Is the A-Theory Properly Basic?

In the last blogpost, we covered the A and B theories of time. I also mentioned the fact that the A-theory, being the theory most comfortable with our tensed language, is the most intuitive.[1] But there is another issue to consider. Is belief in the A-theory of time properly basic? More explicitly, is belief that things are objectively coming into and going out of existence—that time is really passing—properly basic?

First, we should understand proper basicality. I’m not going to explain the whole thing here (I actually want to keep this somewhat brief). However, I will say that some belief is properly basic when one is rational for holding the belief, even if he does not have evidential, non-circular justification for it. Consider, for example, the laws of logic (specifically let’s take the law of noncontradiction). Suppose you cannot quite explain why the law of noncontradiction holds. Suppose (as is the case) you cannot give non-circular justification for why you believe this law. Are you irrational for holding it? No, in fact you are at the height of rationality in holding it, and would be in the depths of irrationality in so denying it. When one tries to articulate the justification for her beliefs, there will come a stopping point (that is, when she tries to spell out just how she knows that she knows, for example). That stopping point is most plausibly a foundation. Some belief is foundational, then, as it is properly basic. Other beliefs may be quite right and rational to hold, but they will be properly based—that is, they will be deduced from properly basic beliefs (or at least can be).

This isn’t to say that properly basic beliefs cannot be defeated; they certainly can. It is a properly basic belief to take one’s perceptive faculties as delivering the truth of the world around you; generally, you can trust what you see as being true. However, this doesn’t mean your eyes can never play tricks on you, or that you can never be wrong. It appears, from our view, that the sun rises; but our best science says that is mistaken.

So, is the A-theory like this? Is belief that time passes such that it is properly basic? Well, it seems that it is. It’s quite intuitive to think that there is such a thing as “now,” and that tensed language describes the truth of the matter. Combining this view with a view of warranted true belief (a theory of knowledge) called proper functionalism will illustrate this.

Proper functionalism is the view that a belief is warranted just in case it is produced by cognitively reliable faculties operating in a proper epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth. Our cognitive faculties do seem to be generally reliable, which is helpful for survival. And, we do operate in an appropriate epistemic environment in general. However, what about the belief that tensed language is true? Is our environment proper for that? I don’t see that we’re in an epistemic environment that’s inappropriate (for example, we don’t have reason to think that an evil demon is manipulating our thoughts so that we merely think time is passing in such a way). And, for Christians especially, we have good reason to think that the design plan is successfully aimed at truth. So it seems then, that the A-theory is both properly basic and stands as warranted, in the absence of a defeater.[2]

Now some may protest: “But won’t this mean just any belief counts as warranted, so long as you believe it?” No, for a number of reasons: first, there are defeaters for any number of beliefs. Second, there are beliefs formed from improperly functioning cognitive faculties (such as would be the case were I suddenly to form the belief that I had made myself invisible through a loud whooshing noise). We could go on, but it wouldn’t be the case that just any and all beliefs would be permissible.

Tensed language is an important part of our lives, and I suspect that it’s nearly impossible to rid ourselves of, even while paying lipservice to the B-theory. Thus, I hold to the A-theory as a quite intuitive one!

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[1] I realize this is controversial, and one could be forgiven for claiming that this theory is no more intuitive than the one where spacetime exists as a four-dimensional block. But I submit such a view is not really intuitive at all; rather, it is a view that has been ingrained in us by years of repetition and education. This is not a bad thing, but it’s not intuition. It’s a presupposition—taken for granted, perhaps—but not an intuition.

[2] Of course, one may shrug her shoulders and simply say, “Well, I’ve got your defeater right here.” So be it. My main concern is that belief in the A-theory is properly basic, or at least warranted in the lack of a good defeater.

  

What about Theories of Time?

