Substance Dualism, Life after Death, and the Intermediate State

This essay concerns my view of post-mortem survival and whether or not there is an intermediate state. Being a Christian, I do believe in post-mortem survival (as all of us do, considering the resurrection). In this essay, I provide an account and support for what I believe, and defend against a few philosophical and theological objections.

Despite the fact that all Christians believe in a post-mortem survival, many Christians disagree over the nature of that survival. I believe in a resurrected body at the end of this particular time; once Christ has returned, he does so to judge the earth. At the resurrection, a new kind of body will be given to us, as foretold by the apostle Paul in 1 Corinthians 15, and confirmed in Revelation 20:5-6. This is an embodied state, joining soul and body together in a harmony not to be divided for the rest of time; it is the final, permanent, and eternal state with God. Those who do not believe are also resurrected. However, their resurrection is not to be with God, but to be without him in conscious and everlasting punishment.

What happens when one dies? It is my view that an A-theory of time is correct. If this is so, then when one dies, one is not removed from time in any real sense. Instead, moments pass and time moves forward for all. 2 Corinthians 5:8 suggests that “To be absent from the body . . . [is] to be present with the Lord” (KJV). If this is so, then upon death, the soul is separated from the body and goes to Heaven for the intermediate state. If one is an unbeliever, then he goes to an intermediate state of punishment (cf. Luke 16, possibly). This soul just is the person, as a real existence is needed in this eternal state. If the soul is not identical to the person, then the person does not exist in the intermediate state, which seems contrary to what Paul is saying here. Further, while one may argue that consciousness takes place even if a person is not technically in existence, it seems natural to assign consciousness to personhood; there just is not the kind of self-aware consciousness natural to humans without personhood associated with it. Thus, in order for a person to be absent from the body and to be present with the Lord, the person must be, at least in principle, separable from his body, and so enters the intermediate state.

There are a number of objections that can be lodged against my position. First, one can argue that either there is no intermediate state, or else that the biblical evidence for such a state can be undercut. For example, earlier in 2 Corinthians 5, Paul seems to be stating that we would be “naked” without a body, and we will not be found that way. Another interesting point is that the chapter does not seem to be speaking about the intermediate state at all, but rather connects this absence from the body with the judgment seat of Christ (cf. v. 10). If this is so, and Paul is concerned with the eschaton, then this passage refers not to any intermediate state whatsoever.

The answer to this objection is not definitive, and yet I still believe my view can survive. Consider the chapter itself, and a careful reading of the text will show that the heavenly house referred to in v. 2 is not necessarily the resurrected body. Instead, while it may very well include this information, it seems to be fitting in with Paul’s contrast between the temporal (or temporary) and the eternal (or everlasting) coming from the end of chapter 4. If this is so, the point is to show the distinction between the two competing things. The deeds done in the body do matter, but they matter precisely because of the judgment and because of who God is (and what he has designed us to do and to be). Further, there is a not-implausible interpretation of the text that suggests judgment occurs for the believer at death (cf. Hebrews 9:27, NASB). If this is so, then the intermediate state comes for the believer at death and upon the judgment seat of Christ.

Another objection could be that one should not even believe in an intermediate state (or at least not this version of it), because hylomorphic dualism is true. In this family of objections, you either need your numerically identical body or else some body that is yours; given the lack of a resurrection and the disembodied nature of the intermediate state, “you” do not exist in Heaven at all. Thus, either the intermediate state should be abandoned, or this particular view should, in favor of a diminished or otherwise-embodied existence.

I am not sure how much it makes sense to have a diminished existence where my soul is present but not me. To illustrate: what if it were reversed, and my body was present, but not me? I can only picture a zombie-like mass, without me there. With my soul, I could see responses to basic stimuli, but again, nothing like a person without me there. The point is only to say that diminished existence seems to be nothing like personal existence at all. Second, while one could receive a loaned body, it does not seem to be indicated anywhere in Scripture; it is only required philosophically on a particular form of hylomorphism.

