Possible Worlds: October 2011

Saturday, October 29, 2011

The Role of Intuition

What role does intuition play in an argument? What about in a debate? Are there good reasons to trust our intuition? All of these are good questions. In the recent William Lane Craig-Peter Millican debate, the issue of whether or not we can trust intuition was raised. Millican thought rational intuition to be unreliable, whereas Craig supported it.

The role of intuition, as Craig mentions often, is that of knowing some premise to be true rather than showing that premise to be true.[1] Once I understood this principle, along with the value of intuition as knowledge, I have come to recognize its power. We do not have to then show a particular intuition as true, but instead it is how we know it is true. As for its role in debate, this does mean that if a particular person does not share the intuition, he or she may not accept our argument or premise. This is where discernment is needed. In the setting of an “offensive” argument, intuition should only be used where it is a highly-regarded or shared intuition. This is what is at work, primarily, in the second premise of the moral argument. That objective moral values exist, is, for most people, intuitively known and perceived as true. This makes it a valuable tool to use.

This brings us to our next point. Sometimes intuitions, though strongly held, should be abandoned. When should an intuition be abandoned as knowledge? When there is evidence sufficient to overcome that intuition supporting the falsehood of that intuition. Notice what this entails: in order for us to say, for example, that objective moral values do not exist (even if we strongly intuit there are such values), we must have some strong evidence suggesting this intuition is false. What could that be? The only thing I can think of that is plausible is God’s non-existence. Since that is the very issue in the question of the moral argument, however, this would be question-begging.

Some people, like Millican, find intuition to be either non-existent or untrustworthy. But why think so? Millican offers the following as a critique: some people have been incorrect regarding intuitive beliefs, therefore intuition cannot be trusted. The problem with this is that it does not follow because one particular belief is incorrect, then my belief is incorrect. Imagine criticizing thinking because some people have had thoughts that are incorrect! Not only is it incorrect to say that because some people have had false intuitions that my intuitions are untrustworthy, it does not follow that even if some of my intuitions turn out to be false, that other of my intuitions are incorrect or untrustworthy. Only if some issue of dependence could be constructed (like, for instance, if I were known to be totally insane, or if there was no a priori knowledge possible. For a treatment of the latter claim, please see my article on intuition here.) would we have some reason to think intuitions are untrustworthy. Each intuition must be dealt with on its own merits. If one intuits something, only in the case there are reasons to think the intuition is false should he abandon it.

One last issue: what of two competing intuitions? Remember, we do not “show” via intuition (except in cases of commonly-held intuitions, which is not applicable here). Secondly, both cannot be said to know these things. If they are truly in competition, then only one of them can be true, and hence only one of them knows. Which one is wrong? Let the evidence decide. Intuitions can be validated or discredited by the evidence. But in the absence of such external justifiers or defeaters, one is justified if he truly holds the intuition (that is, the belief held independently of experience).

[1] William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith 3rd ed., (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008), 43. Here Craig appeals not as much to intuition as he does the biblical concept of the witness of the Holy Spirit (cf. Romans 8:16). I agree with this assessment as well, and apply the distinction as similar because of the internal nature of the knowledge.

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Rejecting the Causal Premise

The first premise of the kalam cosmological argument is “whatever begins to exist had a cause.” This premise is sometimes objected to in very sophisticated ways, and sometimes not as much. The particular objection I have in mind is the objection that says nothing really begins to exist. The idea is that everything just is different arrangements of matter and therefore nothing begins to exist. Rather, all we have are new formations of matter.

There are multiple objections that can be lodged against this view (e.g., the absurdities that “we” existed as matter, or that we don’t really exist at all). However, I have something else in mind to critique the view. My contention is that both of the main reasons for affirming this objection to the premise are fallacious.

The first main reason for affirming that nothing begins to exist is that some kind of reductionist-materialist-naturalist-physicalist (please forgive this clumsy wording) view of the world is true. But that is just to beg the question against the conclusion of the argument in its full form (e.g., it is to say “there is no God”). No one who does not already agree with the objector here will find this helpful.