In this post, I’ll attempt to explain the basics of two major theories of time and some implications.[1] They are called, perhaps unimaginatively, the A-theory and the B-theory of time. Currently, the B-theory is the most popular view, and so we shall explore this first.[2]

The B-theory of time is also called the “static” theory of time. This is because time is not literally moving; things are not really coming into and going out of existence, as it may seem. The most common version of this theory is the theory of four-dimensional spacetime. This spacetime forms a block, along which lie a great many points. Any event that happens in time, then, can be located or indexed to a particular point in spacetime (this, along with the flux capacitor, is what makes time travel possible). While once regarded as a heuristic, it is now taken to be the sober truth by most popular understandings of physics. Early Einstein, for example, did not believe in the literal truth of spacetime.[3] However, it has been propounded enough that most people believe that time is as much of a physical entity as is space (in fact, they are bound together in a spacetime block!). This theory is also referred to as the “tenseless” theory of time, since tensed language is not literal, but instead stands for the particular indexed point along spacetime. For an example, if I say “I will go to the store in one hour,” and it is now 2 pm on Saturday, I am really saying, “I go to the store at 3pm on Saturday” (it’s actually much more specific than this); the idea is that our language is a simpler way of communicating a complex, and more specific, truth.

The A-theory of time is also called the “dynamic” theory of time. This is because time really is moving; things are really changing; things are really coming into and going out of existence, just as it seems. On this view, there really is such a thing as an objective “now” (whereas there is not on B-theory). On this view, there is not really any such thing as the spacetime block. Events are not spatiotemporally indexed to particular points along the block. Instead, an event (such as, say, Washington’s becoming the first U.S. president) comes into being during a particular moment and then passes out of being once the object of the event no longer exists (in this case, the “becoming”; there was a moment when Washington was not the president; the next moment, he is becoming the president; a moment later, he simply is the president, or he had become the president). This theory is also referred to as the “tensed” theory of time, since tensed language is literally describing the truth of the matter. Many people believe that the A-theory implies the truth of presentism, the teaching that only the present moment exists.

There are advantages that A-theory has over B-theory, and I’d like to list/talk about a few of them:

1.     It takes our tensed language seriously.

This one might be quite big. It’s a tall order to suggest that all of our sentences using tensed language are literally false. Further, it accords with our intuition that there really is a “right now” to talk about. Speaking of which:

2.     It allows us to use “now” for necessary language.

The tensed theory gives us important information, such as “Your flight is leaving now!” The tenseless theory can give us information, such as “Your flight is leaving at 4pm,” but it cannot communicate to you that it is now 4 pm. In fact, while you can look at a clock and all of that good stuff to get on the plane, the tenseless theory alone cannot account for a crucial fact that the tensed theory can; namely, it is now 4 pm.

3.     It allows for evil to be truly vanquished.

When Christ comes and the eschaton is fully realized, evil events and actions will not exist.[4] On the B-theory, the worst evils ever committed are always there, in their full existence, indexed along the block. Nothing God does or even can do rids these actions from the block. This seems like an issue, but it may not move everyone.

4.     It gives a more intuitive understanding of temporal persons.

The issue of how to persist through time is one that has plagued philosophers. An “essential parts” doctrine might make sense here, where you persist through time just in case you have the parts that are essentially you present at any and all times at which you exist (substance dualism tends to do well with this). However, at the B-theory, it is difficult to see how it is that you exist at any one time. You are a discrete bundle of time-slices that is not wholly present at any one time. Are any of the individual time-slices you? It seems that it may not be. Regardless of any putative answers, on an A-theory you are wholly present at every moment at which you exist; this is far more intuitive than the B-theory.

Nonetheless, B-theorists believe they can offer advantages over the A-theory as well, and they are worth explanation:

1.     God may be able to avoid being temporal.

On an A-theory, it seems difficult to construe God as being outside of time; if there is an objective now, it seems that if God is sustaining this present “now” in existence, then God is sustaining the present “now” in existence, well, now. If that is so, then on an A-theory, God is in time. While there are potential answers that some A-theorists may attempt, it’s worth noting that, on B-theory, it looks like God can simply interact with the spacetime block and, since time just is the block, be outside of it.

