faith (668). A faith untested is a faith unknown, he claimed (665). In the next chapter, he realizes that a life without pain means no faith that is strong, at least in his case. His faith was exposed as a “house of cards” (672), and now he is stronger for it. At this juncture, he is still unsure whether or not God is truly for his good or evil (673). Finally, Lewis concludes that he had been thinking about himself, then his wife, and finally God—and all along, he should have been praising God for his goodness, for his wife, and then his faith would have followed along (682). AGO is a book about a journey of rediscovering faith in the midst of indescribable loss.

Critical Evaluation

            Lewis writes so clearly and candidly in both TPP and AGO that one may find himself wanting to agree with everything he writes, whether or not it seems to him to be pious or even theologically accurate. TPP is dealt with from a purely intellectual perspective; in fact, Lewis very nearly apologizes for not having experienced certain types of pain himself (though he did indeed lose his mother to cancer when he was a young boy). In TPP, the goal was to tell a story of how it is that a loving and good God, who is all-powerful, could allow so much pain and suffering, and even the existence of an eternal Hell. Lewis achieves this masterfully. In AGO, there is less of an overarching goal as much as a series of lessons. These lessons find their culmination in a practical application of grief and pain, and in that he achieves his objective—at least for him, and others who may be like him.

Strengths

            In TPP there are several strengths. First, Lewis excels at providing a thorough discussion. He includes moral evil, the origin of moral evil, human pain and its purpose given moral evil, the natural world, animal pain, Heaven, and Hell; he also includes God’s omnipotence and goodness, as well as a brief discussion on libertarian freedom. It seems that he left no major aspect unexamined. Second, Lewis did well to assume the evolutionary account of man and still provide an answer. He told a story of how sin may have arisen in the hearts of prehistoric man, even in an evolutionary context, where man ceased to function as God intended (and therefore as man ought to function), and thus sin entered into the world (595). Thus, Lewis argues that, “Science, then, has nothing to say for or against the doctrine of the Fall” (591). On this point he seems quite right.

Third, his theodicy of Hell shows itself to be quite strong. Lewis argues that justice is necessary to any conception of punishment (after all, why punish me if I do not in fact deserve to be punished?). From this, he draws a distinction between condoning and forgiving—and argues that forgiveness must be accepted by the one being forgiven in order for it to be applied (623). Thus, if someone will not accept God, then he will leave them alone (627). He then addresses the objection that eternal punishment does not fit the temporal crime by suggesting that perhaps the eternal punishment is itself timeless (624). This is at least an interesting suggestion, to say the least!

Finally, his defense of animal pain and suffering is worthy to be considered. Lewis argues that most animals are only aware of a succession of pain states, but not that they themselves are in such pain states. Thus, there is a lack of consciousness needed to truly suffer. Thus, most of what goes on in the animal kingdom is not what we would qualify as pain. Next, for even the higher animals that may possibly know that they themselves are in pain, it may be that resurrection in the service of man awaits them; even if not, it may be that the animals were abused by Satan just as mankind was.

AGO’s primary strength is in its candor. Lewis’ openness about his grief and struggles allows the reader to identify with him (and not merely pity him)—even if they have not undergone the specific type of pain he has. Its strength lies in that it is no mere academic exercise. Though it is surely intellectual, it does not come across as sterile. It does not serve to contradict TPP, but complement it. This is why it seems so back-and-forth, verging on contradictory. He recognizes God as undergoing the ultimate grief of sending his own Son, but struggles to reconcile his feelings with a God of ultimate love. In the end, AGO encourages us to view God first, what pleases us or what has grieved us second, and only ourselves third.

Weaknesses

            Both TPP and AGO are amazing works that can and should be read by Christians and non-Christians alike; however, this is not to say that they are perfect works without any room for improvement or lacking any error. First, in TPP, it is not clear Lewis has established his refutation of the temporal/eternal objection to Hell. This is because, amongst other things, it controversially assumes a B-theory of time, whereby those who are in Hell can be timelessly “removed” from chronological existence. Consider the fact that it seems one can argue that the condemned can be said to be condemned at one moment, and uncondemned at a prior moment (that is, not experiencing the punishment of Hell). Or consider that one could argue that eternal, in Scripture, seems to mean “everlasting” rather than “timeless” punishment. If this is so, Lewis’ response falls apart. He also fails to recognize other, perhaps more important responses, such as a sin against an infinitely holy God is an infinite crime, or that the condemned reap more and more punishment as they continually resist God in their God-abandoned state.

            Next, in his chapter on animal suffering, Lewis makes the following claim: “This [the claim that animal suffering results from the Fall] is now impossible, for we have good reason to believe that animals existed long before men” (631). Aside from controversially assuming an evolutionary-like story, even evolution does not preclude human sin from being the reason animal suffering came about. Consider William Dembski’s retrocausal account. It could be that God viewed what would happen, perceived in his omniscience that man would sin, and for that reason, God imparted the consequences unto the world. Now whether or not a Dembski-like account succeeds is not the point; the question is whether it is even possible. It seems that it is, meaning Lewis need not dismiss such an account out of hand (even though, in fairness, he was not aware of it).