Philosophically and theologically, one could also object that this is a kind of Gnosticism, where one places a higher value on the soul than on the body. But this need not be the case. First, the body should be valued due to stewardship concerns. God gave us these bodies and they should be taken care of well. Second, the judgment concerns our actions, all of which are done in the body. Thus, what we do here is of eternal significance, even on this view of SD. The view that states either the body is necessary to existence or else Gnosticism follows is making an error in evaluation.

Finally, a materialist could insist that there is no intermediate state since there is no evidence that such a state obtains. One could respond that there seem to have been credible near-death experiences (NDEs), and if there is even one accurate NDE, then dualism follows. While one could not draw many conclusions from NDEs, as they contain competing religious or metaphysical claims, all of them have a baseline agreement: there is a soul, and it survives the death of the body. NDEs warrant more, and careful, discussion and consideration. I believe the SD view of post-mortem survival is an accurate one, but I am open to having my mind changed on these issues.

My Basic Position on the Nature of Man

The position I hold can best be described as Cartesian substance dualism (hereafter SD). While I do not take on everything Descartes did, I do take on the basic thesis that the “I” of personhood is identical to the “soul,” and that there are two kinds of substances, immaterial and material. In this essay, I give a brief positive argument for and account of SD, while attempting to address philosophical and theological objections against it.

            While there are arguments for a broad kind of dualism, there is at least one argument for SD specifically that I take to be successful, and this is the modal argument. Briefly, it states:

1.                    The law of identity is true: If x is identical to y, then whatever is true of x is true of y and vice versa.

2.                    I can strongly conceive of myself as existing disembodied.

3.                    If I can strongly conceive of some state of affairs S that S possibly obtains, then I have good grounds for believing that S is possible.

4.                    Therefore, I have good grounds for believing of myself that it is possible for me to exist and be disembodied.

5.                    If some entity x is such that it is possible for x to exist without y, then (i) x is not identical to y, and (ii) y is not essential to x.

6.                    My body (or brain) is not such that it is possible to exist disembodied, i.e., my body (or brain) is essentially physical.

7.                    Therefore, I have good grounds for believing of myself that I am not identical to my body (or brain) and that my physical body is not essential to me.[1]

My account of SD is that the mind affects the brain, and the brain affects the mind. The mind does so at the level of agent-causation of intentions; it is the way the mind interacts with the physical world. The brain and body do so at the level of physical ability; if the body is injured such that it cannot physically function correctly or is otherwise diminished, then the soul’s (mind’s) ability to interact with the physical world is diminished as well.

There are objections both to this argument and SD in general. First, premises (2) and (3) may come into question. Several, such as Peter van Inwagen, question whether someone’s modal intuition can be such that he strongly conceives of himself as disembodied. Perhaps he merely has a lack of awareness that such a state of affairs is impossible (whether metaphysically or otherwise); but such a lack hardly constitutes a strong conceivability, but rather a weak one. However, it does seem that we can intuit that what we are is not this body; it seems we can have a positive conception after all. We do have such strong conceptions, modally, in other areas, so even if van Inwagen does not, why can I not do so?

Another potential objection comes to (3) in that perhaps it is the case that one can strongly conceive of something, and it may not be possible. The answer is to grant that this is so; however, the argument does not need a guarantee that the state of affairs is really possible; it only needs to be reliable such that one has justificatory grounds for thinking it is possible. It seems to me that this objection does not remove such justification; analogously, knowledge does not require certainty.

The most famous objection against SD is the interaction problem, which asks proponents how it is the immaterial can interact with the material. The first response is to note that everyone, save truly reductive materialists, has this problem (this is so when brain states give rise to mental properties, for example). Thus, a failure to have a definitive answer does not necessarily count decisively against it. Second, it should not affect Christians, as all orthodox Christians believe God, an immaterial being, created and acts on the material world. Third, it may be that the interaction is direct and immediate, and thus the question of the process that intervenes between the immaterial and material is a non-starter, and hence a category mistake. Fourth, we do not usually require that we know how something works in order to know that it works. It seems this may be an unfair requirement of proponents of SD in order to be justified in holding SD. Finally, it should be acknowledged that it is not clear precisely how the interaction between the soul and body takes place. Nonetheless, in showing what appears to be a coherent account, as explained above, proponents of SD can claim that while we are unsure of how it takes place, the way in which it may interact can be coherently discussed.