The second main reason, if the first way of reasoning is rejected, is also fallacious. It assumes that any being is just identifiable with its particular collection of material atoms or parts. Not only does this seem bizarre, but it also seems particularly like the fallacy of division. The fallacy of division occurs when one attributes, illicitly, the truth of the whole to the truth of all of the parts. “The basketball team has been in existence for 75 years; therefore every member of the basketball team has been in existence for 75 years,” is one such example. So here, the objector assumes “you are made up of atoms; therefore each atom is you.” At best, “you” is an indexical term pointing to some kind of abstract object that we call a particular arrangement of matter. However, since we do not have any reason to think a being is just nothing more than a particular collection of atoms, we do not have any non-fallacious reason for denying the causal premise. It simply does not follow that because I am made up of atoms, each atom is in fact me. It is surely bizarre to think that every person who will ever exist is and has been out there in the universe (or, more properly, in the earth somewhere).

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Tuesday, October 25, 2011

Explanations, Explanations, Everywhere

In reading various blog’s comment sections, I have recently become aware that many people do not understand that it is not necessary for an explanation, if it is to be valid, to have an explanation of itself. The responses to this have been varied, but they all complain that somehow this is false. I contend this is usually due to misconceptions. The reason the Christian brings up this principle is to show that the charge “who created God?” is demonstrably fallacious. This article shall examine first why the claim in the first sentence is true, and then a few challenges shall be examined.

An explanation does not necessarily have to have an explanation of itself because then nothing could ever be explained. Consider some event E that we postulate is explained by event E-1. But before we could validly say E-1 explains E, we have to have an explanation of E-1. So we postulate E-2. But before we can accept E-2 as an explanation, we have to have E-3, and so on and so forth ad infinitum, so that nothing can be explained. Perhaps one may think that while we soldier on discovering new explanations of knowledge, we can hold these explanations as tentatively true. But this is just to say that in the absence of prior explanation the explanation may be considered valid!

Next, an explanation does not necessarily have to have an explanation of itself because then “ordinary people” would not have valid explanations for most anything. Suppose some “ordinary people,” who know next to nothing about laws of motion, kinetic energy, and what not, attend a baseball game. They watch the young player swing the bat and connect with the ball. The ball takes an arc downward and eventually falls. Now it is easy to imagine these people have very limited explanations for what happened. The ball’s moving first was explained by the connection of the bat’s being swung by the player. But suppose they cannot find an event causation-explanation for this (or suppose they can, but they reach an explanatory stopping point—at least for them). Would you then insist they have no valid explanation for the ball’s flying out to left field? Are they not justified in saying the ball’s flying out to left field is explained by the player’s hitting it, even if they know nothing else explanatorily (to say nothing of knowing everything else, which is exactly what is required)?

The following are paraphrases of some objections to this principle. “Everything needs an explanation, even explanations, or else you’re denying science!” On the contrary, to demand that every explanation necessarily must be explained in order to be a valid explanation is to give up science, for science just is the search for explanations. But as we have seen, nothing can ever be explained, for there is always a prior explanation. “What?! This means we don’t have to explain anything! I can just say ‘it was magic!’” This too is confused. Denying that an explanation, in order to be valid, necessitates a prior explanation for itself does not entail that just any and every explanation is valid. Rather, all it asserts is the rather modest proposition that some explanation may indeed be valid even if we do not currently know the explanation of the explanation. “If this were correct, then as long as we have one explanation, we shouldn’t search for any others.” This also does not follow from the principle in question. In fact, it should give us great encouragement that we have a valid explanation for an event or state of affairs. This, in turn, should motivate us to find even more explanations! So, far from being a stifle of knowledge, it paves the way for more of knowledge.

