There was a debate held tonight at N.C.
State University in Raleigh, NC, between Christian philosopher William Lane
Craig and Eric Wielenberg, an academic philosopher at DePaul (not 100% sure
about which school). The debate format featured an opening, two responses, and
a closing, followed by a Q-and-A. Two responses felt like a bit much, as the
participants ended up repeating each other somewhat. The question was something
like: What is the most plausible foundation for objective moral values and
duties? Craig offered the theistic solution, while Wielenberg argued for what
he called “godless normative realism.” What follows is my scattered and only
slightly cleaned-up notes, plus some concluding evaluation.
Craig
opening: Godless normative realism is just Moral
Platonism (akin to mathematical Platonism); conceptual reality for most, but
Platonists must say there are real
abstract objects. When the right physical situations occur, these abstract
objects supervene on the situations. What this means is that moral duties are
superveniences on physical objects and situations. What Wielenberg needs is a
rationally compelling argument against the presumption against Platonism (or a
knockdown argument for Platonism). No rationally compelling arguments against
the presumption against Platonism exist. Theists do not face such a problem,
since God is a concrete, not
abstract, object. Supervenience account seems unintelligible. Wielenberg claims
physical objects cause the abstract objects to supervene on physical situations;
Craig says this is super-duper-venience (utterly mysterious). How can this
happen? Wielenberg appeals to theistic causation as an example; this won’t work
due to the difference of concrete objects, as listed above. Another problem is
as-follows: What if these physical objects pick out some other abstract object
instead of the right one? Some are only contingently caused. That is, what if
the physical object, when one is a brain-state like love, picks out the
abstract object of the square root of 4? What accounts for the correct physical-abstract
pairing? Wielenberg appeals to divine concurrence as an example.. This fails
due to God’s being a personal agent. Wielenberg
does not have agency here. He postulates decisive moral reasons for acting
constitutes obligations. However, this eliminates supererogation (moral heroes
going above and beyond the call of duty). This also is only for instrumental
actions (or conditional obligation, “If you want to act morally, then do
this”). In other words, godless normative realism can only get you that
such-and-such is moral and that if you want tobe moral, do such-and-such; it
cannot get you the further fact that you ought to do such-and-such. This view
also subverts moral duties by undermining freedom of the will, according to
Craig. Mental supervenes on the physical; you are a machine; machines are not
obligated to do anything. There is no enduring self. Thus no one can be held
accountable for particular acts. Moral knowledge is also impossible, due to
Plantinga’s EAAN. The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, in brief,
states that if naturalism and evolution were true, then our cognitive faculties
are aimed at survival, not necessarily truth. If this is the case, then,
probably, we have a defeater for every belief we hold (this is because, for all
we would know, our entire belief set is held for survival purposes only, and
only incidentally gets at the truth rarely, if at all. But if you have a
defeater for every belief, then you have a defeater for evolutionary naturalism.
This also applies to knowledge from evolutionary naturalism about morality!
Wielenberg
opening: He gives a story about a suffering child
and one’s obligation to save them. He claims that moral features of things are
fundamental features of reality. Craig’s view has all the same problems as his
does, so why should these problems count against Wielenberg? First, the causal
connection problem attends to theistic causal views. Second, what explains why
there is a necessary connection between an act commanded by God and an
obligation to do that thing? Third, how to the possible worlds know how to
generate God? Fourth, dualism posits things not accounted for in physics.
Fifth, no argument by Craig for no self. Sixth, it could be that mental states
and physical states are identical and thus accounted for. Seventh, physical and
immaterial interactions are also problematic. Eighth, as to moral
supererogation, Christianity has the same problem (e.g., love one another). His
view can be tweaked by having exclusionary permission. This is the view that there
is value in performing our own goals for our lives (if they are moral); in
these cases, acting on moral reasons anyway is supererogatory. It is
implausible that God’s commands are what constitute moral obligations, since we
can just see that someone in need ought to be helped, for example. Next, people
must be aware of the commands and of the authority of the one giving the
commandment. Craig’s view makes moral obligations inexplicable.
