Some Notes on My Recent Research

I’ve recently received some feedback on my PhD work that I have submitted so far. Without getting too far into it, I am writing a bit (for this current chapter) on the pairing problem. For those who are unfamiliar, the pairing problem basically says that it does not appear that there is anything in virtue of which a mental cause can be paired with a physical effect, and that where we can describe cause/effect pairings, we do so in a manner wholly descriptive of the physical (e.g., the cause is x distance away from the effect, the laws of nature are such-and-such, etc.). Thus, there probably (or necessarily!) is not any realistic way mental causes can be paired with physical effects.

This has traditionally been used to bring up a problem for dualist conceptions of action (where humans who have a soul can interact with the physical world, including their bodies). However, it has recently been applied by Andrei Buckareff to divine causation as well. This is where my current research comes in. I’d like to provide a potential positive model for divine causation, but in order to do so, I’ll need to interact with the divine pairing problem.

The feedback I received for my progression panel was really helpful. However, I was reminded that, in a PhD, there is a sense in which no one knows more of what you’ve written than you do. I am not claiming I am the world’s expert on the pairing problem (far from it); all I am saying is that I know what I mean to convey, why I am conveying it, etc., and this can be advantageous. One of the criticisms was that he thought it may result in the cause and effect being located in the same place, in which case we are still left with the question of what pairs the cause and effect together.

While I will need to take care to be clear on this, I think it makes the mistake of thinking that mental events are or can be located somewhere, if by located we mean “physically located.” A counterintuitive result of discussing mental events or substances as causes and physical location is that these events or substances as causes are not located anywhere! Nonetheless, I intend to work to undercut the pairing problem and to see if I can provide a positive model of God’s creative and sustaining interaction with the world.

An Update

Here is a brief update on what I am doing with my PhD. As some of you may know, I am currently enrolled in the PhD Philosophy program with the University of Birmingham (UK). I am doing the degree under Yujin Nagasawa, an excellent philosopher and already a helpful supervisor. My PhD topic is going to be on alternative concepts of God. Specifically, I want to study a particular argument for God-as-embodied (say, a Christian pantheism or panentheism) and critique it, using a reductio ad absurdum and whatever other tricks up my sleeve I might discover.

It is a three-year program at full-time speed. Thus, I would ask that you pray with me that I can balance work, teaching, family, church, and research all together in the best stewardship of my time. A disciplined exercise will be to write more, both on my research topic and other apologetic or theological topics more frequently. This will cut down on “warm up” time that seems to eat up so much of my research time.

Finally, I am attempting to write a few book reviews and apply for a conference and funding. I’d ask that you pray that I would have strength and that God’s will be done. Normally, I am on Facebook, but for rest reasons I am not returning to Facebook until November 9. Feel free to drop me a line here, and God bless!

Substance Dualism, Life after Death, and the Intermediate State

This essay concerns my view of post-mortem survival and whether or not there is an intermediate state. Being a Christian, I do believe in post-mortem survival (as all of us do, considering the resurrection). In this essay, I provide an account and support for what I believe, and defend against a few philosophical and theological objections.

Despite the fact that all Christians believe in a post-mortem survival, many Christians disagree over the nature of that survival. I believe in a resurrected body at the end of this particular time; once Christ has returned, he does so to judge the earth. At the resurrection, a new kind of body will be given to us, as foretold by the apostle Paul in 1 Corinthians 15, and confirmed in Revelation 20:5-6. This is an embodied state, joining soul and body together in a harmony not to be divided for the rest of time; it is the final, permanent, and eternal state with God. Those who do not believe are also resurrected. However, their resurrection is not to be with God, but to be without him in conscious and everlasting punishment.

What happens when one dies? It is my view that an A-theory of time is correct. If this is so, then when one dies, one is not removed from time in any real sense. Instead, moments pass and time moves forward for all. 2 Corinthians 5:8 suggests that “To be absent from the body . . . [is] to be present with the Lord” (KJV). If this is so, then upon death, the soul is separated from the body and goes to Heaven for the intermediate state. If one is an unbeliever, then he goes to an intermediate state of punishment (cf. Luke 16, possibly). This soul just is the person, as a real existence is needed in this eternal state. If the soul is not identical to the person, then the person does not exist in the intermediate state, which seems contrary to what Paul is saying here. Further, while one may argue that consciousness takes place even if a person is not technically in existence, it seems natural to assign consciousness to personhood; there just is not the kind of self-aware consciousness natural to humans without personhood associated with it. Thus, in order for a person to be absent from the body and to be present with the Lord, the person must be, at least in principle, separable from his body, and so enters the intermediate state.