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Saturday, October 22, 2011

The Evil God, Continued

As a previous article discussed, Stephen Law’s argument concerning Evil God was very interesting. Within the Internet discussion that followed some suggested this argument lends itself to a parallel moral argument. It goes like this:

1. If Evil God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.

2. Objective moral values do exist.

3. Therefore, Evil God exists.

Now, at first glance, one may be tempted to say that the first premise is false, since we believe the Christian God (who is all-good) exists. Hence, it is the case that Evil God does not exist, and yet objective moral values do exist. However, as an objection to the argument it qualifies as question-begging. Hence, we must find another way to critique the premise(s) if we are to avoid the conclusion.

(1) seems to rely on just the same sort of reasoning we use to justify (1*) (the premise of the original moral argument for God). That is to say, plausibly, objective moral values can only originate from a person. Well, Evil God is a person. The atheist or Good God Skeptic (GGS) here contends there is just as much explanatory power in Evil God or God, and therefore we should remain, at best, agnostic about both (1) and (1*).

I do not think this succeeds either. A number of considerations need to be explained here. First, it is somewhat controversial whether or not evil is actually a “thing” in relation to good. Evil just seems to be a privation of the good. The GGS may here simply state that it is the other way around on an Evil God-account of objective morality. This leads us to our second consideration. Most people perceive objective moral duties as obligations to do good. Note what this is not saying: this does not claim that what people perceive they ought to do is always objectively good. Rather, it is the mere fact that they perceive what they ought to do (regardless of what that actually is) is actually good. This is an incredibly powerful observation when one thinks about it.

The third observation logically proceeds from the second. It seems to be a truth inherent to moral duties (which are derived from moral values) that whenever one performs an act in accordance with an objective moral duty he has done what is good. That is, it seems if it is the case that one ought to do X, then one’s doing of X is in fact good, and not evil! Perhaps here the GGS will retort that rather than being good and evil, the real delineation for objective moral duties is “right” and “wrong,” and thus the axiom above should be read: “if it is the case that one ought to do X, then one’s doing of X is in fact right, and not wrong.” Fair enough. This leads to:

Fourthly, related to the previous point, is that it makes no sense to speak of duty-fulfillment in terms of moral objectivity as “right” and yet objectively evil. This is what I mean. Suppose the being who grounds morality commands Jackie to do some act A. She happily agrees to do A, since she typically desires to do what the being commands. At this point, A constitutes an obligation. Jackie’s fulfillment of A is right and if she were to reject or fail to fulfill A it would be wrong. Now if this moral being were to be all-evil, then her fulfillment of A, though right, would be itself evil! This seems horrendously confused and violates normal sensibilities.

Finally, if Evil God existed, this would make good a privation of evil. That is to say, good very plausibly is just the lack of committing evil. But since evil is usually described in terms of failing to do good, or doing the opposite of good, or whatnot, and good cannot be explained on this account except as a failure to do evil or privation of evil, it seems the Evil God account of objective morality fails after all. At the very least, it is less plausible than an all-good account of objective morality, given what morality is and our moral intuitions.

And that is the central point. The key distinguishing feature with respect to morality is that Evil God just is less plausible, all things being equal, than an all-good God, if morality is to be explained by one of them. Even if we decide to grant both beings the same level of explanatory scope and power (the latter of which is dubious), the Evil God hypothesis is a far more complex (and thus gratuitous) explanation, and without compelling evidence is not to be preferred over the good God hypothesis.[1]

So we can see, on moral considerations and intuitions alone, that good God is untainted, and Evil God remains implausible, even for the GGS.[2]

[1] It is helpful here to note this kind of “inference to the best explanation” is only in regards to the competing first premises of the respective arguments, (1) and (1*), and not to the arguments themselves, which are deductive.

[2] Some may point to the ontological argument and the idea of maximal greatness to show God is to be preferred over Evil God. This is, I think, quite correct. However, I wanted to vindicate the moral argument as typically presented by the Christian in favor of God.

Craig, Law, and Evil God: Oh My!