Craig
response: Frames the issues of Wielenberg’s
responses to Craig: 1. Craig’s view arbitrarily singles out divine commands:
Craig denies this; there can be multiple sources, but commands are the highest
in the order. God issues general commands to all of humanity; in any specific
situation it is up to us to apply that general principle. 2. Craig’s view
implies non-believers have no obligations since they are not aware. On
Christianity, God has written the law on their hearts, so that they do have
such obligations. 3. Craig’s view makes morally wrong acts inexplicable, since
God commands them to do what he knows they won’t do. Didn’t catch fully his
response here. No powerful objections by Wielenberg to first contention. Second:
So’s-your-old-man response. The alleged problem with the view of Wielenberg is
unresolved. Second, if opponent can show any relevant difference, then the
strategy collapses. Next, even given moral Platonism, there are still
formidable objections: first, the account of supervenience seems
unintelligible; Wielenberg says it is also obscure how non-physical entities
can be causally connected to physical entities. It’s not as obscure though! We have experience of our own causal connection,
even if we don’t know how it works. Craig can’t know why God’s commanding gives
us a powerful reason to do it, Wielenberg claims. Theists are not naturalists,
so this is not relevant. After all, on Wielenberg’s view, obtaining reasons
that direct one to a moral action is the naturalistic
one. Craig responds that possible worlds do not instantiate God, so something
of a category error has been committed. Supererogation: the tweak contradicts
his own view; it is no longer godless natural realism accounting for morality,
but this new principle. Freedom of the will: reductionism has been largely
rejected by philosophers of mind. Moral knowledge is impossible: EAAN: needs to
be addressed.
Wielenberg’s
response: Craig’s view needs to make sense of
morality as well or better than Wielenberg’s view, and it’s not clear he has.
So the tu quoque is relevant, says
Wielenberg. He doubles down on lack of theory being the equalizer. Great-making
properties: how do these actually cause
God to be great? Mental states are not brain states according to Craig.
Wielenberg claims this is inaccurate; that philosophers of mind don’t reject
the view as Craig says. We don’t know how souls can possess agency, so there’s
no special problem for Wielenberg. EAAN: unguided evolution has made rational
creatures, so EAAN is doubtful. Be perfect is a Christian obligation to show
there is no supererogation. As for Craig’s intuitive remarks, psychopaths
refute this. Wielenberg discusses, basically, Molinism. Craig’s idea: I deserve
punishment, so God commands me to help; if I can be punished, then command is
not needed; if command is violated, then that can’t be a reason for the command
(deserving of punishment). The million Holocausts objection to God’s presence
needed: if you could lift a finger and prevent a million Holocausts, it is
evident, morally, you should do it, even if you receive no command.
Craig’s
second: Craig’s view is arbitrary; we do experience
duties, but this doesn’t reveal to us the ultimate source. Psychopaths: if they
don’t know the difference for real, they are not culpable. Craig did not say by
issuing commands God is able to hold those who do wrong responsible; rather, able to those who do evil acts, so no circularity. A problem
with Wielenberg’s account is the kind
of causal connection, not primarily how
it works. Great-making properties: this is a misconceived objection, same as
possible worlds, since great-making properties are just things it’s better for
a perfect being to have than to lack, not things that “generate” God. “Christianity
has no supererogation”: perfect obedience does not entail there are no
supererogatory acts. Freedom of the will: mental states and brain states have different properties, meaning mental
states are not reducible. Mental states cannot cause anything not already
determined by brain states. Causal agency is necessary for free will. Physical
states do not have brain states. Wielenberg denies initial premise of EAAN.
This is question-begging.
Wielenberg
second: Craig’s great-making God must just be so,
which is a tu quoque. Supererogation:
Craig didn’t address this. Craig’s phil of mind claims are controversial. Craig
appealed to Plantinga’s EAAN, which solves nothing. Consider that the lighter
is reliable. In the same way, unguided evolution produces mostly true beliefs.