2.     The redeemed are experiencing their glorification.

While it would be a mistake to say the redeemed are experiencing their final glorification now (at least, it would be if they are not currently dead nor are we in the eschaton), it nonetheless is true, on a B-theory, that the redeemed are worshipping around the throne in eternal bliss with God at particular spatiotemporal points that lie along the block in our relative (but non-literal) future. The A-theory cannot account for this, instead having to say that, while the Earthly living saints are not experiencing eternal bliss in glorification with God, one day they will—that will become reality. This point in favor of the B-theory has been theologically attractive to many.

Interestingly, which theory you adopt (or unconsciously assume) can lead you to accept or reject various other arguments in philosophical theology. Even now, I find myself reading an essay and will think, “This only works if such-and-such theory of time is true!” So what do I think? I think the A-theory is true, as I find myself very attracted to intuitive views in philosophy. My point in this article, though, is to suggest that any view one adopts will have problems, and any view one adopts will have advantages over the other. Pick your favorite set and have fun! J

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[1] I am aware that there are more than two theories; there are different versions of A and B theories, and there are even hybrid attempts between the two. Nonetheless, I am going to try to describe either what the various views have in common (e.g., what makes a theory an A-theory), or the most popular version of one of the major two theories. I hope I can be forgiven for this in a blog post.

[2] I’ve noticed something quite interesting about the popular understanding of time, however: people hold contradictory notions of it. I suspect that large part of this is due to people’s natural intuitions clashing with common scientific language about the nature of time. That’s a post for another . . . time, I guess.

[3] Mitch Stokes, How to Be an Atheist (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2016), 107. It is worth noting that after he had developed his theories on relativity and espoused them, he came to accept a realist view of these entities.

[4] It should be noted, however, that there is a crucial caveat which must be addressed: for those who do not embrace some kind of annihilationism or universalism (which I do not), then it may be that evil events take place throughout eternity, on either view. This would be so if the condemned in Hell accrue further punishment by acting in evil rebellion toward God.

The Principle of Bivalence and Tensed Truths in Possible Worlds

The Principle of Bivalence (PB) says, basically, that for any proposition P, either P or not-P.[1] That is, PB says P is either true or false. A possible world is something like a maximal description of propositions (like P) or else states of affairs (which of course contain propositions). This can seem like a problem for the Molinist who embraces an A-theory of time (more on that later), since, if a possible world W contains a maximal description of all propositions, this will include tensed propositions. An A-theory of time states that tensed-talk, like “He will do such-and-such,” or “She was there,” etc., all express real features of objective reality, and not merely subjective experiences. That is to say, A-theorists about time think that tensed-talk is all true, instead of a literally false but linguistically unavoidable heuristic (as on a B-theory). So what’s supposed to be the problem?

Well, if an A-theory is true, then descriptions of W are going to include tensed truths like “Jim will eat a hot dog in one hour.” But what sense does that make in W, which is a complete description of all propositions? It seems that proposition would be both true and false. “I know how to solve this,” you might think, “Just point out that ‘Jim will eat a hot dog in one hour,’ is a tenseless statement roughly equivalent to, ‘Jim eats the hot dog at time t+1h,’ where t is some specific time, and the +1h is meant to indicate the tenseless ‘later-than’ relation.” I think that’s a very correct account of what’s going on. But then notice it seems that, if Molinism is true, tensed statements don’t appear to be a part of possible worlds. We thus seem to have to jettison A-theory, Molinism, this particular account of possible worlds, or some combination. None of that seems appealing.