The recent debate between William Lane Craig and Stephen Law has sent what amounts to shockwaves through the Christian community. Law’s “Evil God” argument is certainly interesting. The atheists are typically touting the victory of Stephen Law (as is Law himself). Interestingly, depending on what criteria one uses, there is a sense in which Law may be regarded to have won the debate hands-down, there is another sense in which he may be regarded to have lost the debate hands-down, and at least one other sense which claims it was a draw (for the record, I lean towards a “draw.”). I will spare you a full review of the debate, as J.W. Wartick has done an excellent job on his blog: http://jwwartick.com/2011/10/20/craig-vs-law/ These are some thoughts about Stephen Law’s Evil God argument.

The argument is

1. If gratuitous good exists, then Evil God does not exist.

2. Gratuitous good exists.

3. Therefore, Evil God does not exist.

It is important to understand, in the context of the Craig-Law debate, how this argument arose. Law’s original argument is that God does not exist if there is gratuitous evil; since there is gratuitous evil, it follows God does not exist. Craig’s objection is that we simply do not have an epistemic position to warrant that claim. Craig’s objection is not in fact a defeater of the premise that there is gratuitous evil, but rather an undercutter of that premise. This means that it undermines the warrant for saying that there is in fact gratuitous evil. In response, Law offered up, essentially, (1-3) above. His point was that Craig’s objection can be run in a parallel sense. Namely, Evil God could have some overridingly evil reason to permit the good. Law rejects this as sound reasoning, and thinks others will too. But in that case, we are essentially allowing the many apparent acts of good in the world to count as evidence against an Evil God. Since there appear to be many more acts of good than would be necessary for an all-Evil God to permit, we thus can conclude Evil God does not exist. However, we therefore admit, mutatis mutandis, that the argument against God is warranted, and hence the objection fails. Does Law here succeed? I think not.

First, it should be noted this does not actually counter Craig’s objection at all. After all, which part of that overcomes the undercutter that we are not in an epistemic position to be able to judge which acts of evil are in fact gratuitous? It is here Law offers no rebuttal. In fact, his parallel argument may be more one of psychological, rather than epistemological, significance.[1] It seems to me, and to Craig, that no one who does not already agree with Law’s method should agree with this parallel argument. If you think whether or not God’s existence is justified is not done on an inductive survey of goods, you should not be persuaded by this parallel argument (since it relies on the exact same reasoning). It is here I wish Craig had pressed forward, when it became apparent Law did not understand what was being said in its fullest. This failure on Craig’s part is most of what I think contributed to the perception Law had concerning his performance and whether or not he won.

Since the argument was to be parallel, if the methods of arguing are not truly parallel, then the proposed “counterexample” fails in its intended purpose. However, once again, we ought to reiterate that because we have no idea of any of the consequences of certain evils, we cannot say God has absolutely no purpose for them. Law implied this was an unjustified skepticism, but what, exactly, is unjustified about it? Justification is the ability to claim something as true (whereas “warrant” is the cumulative amount of evidence). Does Law think we can justifiably say certain evils fulfill no good? If he does, how does he overcome the cognitive limitations of our points in space and time? How can he know the ultimate consequences serve absolutely no ultimate good? To say Craig’s objection is unjustified is to say there really isn’t a good reason to think we do not know these ultimate consequences. But for that we have been given no argument. Hence, it seems the objection really does stand, and hence it is hasty to assume the second premise of the original argument is true, and thus the argument fails.

Part 2, dealing with a parallel moral argument for Evil God, comes later tonight.

[1] For instance, perhaps it is the case that, psychologically, most sane individuals do not wish there to be an Evil God. Hence, an inductive survey of goods tells them there probably is no Evil God. Whether or not one is in an epistemic position to judge this is exactly Craig’s point, however.

Wednesday, October 12, 2011

Perfect Being and Worlds

1. A world W1 is preferable to W2 for a Perfect Being (PB) in the case that, all else being equal, PB wishes to actualize W1 over W2.