            If AGO has a weakness, it must only be in its strange assumption that Lewis’ wife no longer existed currently. Perhaps this is due to his belief in Purgatory, or perhaps he was merely emphasizing the nature of time and existence, but either way it seems false. He seems to rely on the claim that passages that speak of hope and life after death and reunions with others as entirely unscriptural if interpreted literally (666-67). Perhaps in one sense he is right: but surely there is a literal truth behind even the most fanciful of metaphors. And what would that literal truth be? “To be absent from the body is to be present with the Lord.” While Lewis does eventually recognize there is more to his wife’s person than her body, it does seem that he does not take seriously the idea that she is in Heaven with God even now, and that is an unfortunate loss of comfort.

            Both TPP and AGO are strongly recommended. TPP is recommended both for believers and unbelievers alike. AGO is recommended primarily for believers; I suspect that unbelievers will not grasp it without a faith already in Christ. While believers who have not undergone such grief as Lewis may struggle to understand it, it will give them at least an empathetic insight into those who are hurting, and for that reason they will find it very helpful.

Book Review: Mere Christianity

Summary

Mere Christianity is a work derived almost completely from radio broadcasts originally done on BBC radio in England during World War II. Lewis largely wanted the book to read as a talk (5), and that is indeed how it reads. It is familiar, warm, and yet cuttingly insightful when it comes to the condition of man and the truth-claims of what he calls “mere Christianity.” His main goal was to state the basic, core beliefs that virtually all Christians across history have held to be true and do so in a way that accounted for their plausibility.

The work is actually divided into four books (which should rather be called “parts”). The first book features Lewis unraveling his masterful use of the moral argument for God’s existence. He wrote quite methodically; not attempting to go too fast, he wanted to claim only what his argumentation had warranted, and nothing further.

First, Lewis argued that everyone has a particular concept that there is an objective moral standard, and that this standard dictates what is right and wrong. He argues for universal perception of this moral law, in part, by stating that no one ever tries to simply shrug off the standard. Instead, they argue that they meet the standard, or there is some particular circumstance that excuses them in this case, and so on. He puts it like this: “Quarrelling means trying to show that the other man is in the wrong. And there would be no sense in saying that a footballer had committed a foul unless there was some agreement about the rules of football” (16). As an aside, Lewis excels at showing his point by way of analogy.

Lewis then deals with objections to the moral law, showing that it is not merely social convention or useful behavior by using counterexamples from everyday life (26). He closes this chapter by pointing out this means there is “a real law, which none of us made, but which we find pressing on us” (27). He has not yet argued about who or what made this law, but has established that we all think it to be there. After this, he closes the first book with two main contentions. First, that there is a higher power that created these moral obligations. Second, Christianity is the remedy for those who have broken the moral law—which is all of us (35). This serves as a good segue into the next book.

The second book concerns Christian doctrine in particular, and how it differs from other religions. Lewis argues that Christianity must be more than a pagan kind of dualism, because one of the sides is good, and thus is a better representative of an objective moral standard than the other. Thus, the two sides are not really equal, and only one of them is God (44). Christianity also has a remedy for sin, and that is found in the person of Jesus Christ. This is where Lewis’ famous trilemma appears: Jesus is either a liar, lunatic, or Lord (50-51). This weight presses upon the skeptic as Lewis moves to the third book.

This book concerns Christian behavior. Lewis nicely defines morality according to three parts: “fair play and harmony between individuals . . . harmonising the things inside each individual. Thirdly, with the general purpose of human life as a whole;” he also argued that most people are only ever concerned with the first part, to their detriment (67). He then speaks of the cardinal virtues, and argues that each act makes a man more like heaven or more like hell (81). Thus, for Lewis, life was a progression unto an eternal state: eternal joy or eternal condemnation. Of particular note is his distinction between two kinds of faith. First, is intellectual acceptance of the truth of Christianity and its teachings (115). However this faith is not merely intellectual. That is, Lewis argues that reason is not cold and divorced from the emotional life of man. Thus, when one is tempted to forego Christian beliefs about morality because it suits him, true faith is in fact a virtue, for it overcomes the emotion to retain this belief even still (116-17). Second, faith is believing something “that cannot be understood until after you have gone a certain distance along the Christian road” (119). This naturally leads the reader into the fourth and final book.

This book engages the deeper doctrine of God, including the Trinity and the Incarnation. Lewis maintains that the nature of the tri-personal God is like a cube, and it is only when we are able to perceive all of the dimensions that we are able to understand that it is made up of more than one square (133). He also attempts to tackle the idea of a timeless God, and explains that the Holy Spirit is the way in which we “catch” the spirit of God (143). Finally, he argues that it is our choice whether or not we will resist God and his actions to make us into true Sons of God (148); it is at this stage of being conformed to the image of the Son that we become our true selves (175). It is this closing thought Lewis dwells on to create a final dilemma for the reader: “Look for yourself, and you will find in the long run only hatred, loneliness, despair, rage, ruin, and decay. But look for Christ and you will find Him, and with Him everything else thrown in” (177).