There are a number of objections that can be lodged against my position. First, one can argue that either there is no intermediate state, or else that the biblical evidence for such a state can be undercut. For example, earlier in 2 Corinthians 5, Paul seems to be stating that we would be “naked” without a body, and we will not be found that way. Another interesting point is that the chapter does not seem to be speaking about the intermediate state at all, but rather connects this absence from the body with the judgment seat of Christ (cf. v. 10). If this is so, and Paul is concerned with the eschaton, then this passage refers not to any intermediate state whatsoever.

The answer to this objection is not definitive, and yet I still believe my view can survive. Consider the chapter itself, and a careful reading of the text will show that the heavenly house referred to in v. 2 is not necessarily the resurrected body. Instead, while it may very well include this information, it seems to be fitting in with Paul’s contrast between the temporal (or temporary) and the eternal (or everlasting) coming from the end of chapter 4. If this is so, the point is to show the distinction between the two competing things. The deeds done in the body do matter, but they matter precisely because of the judgment and because of who God is (and what he has designed us to do and to be). Further, there is a not-implausible interpretation of the text that suggests judgment occurs for the believer at death (cf. Hebrews 9:27, NASB). If this is so, then the intermediate state comes for the believer at death and upon the judgment seat of Christ.

Another objection could be that one should not even believe in an intermediate state (or at least not this version of it), because hylomorphic dualism is true. In this family of objections, you either need your numerically identical body or else some body that is yours; given the lack of a resurrection and the disembodied nature of the intermediate state, “you” do not exist in Heaven at all. Thus, either the intermediate state should be abandoned, or this particular view should, in favor of a diminished or otherwise-embodied existence.

I am not sure how much it makes sense to have a diminished existence where my soul is present but not me. To illustrate: what if it were reversed, and my body was present, but not me? I can only picture a zombie-like mass, without me there. With my soul, I could see responses to basic stimuli, but again, nothing like a person without me there. The point is only to say that diminished existence seems to be nothing like personal existence at all. Second, while one could receive a loaned body, it does not seem to be indicated anywhere in Scripture; it is only required philosophically on a particular form of hylomorphism.

Philosophically and theologically, one could also object that this is a kind of Gnosticism, where one places a higher value on the soul than on the body. But this need not be the case. First, the body should be valued due to stewardship concerns. God gave us these bodies and they should be taken care of well. Second, the judgment concerns our actions, all of which are done in the body. Thus, what we do here is of eternal significance, even on this view of SD. The view that states either the body is necessary to existence or else Gnosticism follows is making an error in evaluation.

Finally, a materialist could insist that there is no intermediate state since there is no evidence that such a state obtains. One could respond that there seem to have been credible near-death experiences (NDEs), and if there is even one accurate NDE, then dualism follows. While one could not draw many conclusions from NDEs, as they contain competing religious or metaphysical claims, all of them have a baseline agreement: there is a soul, and it survives the death of the body. NDEs warrant more, and careful, discussion and consideration. I believe the SD view of post-mortem survival is an accurate one, but I am open to having my mind changed on these issues.

My Basic Position on the Nature of Man

The position I hold can best be described as Cartesian substance dualism (hereafter SD). While I do not take on everything Descartes did, I do take on the basic thesis that the “I” of personhood is identical to the “soul,” and that there are two kinds of substances, immaterial and material. In this essay, I give a brief positive argument for and account of SD, while attempting to address philosophical and theological objections against it.

            While there are arguments for a broad kind of dualism, there is at least one argument for SD specifically that I take to be successful, and this is the modal argument. Briefly, it states:

1.                    The law of identity is true: If x is identical to y, then whatever is true of x is true of y and vice versa.

2.                    I can strongly conceive of myself as existing disembodied.

3.                    If I can strongly conceive of some state of affairs S that S possibly obtains, then I have good grounds for believing that S is possible.

4.                    Therefore, I have good grounds for believing of myself that it is possible for me to exist and be disembodied.

5.                    If some entity x is such that it is possible for x to exist without y, then (i) x is not identical to y, and (ii) y is not essential to x.

6.                    My body (or brain) is not such that it is possible to exist disembodied, i.e., my body (or brain) is essentially physical.

7.                    Therefore, I have good grounds for believing of myself that I am not identical to my body (or brain) and that my physical body is not essential to me.[1]

My account of SD is that the mind affects the brain, and the brain affects the mind. The mind does so at the level of agent-causation of intentions; it is the way the mind interacts with the physical world. The brain and body do so at the level of physical ability; if the body is injured such that it cannot physically function correctly or is otherwise diminished, then the soul’s (mind’s) ability to interact with the physical world is diminished as well.