2. A world W1 is significantly preferable to W2 for PB in the case that, all else being equal, PB wishes to actualize W1 over W2 and PB is able to actualize W1.

3. A world W1 is completely preferable to W2 for PB in the case that every event in W1 is preferred to events that differ in W2.

4. This actual world is not completely preferable for PB to every other possible world.

5. PB would prefer at least some other worlds to the actual world (from [1, 4]).

6. If there is a world that is significantly preferable to the actual world, then PB would actualize that world.

7. PB did not actualize that world.

8. Therefore, there is no such world that fulfills the conditions of being significantly preferable.

It seems to me that (1) and (3) are pretty uncontroversial. The only thing I can see about (2) that may be controversial is the wording of the term “significantly preferable.” (4) seems to be quite true, as it seems that whatever measure we may employ for evaluating the relative worth for a possible world to a PB, we are almost guaranteed that there are many such possible worlds that are better. (5) is just analytically true given (1) and (4). (7) cannot be denied if other premises are embraced, and (8) is just the conclusion to the argument.

It is (6) that is the most controversial premise. Notably, it may be objected that there is indeed a world that is significantly preferable and that PB has not actualized it. However, this is where a world infeasible for PB comes in. Suppose PB prefers a world where Jim performs some specific action, and the world is otherwise identical in circumstance to the actual world. If Jim would not freely perform the act, then such a world, while preferable, is not feasible for PB, and hence is not significantly preferable. One may object we have not shown true metaphysical possibility. (6) does at least seem plausible, however. What reason do we have to suspect that PB would not actualize such a world? What reason do we have for suspecting that all such counterfactuals of creaturely freedom necessary for a significantly preferable world are compossible? In this case, then, it follows there are no worlds significantly preferable to the actual world.
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Friday, October 7, 2011

Beliefs and the Will

1. If a belief is not at least in part an act of the will, then it is not rationally-based.

2. Beliefs are rationally-based.

3. Therefore, a belief is at least in part an act of the will.

This syllogism arrives in large part due to those (mostly atheists/agnostics) who insist that the will plays no role in their beliefs. That is to say, they could not choose to believe in God (or any negation of propositions they accept) even if they wanted to, for beliefs are not formed by an act of the will. Thus, while people may come to change their beliefs under varying and specific circumstances and given different facts and evidences, it is not because they chose to embrace the proposition. Rather, it was simply deterministic causes that engendered belief.

The problem, as (1) above notes, is rationality (or irrationality) does not seem to play any role whatsoever. If one cannot choose to believe other than what he does, is he really being irrational?[1] It seems not. One may object by saying, “if one’s belief was formed in accordance with logical rules, then he can be said to have had a rational basis for his belief even though he could not choose it.” This seems to make two mistakes.

First, consider the counterexample of a computer. It does not learn, or rationalize, or make inference; at least none of these things are done as a person seems to do them. It goes through all the motions of rational thought (modus tollens, modus ponens, etc.), but does not actually seem to be doing rational thought. This suggests that simply because one goes through the motions of following logical rules one has not necessarily been rational. Another counterexample would be the one who follows rules of rationality but who did not understand why these things are true; such a person should not be said to be rational in the same way as someone who does understand the principles.

Second, if beliefs are the products of some kind of determinism and void of the will, then even rules of rationality are subject to this. It won’t do to say the laws of logic and rationality are some kind of externally objective measure by which we can judge the world. Yet we take rationality and the laws of logic to be just that! But if even the beliefs of rationality are simply accepted or not by deterministic factors, is one really being rational in the normal sense of the term? Not really.[2]

One could always bite the bullet and deny (2), claiming beliefs are not rational. But in that case, even the belief that beliefs are not rational is not rational, so that we have no rational reason to accept the denial of (2). In that case, then, (3) follows. If that is true, then we have good reason to believe that atheists, at least in some small part, can control their beliefs.[3]

[1] By “irrational,” I do not mean merely lacking rationality, for then the answer would clearly be yes. Rather, I mean forming beliefs for utterly horrible or irrelevant reasons.