So how can we solve this? This is where PB comes in. The objecting argument above has assumed something like this is true:

It must be the case that one of the following is true in W:

1.     Jim will eat a hot dog in one hour.

or

2.     Jim will not eat a hot dog in one hour.

To see why this is fallacious, consider this proposition: “I still beat my wife.” According to PB, supposedly anyway, it must be that either one of the following is true:

3.     I still beat my wife.

4.     I do not still beat my wife.

But notice the problem? This implies: a) that you beat your wife, and b) that you have a wife. Perhaps it is the case that one or both of these conditions is unsatisfied. So do we say PB has gone wrong? Not at all. Instead, PB actually isn’t saying, necessarily, either (3) or (4). Instead, what is necessary is either (3) or

5.     It is not the case that I still beat my wife.

Now (5) can be asserted just in the case that: a) you no longer beat your wife, b) you did not ever beat your wife, or c) you do not have a wife. And from this it becomes apparent that (3) or (5) is the state of affairs that PB demands, not (3) or (4). And from this, it becomes apparent what our application will be. For it is not (1) or (2) that is being demanded by PB, but instead (1) or

6.     It is not the case that Jim will eat a hot dog in one hour.

Taken this way, PB demanding (1) or (6) means (6) can be asserted under the following conditions: a) Jim does not exist in W (that is, he is uninstantiated in W); b) that tensed statements are false; c) hot dogs do not exist in W. Let’s stipulate (a) and (c) are unsatisfied (that is, Jim and hot dogs are instantiated in W). So, (b) isn’t open to the Molinist who is an A-theorist, right? Wrong!

The Molinist can just employ William Lane Craig’s strategy of saying that time had a first moment, and, thus, God is timeless without the creation, and in time subsequent to it.[2] This means that, logically prior to the first moment of time, no tensed propositions were true; nothing like (1) would be true, (6) would instead. Then, propositions like (1) would become true (see that objective becoming, just like A-theory says?!) upon both: a) God’s actualizing the world, and b) the relevant time applying. So (1), for example, would still be false, until one hour prior to the state of affairs of Jim’s eating a hot dog.[3] Thus, it seems the Molinist can have his cake and eat it too, at least with respect to the A-theory, a first moment in time, and possible worlds semantics.

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[1] I am deliberately mixing this with the Law of Excluded Middle for simplicity; just take the not-propositions as affirming that the “false” side of the original proposition is true.

[2] William Lane Craig, “Timelessness and Omnitemporality,” Philosophia Christi, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2000:), 29-33.

[3] Interestingly, this type of proposition (1) can be false, become true, become false again, and then become true, because it’s not dependent on any specific hot dog; it is true just in case the state of affairs Jim’s eating a hot dog is true one hour from the point in time objectively considered.

God and Time

When it comes to statements on God’s relationship to time, laymen in the church usually hold logically contradictory positions. Oh, when you ask them what position they take, it’s typically only one. But if you listen long enough, the church has typically an incoherent view of God and time. While I don’t suspect that everyone will agree with the approach that I take, I do try to take a logically cohesive view that the biblical record at least allows for.

First, let’s show what I mean by “laymen incoherence.”[1] Well, a typical statement will come in the form of a biblical quote: “A day with the Lord is as a thousand years, and a thousand years is as one day.” (2 Peter 3:8) From this, we are assured, “Time is meaningless to God; hence, God exists outside of time.” Yet in other conversations, virtually all of these same laymen will say things like “God knew from eternity past that you would do such-and-such,” or make some other reference to “eternity past.” Well, if God was in the past, that is a temporal relation, and so God exists inside temporal relations. But now we have a contradiction: God both exists inside and outside of time.

So, let’s see if we can solve the problem by appealing to the biblical text. “After all,” the concerned layman can reply, “If 2 Peter teaches that God is outside of time, I’ll just have to be more careful about speaking of ‘eternity past,’ is all. Problem solved.” But maybe not. Psalm 90:2 says, “Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God” [emphasis mine]. If God lasts from an everlasting duration to an everlasting duration, then God is in time.

The atemporalist[2] can just insist that Psalms uses poetic language, however, and use 2 Peter 3:8 as a “control text” by which we can interpret other texts that seem to suggest God is in time. However, it isn’t clear this can be done so easily. Consider texts like “In the beginning…” from Genesis 1 and John 1 that seem to indicate divine temporal activity. Why does 2 Peter 3:8 get to be the control text and not Genesis 1:1?