There are objections both to this argument and SD in general. First, premises (2) and (3) may come into question. Several, such as Peter van Inwagen, question whether someone’s modal intuition can be such that he strongly conceives of himself as disembodied. Perhaps he merely has a lack of awareness that such a state of affairs is impossible (whether metaphysically or otherwise); but such a lack hardly constitutes a strong conceivability, but rather a weak one. However, it does seem that we can intuit that what we are is not this body; it seems we can have a positive conception after all. We do have such strong conceptions, modally, in other areas, so even if van Inwagen does not, why can I not do so?

Another potential objection comes to (3) in that perhaps it is the case that one can strongly conceive of something, and it may not be possible. The answer is to grant that this is so; however, the argument does not need a guarantee that the state of affairs is really possible; it only needs to be reliable such that one has justificatory grounds for thinking it is possible. It seems to me that this objection does not remove such justification; analogously, knowledge does not require certainty.

The most famous objection against SD is the interaction problem, which asks proponents how it is the immaterial can interact with the material. The first response is to note that everyone, save truly reductive materialists, has this problem (this is so when brain states give rise to mental properties, for example). Thus, a failure to have a definitive answer does not necessarily count decisively against it. Second, it should not affect Christians, as all orthodox Christians believe God, an immaterial being, created and acts on the material world. Third, it may be that the interaction is direct and immediate, and thus the question of the process that intervenes between the immaterial and material is a non-starter, and hence a category mistake. Fourth, we do not usually require that we know how something works in order to know that it works. It seems this may be an unfair requirement of proponents of SD in order to be justified in holding SD. Finally, it should be acknowledged that it is not clear precisely how the interaction between the soul and body takes place. Nonetheless, in showing what appears to be a coherent account, as explained above, proponents of SD can claim that while we are unsure of how it takes place, the way in which it may interact can be coherently discussed.

There are also theological objections to SD. Consider that if SD is correct, then the body is not necessary; if this is the case, then the resurrection in the eschaton is simply an added bonus. Yet this is not how the Bible seems to portray the resurrection: in fact, in 1 Corinthians 15, the resurrected body seems to be the primary goal. It is true that SD makes the resurrection unnecessary for a human person to be a person. Yet, even on SD, one can claim the resurrection is necessary in order for a human person to be what God designed him to be: embodied. This necessity, although colloquial, is nonetheless quite important. The endgame of Christianity is that God will restore what sin has damaged; God will have the victory. This includes the spiritual (e.g., the souls of men) as well as the physical (the earthly creation and physical universe). The kind of character God has is such that he will restore our bodies, either to judgment or reward. As such, the resurrection body we will have, although not metaphysically necessary to our mere existence, ensures we will have the quality of life we were meant to have.

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[1] J. P. Moreland, The Soul: How We Know It’s Real and Why It Matters (Chicago: Moody Publishers, 2014), 125-26.

The Modal Argument for Substance Dualism: A Spirited Defense, Part 2

Objections and Replies

If the premises of Moreland’s argument go through, then the conclusion is guaranteed to be true; this is to say no more than that his argument is deductively valid. Further, this establishes more than the thesis that physicalism is false; rather, it establishes that SD is true. There are three major lines of objection to this argument.

The first objection is what I am calling the “overdetermination objection.” This can best be explained by a contrast with a particular issue in the philosophy of science called underdetermination. This problem is that the data available to the scientist does not alone decide which theory or scientific hypothesis is to be preferred; the data can be said to underdetermine the truth of the hypothesis.[1] By contrast, overdetermination occurs when two or more entities or hypotheses are postulated and only one is necessary for the explanation of the data.

If there is the mind, then why does it affect the body? If there is the body, why does the mind exist? It seems that if the body is sufficient for the production of physical states (and it seems that it is), then there is no need for the mind. If the body does not produce mental states, then why would the body exist? Admittedly, this latter objection may not be uttered by anyone except for the idealist variety of monists; nonetheless, it highlights the issue of overdetermination. This can also be referred to as the issue of Ockham’s razor. This principle of simplicity states that, all else being equal, the simplest explanation is the one to be preferred. Since the body can sufficiently answer the questions presented, then, the mental is simply not needed.