[2] One could object, however, that the laws of logic and rationality “work,” and hence we have reason to accept them. However, we have good reasons to suspect pragmatism does not always form true beliefs (right for the wrong reasons, anyone?), and we may question why we ought to believe what is pragmatic.

[3] Finally, there is belief for emotional or psychological reasons (which people often refer to as irrationality), which seems to me to be prima facie evidence of will-based belief.

Can a Calvinist be a Molinist?

The following is not meant to be combative, but analytical. Can a five-point Calvinist be a Molinist? Not consistently. Molinism is the framework dealing with omniscience and free actions of God’s creatures. Calvinism is the framework dealing with God’s sovereignty and his glory. Hence, there is nothing directly incompatible with these two concepts. Indeed, Bruce Ware has attempted a Molinist understanding of omniscience from the standpoint of a compatibilist free will. Nonetheless, I think this attempt, though noble, falls short of Molinism and fails to escape the logical implications of Calvinism.

First, five-point Calvinism, traditionally, affirms that man cannot respond to God without his active calling. Many, if not nearly all, Molinists would agree. The man in this position will then say God’s movement upon men’s hearts is irresistible, so that man cannot refuse. Because man is determined either way (whether or not he is saved), this is at odds with Molinism.

Molinism is predicated on the twin ideas of God’s omniscience and man’s free will. It was designed in part to solve the “problem” of how it was God could be said to be sovereign and yet man be truly free. Let this “true” freedom mean that in any given situation a creature is the originator of his own choice, and could have refrained from performing the action were he to decide to do so. We will also call this “libertarian free will.” Compatibilist free will, by contrast, suggests that man is free to perform some action by virtue of not being constrained by any outside factors.[1]

Molinism is also based on the idea of middle knowledge. The knowledge is said to be “middle” because they are contingent truths, the truth-value of which God does not control (as opposed to natural knowledge, which is necessary, and free knowledge, which is contingent knowledge of the actual world that God does, in fact, control the content of). Now libertarian free will fits in nicely here. Compatibilism does not quite make it.

By definition, compatibilism means freedom is compatible with causal determinism. Further, compatibilists want to say it is God who causes one to freely accept Christ and be saved. In this case, then, I do not see how the knowledge of these truths can truly be middle. If the truths that are of the saved are contingent, they are only contingent upon God’s choice; hence, they belong to God’s free knowledge. If the truths of the unregenerate are contingent, they can only be so on God’s choice, which again conflates middle knowledge into free knowledge. Only by postulating these are necessary truths can one escape this. But in that case, compatibilism does not lend itself to middle knowledge.

Now, can one be a five-point Calvinist and be an incompatibilist? Absolutely. He may hold to a view of the will as not free given causal determinism (a bit how Luther or Edwards came off in their writings on the subject). But that won’t lend itself to Molinism either. What about those who accept libertarian free will? If there are any five-point Calvinists who also accept libertarian free will, this would at least be sufficient to accept Molinism. However, as we have pointed out, if one is a five point Calvinist, then she cannot accept libertarian free will as defined! So it seems that even though the attempt is commendable, five-point Calvinists can not, with any consistency, be called Molinists.

[1] This applies to our situation since it is man’s unregenerate nature that makes him incapable of a good response, and thus is a factor within himself. When he does respond, it is only due to his regenerate nature (regenerated by God), and hence is a factor within himself.

Tuesday, October 4, 2011

Conditional Statements and God

A common way of understanding conditionals (in the form of “if A, then C”) is that one accepts a conditional in the case that he believes Not-A or C, but not both. The following would constitute examples of such.

Examples:

A and C

If Prince William is alive, then I am currently employed.

Should be believed by premise? Yes.

A and not-C

If peanut butter is a peanut product, then the Allies lost World War II.