Critical Evaluation

            Lewis accomplishes his goal of presenting a plausible version of mere Christianity for those unbelievers. He does not adjudicate between Christian denominations, nor does he intend to do so. It is important to note that there appear to be doctrines (at least one) that does not belong to the essential aspects of Christianity—namely, the defense of a timeless God. While the timelessness of God has been defended far and wide, it is now usually recognized that one is not completely outside of the pale of orthodoxy by conceiving of God as somehow in time. This is the only real bias I can detect that may impact the facts of the matter; the book was very well done!

Strengths

            A particular strength of Lewis is his ability to relate to the “common man,” or the outsider layman. By using both analogies and thought experiments, he is able to relate difficult concepts in a way that makes them sensible. It is true that these are not perfect analogies, but he never claims they are—and in fact takes great pains to note they are not so perfect. They do, however, tend to accomplish his goal of showing how Christian doctrine impacts life, and each individual human as well. Two particular points of emphasis will be considered.

            First, Lewis considers the point of Christian virtues, given that one is saved purely of faith and not of any merit. He writes, “Now there are a good many things which would not be worth bothering about if I were going to live only seventy years, but which I had better bother about very seriously if I am going to live for ever. Perhaps my bad temper . . . might be absolute hell in a million years” (68). He exposes that the inner man is either becoming more and more like Christ, or turning inwardly into self. This is why all three facets of morality (as Lewis outlined them) matter: they are intertwined so that they affect the others!

            Second, Lewis hints at here what has later been called his argument from desire. He writes, “If I find in myself a desire which no experience in this world can satisfy, the most probable explanation is that I was made for another world” (114). The critic may attempt to defeat Lewis’ underlying premise: for every natural desire there is some thing in existence that can satisfy it. Suppose someone has the desire to become the number 42, for example. There is nothing in the world that can satisfy this desire. But Lewis’ response may be two-fold. First, no one is born with such a desire. Second, if there is a natural desire present, this irrational desire is possibly reducible to it. The desire to be something else is a desire not to be inadequate, not to be limited, not to be finite, not to be contingent, not to be mortal, etc. The satisfaction of even this desire, then, may or may not be found in the world, but one can imagine that the Christian God fulfills these desires via eternal life!

            Next, someone may complain that Lewis presupposes some kind of telos or purpose to human existence. It is true that if there is no purpose to human existence, then God does not exist (and neither does eternal life). However, the “common man” does not believe life to be devoid of purpose, and thus this complaint just will not do for the majority of people. Additionally, one detects a kind of proper basicality to the belief that one’s life has objective purpose.

Weaknesses

            While I found much strength to Lewis’ arguments, I did not find much about which to complain. However, two sections will be considered. First, he writes, “Almost certainly God is not in Time” (138). This is quite a contentious claim! A counterexample seems to be found in the Incarnation itself: at one point, God (Jesus) did not have human flesh (a human nature), and at another point in time he did. This, however, Lewis combats by claiming such human nature as “somehow included in His whole divine life” (139). If there are no temporal parts to the experience of God, then it seems mysterious, if not contradictory, to suggest that Jesus’ humanity was an eternal, and hence metaphysically essential, part of Jesus’ life. To see why, consider this: suppose Jesus’ human nature is a timeless part of the divine life. Further suppose God actualizes a world containing no moral agents and no human creatures. It would therefore be a puzzling thing to say that Christ should have humanity as part of his nature. So suppose a defender of Lewis makes a counterfactual claim that were it to be the case that humans were not created, then it would be the case that Jesus would lack humanity as part of the divine life. But then it would be the case that the taking on of humanity was logically posterior to the contingent decision to create free human moral agents. Thus, there is a logical part of God’s life such that he does not have Jesus taking on human nature, and Lewis’ view seems to be incorrect.

            A second criticism focuses on Lewis’ “hard inclusivism.” He claims that it may be the case that God counts for righteousness the true faith of adherents of other major world religions, casting off the bad (165). This is only a minor criticism, because it does not affect his larger point in that chapter. However, it seems that he is overstating his case with respect to Old Testament saints prior to the patriarchs. It does not seem to be the case that these saints were adherents to other world religions at the same time they were regarded to be saints. At the very least, hard inclusivism seems to be more difficult to defend.

            This book was an extremely powerful defense of the doctrines of mere or basic Christianity. It was aimed at the unbeliever (for a rational defense), but there is much in this work for the believer as well. First, it models for believers how to speak to unbelievers concerning the doctrines of the Gospel. Second, it helps the believers to understand aspects of the faith that they never had before. Finally, it helps believers understand that Christian truth applies to every facet of life. This book comes highly recommended for everyone, regardless of age or ability.