The answer lies in the fact that the body is not sufficient for the mind. It is not the case that the physical brain states are sufficient to produce distinct mental states. Douglas Groothuis explores this answer when he writes, “There is a difference in kind between mental and physical states that has ontological implications,”[2] and this difference lies in the fact that the mental and physical have different kinds of properties. He writes, “Whatever differs in kind cannot be identical.”[3] Here is his example: physical stuff is not the same as mental stuff. A rock is not (morally) good or (morally) bad; a stick is not loving, and so on. But if this is the case, then the difference between the physical and mental is not one of degree (where it would be the case between two physical things and two mental things), but rather of kinds. And this difference in ontological properties is sufficient to render the two non-identical.

In a similar vein, Moreland and Craig ask the reader to consider the thought of a pink elephant. Even though, upon thinking of the pink elephant, there is such an entity in your mind, there is no location in the brain or body that is that representation or is that pink elephant entity.[4] Were brain states identical with mental states, there would be this representation. However, one cannot find it.

This is not precisely sufficient to solve the problem. This is because, while the preceding does show brain states and mental states to have different properties and hence to be non-identical, it does not show that brain states are not sufficient to give rise to mental states. Perhaps there is still only one substance, and yet both physical and mental states are present within the physical body as a singular substance. This seems to miss the point of the dialectic, however. In the problem of overdetermination (or the problem of simplicity), the claim is that the physical is sufficient to account for the mental. But it cannot account for particular aspects of the mental, such as mental concrete entities (such as thoughts) having no corresponding physical properties.[5] If this is true, then the conditions of the mental do not supervene on the conditions of the physical; indeed, they cannot, because of the types of things (or substances) that they are. If this is the case, then the only legitimate shot at avoiding a reductive physicalism is to embrace substance dualism, and thus overdetermination is actually not present.

The second major type of objection is the most famous: the interaction problem. Moreland and Craig explain this problem well when they summarize: “Physicalists claim that . . . mind and body are so different that it seems impossible to explain how and where the two different entities interact.”[6] How can an immaterial soul possibly have any impact on the material universe, especially a particular body? It would make sense were there to be some measurable transfer of energy from a soul to a body, but, given that the soul is an immaterial entity, there can be no such transfer. How, then, can we even reliably understand the interaction between body and soul?

It is noteworthy that Christians—even physicalist ones concerning anthropology—typically do not press this objection. This is because such an objection, if successful, would apply to God as well. Thus, any Christian who believes God can so interact with the world (immaterial with material) should not find his faith tremendously shaken with respect to SD. Second, Groothuis argues that a lack of knowledge on how something works is not positive evidence that it does not work at all.[7] He points out, “If a good case is made against materialism and for the objective existence of mind as an immaterial substance, then there is good evidence for dualism . . . . There are a number of puzzles and conundrums concerning the activity of subatomic particles, but their existence is nonetheless well established.”[8] The interaction problem, of course, does not go away on this response—nor should it. Instead, it places the problem in its proper perspective: it is not, by itself, a defeater for SD. In fact, it would need some kind of accompanying principle that claimed, “If SD were true, then we would know how the mental interacts with the physical.” However, it is unclear how this principle would be justified; as Groothuis effectively demonstrates, we do not hold scientific theories to such standards, so why do so here? As Moreland and Craig claim, “We often know that one thing causes another without having any idea of how causation takes place, even when the two items are different.”[9]

Next, the interaction problem may not even really be a true issue in the first place. It may be that even raising the question of how the mental and physical interact is very much like asking the libertarian (in issues of human freedom) “What made Jones choose as he did?” In the libertarian question, the question simply presumes the falsehood of libertarianism, since nothing, strictly speaking, made Jones do as he did. What Moreland and Craig are claiming is that it is possible that the interaction between the mental and the physical is not an indirect process or one that uses an intermediary (if it were, the request for an interaction source or method becomes quite clear). Instead, it may be that such interaction takes place directly, with no intermediary.[10] If this is right, the interaction question is a non-starter.

It still seems to me as though the substance dualist owes a positive account of what is going on with interaction, even if one takes the view that such interaction is direct and immediate. While I do not know precisely how they interact, I suppose the interaction takes place on the level of intentions for actions. This would be a form of agent-causation where one is able to agent-cause her intentions, and, so long as nothing interferes or the agent does not countermand her earlier intentions with new ones, she acts on those intentions. In these cases, what happens is the agent’s choice is a direct one, and it would start brain processes that lead to a decision for action (rather than merely intention). When the mind acts on the body, then, it does so in a causal process that leads to action unless a new intentional chain is started.