Should be believed by premise? No.

Not-A and C

If water is an abstract object, then George W. Bush was the most recent Republican president.

Should be believed by premise? No.

Not-A and Not-C

If a man is poor, then he is rich.

Should be believed by premise? Yes.

This last one is so counterintuitive. But consider the postulated scenario: you deny the antecedent, which means you think the man is not poor. But further, you deny the consequent, which means you think the man is not rich. Since you cannot derive a conclusion by denying the antecedent, you must deny the consequent. A denial of the consequent is just to say “the man is not rich.” Yet this results in the conclusion being “therefore, he is not poor.” This is perfectly consistent with your beliefs about the antecedent and consequent. “Now wait a minute!” one may object, “modus ponens is just as valid, and that would get us the following:”

1. If a man is poor, then he is rich.

2. A man is poor.

3. Therefore, he is rich.

This is flatly contradictory. But then notice what is being done: the affirmations are not not-A and not-C, but rather A and C. But since you, the objector, have pointed out A and C are contradictory, you do not believe A and C. Rather, you reject one or the other. But in any case, this is not an objection against not-A and not-C.

This has bearing on philosophical arguments for God. For this means one ought to accept every material conditional that fits the following states of belief for the one who is considering them: (A and C) and (Not-A and Not-C). Consider the first premise of the moral argument:

4. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.

If one believes “God does not exist” and “objective moral values do not exist,” she should accept this material conditional. If she believes “God exists” and “objective moral values exist,” she ought to accept this. If she attempts to discredit the premise even while holding these states of beliefs, it is maintained that she does not understand the conditional.

If she believes “God does not exist” and “objective moral values exist,” or “God exists” and “objective moral values do not exist,” then she may rightfully reject the conditional. Therefore, we can see the only atheists/agnostics/skeptics that should be disputing this premise are the ones who believe objective moral values exist, but God does not exist. Hence, we can see it’s not open to the objector to deny both premises of the argument by saying they are false.

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Monday, October 3, 2011

Is Molinism Utilitarian?

The moral theory of utilitarianism, in its basic form, is that whatever achieves the greatest amount of a particularly desired result is what is good and right to do. Hence, if the outcome is, say, greater human flourishing, or greater happiness, then any act bringing this about is good. Moral philosophers have long recognized the basic problems inherent in such a bare-bones view. But could such a criticism apply to Molinism?

It seems easily demonstrable it does not. First, Molinism is only a framework for understanding God’s omniscience. Hence, any criticism of utilitarianism cannot come against “Molinism proper.” However, many Molinists apply this teaching to the problem of evil, the free will defense, and other such areas. The charge made is in response to the somewhat common Molinist belief that God so orders the world to achieve the greatest number and optimal balance of those saved to those lost, all the while including as little evil as possible. This, charges the objector, makes such a particular conception of Molinism both utilitarian and unacceptable (and hence only this particular application within the problem of evil would have to be abandoned).

There is a possible defense that does not rely wholly on utilitarian moral reasoning. Consider that it is entirely reasonable, given some entity X’s existence being a good thing, that God prefers a world full of redeemed sinners in Heaven to a world where only a select handful come to him. In other words, it is a better world with greater good than the other. If this is true, consider also God would desire the salvation of every individual as he or she is. Now suppose God, desiring the salvation of every individual, could instantiate a world in which every person (no matter how many there were) would choose God and be saved. It is easy to suppose that God would then instantiate such a world containing many persons that would yet be limited in number (hence demonstrating no utilitarian concept is at work, but merely benevolence and love).

Of course, not all persons will choose to receive Christ and be saved. But since a populated world is better than a sparse world, God desires all men to be saved, and not all persons will be saved, it only follows that whatever world God instantiates will contain the greatest number of persons saved, given other certain goals (which we may debate amongst ourselves as to what they are). In any case, the reason the number is the greatest that can be achieved given these truths is not due to utilitarianism, but due to God’s benevolence toward every creature.

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