Further, the biblical text itself does not intend to teach much, if anything, about the nature of time or God’s relationship to it. Consider, for an example, 1 Corinthians 2:7, which states in part that God “ordained before the world unto our glory” (KJV). Besides seemingly teaching that God is involved in temporal relations, the Greek word behind “world” is the word aiwvnwn. This is why other translations will render that last phrase as “before time began.” That, taken literally, is an incoherent concept. It’s like saying something is on Earth that is north of the North Pole. But we shouldn’t want to ascribe incoherence to the biblical record. Therefore, it’s most plausibly not trying to teach us about the nature of time or God’s relationship to it. In fact, at bottom, it’s not too difficult to see that the Bible isn’t trying to teach us about God’s relationship to time in 2 Peter 3:8. Context shows that Peter is teaching about judgment of those who mock and scoff at God’s Word. Peter makes an allusion to Noah’s Flood, which was a judgment, and contrasts that with a future judgment, a “Day of the Lord” (vs. 7, 10). Verse 7 talks about “the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men.” Even though judgment has been reserved for the future, and even though it has been a long time without God’s coming (v. 4), nonetheless, God’s judgment is coming. This is the parallelism of verse 8. Oh, it seems like a long time with no judgment, but when it comes, it really comes! Further, Peter is explaining the reason for the delay of judgment: according to verse 9, God is not willing that any should perish. Peter’s just using figurative language to explain the context of what’s going on.

So, if the biblical text cannot settle the matter one way or the other, since it doesn’t seem to intend to teach on God and time, then have we any hope? I think we do, although we should hold such things tentatively. I want to explain my position and then present two brief arguments for it. My position is identical to William Lane Craig’s: I believe that time had a beginning, and thus God is atemporal without the creation, and temporal (in time) subsequent to creation. Here’s the argument for time’s beginning:

1.     If time had no beginning, then an actually infinite number of moments has elapsed.

2.     It is not the case that an actually infinite number of moments has elapsed.

3.     Therefore, time had a beginning.

I won’t go into detail defending (1) and (2) here, but most people on every side of the debate (inside of Christianity, and even science) agree that time had a beginning.

4.     If there are tensed truths, then God knows them.

5.     If God knows tensed truths, then he is in time.

6.     There are tensed truths.

7.     Therefore, God is in time.

These premises need brief defenses. (4) just is a consequence of omniscience. Since God is omniscient, he knows all true propositions and does not believe any false ones. We’ll get into what “tensed truths” are in a moment. So that should be set for orthodox Christians. But why should we think (5) is true? Take the tensed truth, “The plane will depart.” If God knows the tensed truth, “The plane will depart,” then it must be the case the plane will depart in the future. Why? If it were not to be the case that the plane will depart in the future, then God would have a false belief, which contradicts our conception of omniscience. But then this means the event of the plane’s leaving is in the future relative to God. But then it follows, by definition, that God stands in temporal relations (i.e., is in time). What about (6)? A tensed truth is a truth that intends the tense found in language to be a real feature of reality: It’s really true that I will go to sleep, and then I will no longer be asleep (at least, hopefully), so that I was asleep. Tensed-talk is so ingrained in not only our language but our very thought structure that it seems nearly crazy to claim that all of these descriptions are literally false. But if so, it would take a very powerful argument to make us think tensed truths are not real. So (6) seems to stay. But if that is the case, then God is in time.

I’m not going to pretend there are no responses to my position and arguments. But I do think that my position is a reasonable one to take, and one for which the Bible allows.

                                                                                       

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[1] Please do not view any of this as pejorative or as a superiority issue. We’re all brothers and sisters, and we’re all here, in part, to help sharpen each other’s thinking.

[2] “Atemporalist” is the term we use for those who say God exists outside of time.