Actions that happen to the body, on the other hand, become less clear. It seems that the body is the physical vehicle the mind uses to interact with the physical world. If it is damaged such that it cannot be used, it impairs the mind’s ability to act within the physical world. This partially explains why injured persons seem not to be able to think (thinking does involve physical processes in the human body, even if the physical cannot fully account for thinking); they are tied interactively to the body. Admittedly, this is highly speculative, but it seems to fit the facts.

Notice the first two major lines of objection do not specifically rebut any given premise in (1-7) above. Rather, they take the form of broad challenges to SD generally, so that an opponent may say something like, “I do not know what is wrong with Moreland’s modal argument above, but given these challenges to SD, there must be something.” This third line of objection is much more specific. It challenges (2), which was: “I can strongly conceive of myself as existing disembodied.” The challenge is not that (2) is false, but rather that (2) is unjustified.

Stewart Goetz makes the distinction between weak and strong conceivability, and suggests that what is at play in Moreland’s argument is of the weak variety. The major concern, for Goetz, is that support for (2) will be hopelessly circular. In order to strongly conceive that I am not identical to my body, for example, I must be aware of the contingency of the embodiment relationship (Goetz’ term for the connection between soul and body). Of course, in order for me to be so aware, I must know that I am a substance distinct from my body. But this is precisely what we want to prove![11]

How may a proponent of Moreland’s argument respond? Moreland himself responds that we just seem to be aware of certain truths regarding ourselves and what we can and cannot do, and this awareness can serve to support (2).[12] Similarly, Moreland and Craig argue that we have a basic modal intuition, and we are acquainted with it directly. If we have direct knowledge that we are “enduring . . . [selves] who” exist “as the same possessor[s] of all . . . [our] experiences through time,” then this shows us “a person is not identical to his or her body . . . but rather is the thing that has them.”[13] Of course, if one knows this way that one can exist disembodied, then the contingency of the embodiment relationship and SD follows; this is just an entailment of the direct awareness, upon reflection. But this reflection is not question-begging nor circular. With these objections discussed, one must now turn to applications to the local church.

Application

There are at least two applications that can be made to the thesis that Moreland’s modal argument for SD can be justifiably held in the face of contemporary objections. First, we can have a real existence in the intermediate state. Paul wrote in 2 Corinthians 5:8, “We are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord” (KJV). Without getting into a full textual analysis and comparative Bible study, I assume there is an intermediate state. If there is, then it seems Paul is asserting that we exist in that intermediate state, even if we have no body. This is not available to most other views.[14] While it is true that even on SD, the resurrection body, which is greater than disembodied existence for humans, awaits, we nonetheless can exist as ourselves in the intermediate state; we will not fail to exist during that time.

Second, we have a strong motivation to take care of our earthly bodies, since God gives us at least two major reasons to do so. First, this is because we are judged according to the works we have done in the body on this earth. According to 2 Cor. 5:10, each one of us will be “recompensed for his deeds in the body, according to what he has done, whether good or bad” (NASB). Second, and closely related, the body we have been given requires our stewardship. Just as God could have given us a different earth (or perhaps even a different kind of earth), nonetheless, this is the one we have, and we must take care of it as good and wise stewards. Similarly, this is the body we have been given by God, and we must take care of it. Proponents of SD should never minimize either the future or current importance of the body, whether imperfect (as now) or perfect (as in the resurrection).

Conclusion

This paper purported to show that Moreland’s modal argument for SD can be justifiably held in the face of contemporary objections. First, I expounded on premises (1-7), exploring both the deductive validity and reasons for affirming the premises. Second, I examined three major lines of objection and provided responses to them. These responses, I took it, were sufficient to undercut their force against SD. Finally, I provided two basic applications for believers in SD within the local church. Moreland’s modal argument, while not decisive for everyone, should at least be sufficient for the traditional believer in SD to be justified in holding it.

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[1] Samir Okasha, Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 71.

[2] Douglas Groothuis, Christian Apologetics (Downers Growe, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2011), 394.

[3] Ibid., 395.

[4] Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 234.

[5] Groothuis, 395.

[6] Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 243.

[7] Groothuis, 403.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 243. David Hume and his views on causation notwithstanding.

[10] Ibid., 243-44.

[11] Goetz, 45. This works against (2) since in order to know that you can exist disembodied, you must know that you are a substance distinct from your body. But that is just to assume SD, and hence the same circularity arises.

[12] Moreland, The Soul, 127.

[13] Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 238.

[14] This is available to a hylomorphic view that does not take a numerically identical body to be necessary (e.g., one must simply have a body that is hers, not the numerically same body as on earth).