There are also theological objections to SD. Consider that if SD is correct, then the body is not necessary; if this is the case, then the resurrection in the eschaton is simply an added bonus. Yet this is not how the Bible seems to portray the resurrection: in fact, in 1 Corinthians 15, the resurrected body seems to be the primary goal. It is true that SD makes the resurrection unnecessary for a human person to be a person. Yet, even on SD, one can claim the resurrection is necessary in order for a human person to be what God designed him to be: embodied. This necessity, although colloquial, is nonetheless quite important. The endgame of Christianity is that God will restore what sin has damaged; God will have the victory. This includes the spiritual (e.g., the souls of men) as well as the physical (the earthly creation and physical universe). The kind of character God has is such that he will restore our bodies, either to judgment or reward. As such, the resurrection body we will have, although not metaphysically necessary to our mere existence, ensures we will have the quality of life we were meant to have.

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[1] J. P. Moreland, The Soul: How We Know It’s Real and Why It Matters (Chicago: Moody Publishers, 2014), 125-26.

Keeping the First Commandment

In dealing with the applicability of the Old Testament Law to contemporary times, and in showing a possible application of the interpretation of the OT Law in viewing the Sabbath (the fourth commandment), I decided I wanted to talk very briefly about each of the other Ten Commandments as well. Some of them will have more obvious principles than others. While I don’t intend to mine out all of the possible applications that can be had, I do want to highlight a few for each one. Today, the first commandment will be discussed.

What is the first commandment? Exodus 20:2-3 says, “I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. Thou shalt have no other gods before me.” This very simple commandment is also very straightforward: the other cultures of the Ancient Near East (ANE) were very polytheistic, often adding gods where other conquering cultures moved in. God is telling the Hebrew people who had recently been freed from Egypt that in no uncertain terms were they to do that. That’s a pretty easy interpretation.

But what about application? As I said to a church yesterday, “It’s not like any of you are in danger of going home to your Buddhist shrines and worshipping idols or whatever.” And that is largely true of us in Western culture. We don’t tend to overtly worship idols. But what does this mean for us, then? Of what relevance is it? First, there is the obvious application of things or pursuits or even other people that can take the place of God, and become de facto gods in our lives. I am wanting to pursue a PhD. If I am not very careful, that idea of a PhD may be what drives what I do every day, instead of the worship of a very holy God. I must actively guard against that.

But there are other biblical texts that can show us the true reach of the first commandment. Next, we want to take note of texts that tell us to love God with every part of our being. Deuteronomy 6:5 implores Israel: “And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might,” while Matthew 22:37 implores followers of Christ: “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind,” while Mark has the expanded meaning (showing the duality of meaning potentially in the Hebrew of Deuteronomy) in 12:30: “And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength: this is the first commandment.”[1] So it’s not enough to say merely that we’re not worshipping another god directly, or even replacing him with daily items. We must instead worship him with every facet of our being.

So how do we do that? The Bible is not silent on this either. Take the Pauline epistles, for just one brief example. 1 Corinthians 10:31, in a discussion on Christian liberty, Paul exhorts the church at Corinth thusly: “…Whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God.” And again in Colossians 3:17, 23: “And whatever ye do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God and the Father by him…And whatsoever ye do, do it heartily, as to the Lord, and not unto men.” These verses form a kind of general principle in family relationships (the former verse) and employment relationships (the latter). We love God with every area of our being by loving God in everything that we do, every day. We don’t get an off-day for loving God. On the flip side, if we are doing all to God’s glory, and thus loving him with all of our being, then we will be fulfilling the spirit and intent of the first commandment: that the biblical God is the only one we will serve.

So how are you doing in this regard? Are you fulfilling the intent of the first commandment? Once we have understood what the commandment is truly about, it becomes apparent that it’s not merely a prohibition of something negative, but an exhortation to do something positive. What will you do now with the first commandment? Discuss below!

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[1] This sense of “first” is the one of priority or importance, not necessarily first in a series. It refers directly to Deuteronomy 6, but I contend its importance is due to its logical extension of the first commandment of the Ten Commandments.

Ancient Comments on Easter

“For I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures; And that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day according to the scriptures: And that he was seen of Cephas, then of the twelve: After that, he was seen of above five hundred brethren at once; of whom the greater part remain unto this present, but some are fallen asleep. After that, he was seen of James, then of all the apostles. And last of all he was seen of me also, as one born out of due time . . . Now if Christ be preached that he rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there be no resurrection from the dead, then is Christ not risen: And if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain . . . And if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins. Then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished. If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable. But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the firstfruits of them that slept. For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive . . . O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory? The sting of death is sin; and the strength of sin is the law. But thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore, my beloved brethren, be ye stedfast, unmoveable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, forasmuch as ye know that your labour is not in vain in the Lord.”

Paul, in his first letter to the church at Corinth, 15: 3-8, 12-14, 17-22, 55-58.

Atheists and the Need for God to Exist for Moral Epistemology

          Typically, an atheist will ask, “Why can’t an atheist know and do good without God?” The usual (and quite helpful) response is that, yes, atheists can know and do good without acknowledging God in their lives. However, the main point is the foundation or grounding of the good—and that is plausibly not anything other than God. While this response is adequate, and frames the debate in terms of ontology rather than epistemology, I want to focus a bit on the epistemological claim. I want to say, as a word of warning, that I mean no offense to any atheists, skeptics, agnostics, or non-Christians. If you can read this in a spirit of charity, you may be able even to agree with what I am saying!

            I happen to think the atheist often does not, in fact, know his moral obligations and duties. Further than this, there are some moral obligations that bear upon him that he cannot know, even in principle, if God is excluded from the moral epistemology. Now, in a certain sense, no atheist can escape God from his moral epistemology. This is because, as a part of our design, moral knowledge is built in a priori, as a function of how we are to operate. With God as the designer and giver of the moral law, humans everywhere will, if operating correctly, apprehend the moral law.[1]

            I hold to a divine command theory of ethics. This means that our moral obligations are constituted by God’s commands. These commands are given in part through the deliverances of a properly functioning conscience. Many of them, however, are deduced from God’s Word. It should strike the reader as obvious that atheists do not accept the Bible as the Word of God. In that case, it just follows that there are some commands that are incumbent upon humanity that the atheist will not even recognize.

            Take the example of doing all to the glory of God (cf. 1 Cor. 10:31). For more than one reason, this is not something that immediately shows itself in the consciences of people a priori. It strikes even “veteran” Christians as an insight of morality that each and every aspect of their lives, even down to what they eat or drink, is to be consecrated to God. It then becomes obvious that atheists do not know this moral command, and thus a crucial point of moral obligation is not a part of the atheist’s moral epistemology.[2]

            Moreover, as odd as the claim that atheists cannot, even in principle, know certain moral obligations upon them is, we actually see myriad examples in everyday life. Consider the fact that atheists and Christians are at odds on a great many moral issues. Abortion, euthanasia, gay marriage and homosexual behavior, raising children, etc. All of these issues exhibit a great controversy between atheists and Christians. Yet Christians derive these moral commands (both obligations and prohibitions) either directly or indirectly from Scripture, coupled with moral intuition. In some cases, it is either not possible or very weak to make a case for certain of these positions on an atheistic epistemology. So I think it follows as obvious there are some positions that, given atheist commitments, are impossible for atheists to know. In that case, it follows they do need God for their moral epistemology.

            One final application to make: this applies not only to atheists, but even (in certain cases) to all non-Christians. This is not meant to show that God exists. It is just an interesting avenue to explore, as entailments of my personal positions.

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[1] I do understand, of course, that there are psychopaths, who do not perceive moral right and wrong. This is obviously not the norm.

[2] I am using “know” here in the sense of “justified true belief.” Presumably, the atheist does not believe God exists, and so does not believe he has the moral obligation to fulfill this command, even if he is aware the Bible teaches it.