The million Holocausts objection again. Craig says an order is needed.
Reiterating evil act circularity objection. Psychopaths objection pressed
again. Combined with Craig’s evil/wrong distinction, so that psychopaths should
be punished, but if they don’t perceive the wrong, they shouldn’t be.
Craig
closing: First, theism provides sound foundation of
objective moral values (God as concrete object). Second, it provides for
objective moral duties. Objections have been morphing throughout, not
consistent. Several powerful objections to godless normative realism.
Correction on EAAN.
Wielenberg
closing: Million Holocausts again. Craig’s view
predicts no morally wrong actions. Now introduces pointless evil; evildoing
merits punishment. Psychopaths are plausible exceptions to what Craig says,
which means they don’t have obligations; however they are evildoers; Craig’s
view requires that psychopaths then do have moral obligations.
Evaluation:
I will try to keep this brief. I thought Wielenberg
did well; better, in fact, than the average Craig opponent. However, I thought
his criticisms of Craig were more often than not based on misunderstandings,
and what was perhaps his best critique of Craig wasn’t fully articulated until
the closing statement, which was unfortunate. Craig seemed to get the best of
Wielenberg several times—especially with respect to the EAAN. I will say,
before going back to earlier points in the debate, Wielenberg’s handling of the
EAAN was his poorest aspect. In response to the EAAN, Wielenberg claims we can
just look around at the kind of things naturalism has produced, to see if they
have regularly true beliefs. This is both question-begging and circular!
Question-begging because he assumes naturalism is true—which is the very thing
under question! The whole point of the EAAN is to figure out if it’s true—you
can’t very well respond to an argument for its falsehood by saying, “Well,
since naturalism is true, we know that evolution and naturalism do yield true
beliefs on a good enough scale!” It’s circular because it turns out that one would
have to be using his cognitive faculties to know that the cognitive faculties
around him were functioning toward truth, in general.
It seems to me Craig was pretty right on in
his critique of Wielenberg’s account. Additionally, he did fairly well against
Wielenberg’s critiques. I wanted to address a couple. First, Wielenberg didn’t
seem to appreciate fully the distinction between objective moral values and duties. If you do evil (value), you should be punished. But God’s
commands constitute your duties, so God gives a command (duty). Thus, evildoers
are punished. But what about non-believers? These people do not recognize God’s
authority and do not know about God’s commands. Craig’s intended meaning
becomes clear: he means normally functioning people do receive God’s commands
in the form of general moral knowledge on the heart. So what about psychopaths?
The psychopath objection ultimately was
Wielenberg’s best, in my opinion. Eventually, the idea is this: Craig says that
evildoers have commands by God that give them an obligation that they
flout—otherwise, they would get away with murder. Psychopaths do evil, so on
Craig’s view, they get a command and now have an obligation not to do it. But,
plausibly, psychopaths do not know the difference between right and wrong and
so, on Craig’s view, do not have an obligation. So now psychopaths both do and
do not have an obligation, and anything that generates a contradiction is
absurd.
The answer to this for Craig came out in
the Q-and-A: Craig means this as a normally functioning thing. He doesn’t mean
this for the mentally disabled, or infants, or psychopaths (if indeed they
truly do not perceive right and wrong at
all). Thus they simply have no moral obligation, and no contradiction is
generated.
As for the “Million Holocaust” objection, I
think this is answered by asking a single question. Recall the objection is
that if you could stop a million Holocausts by raising a single finger, you
would have an obligation to do so, even in the absence of a command by God.
Since God’s commands are what constitute moral obligation, there must be
something wrong with Craig’s view.
It seems to me the answer is clear: ask the
question, “Why?” Why is it we would be obligated to help? Suppose Wielenberg
answers, “Because if you can help prevent people from dying then, all things
being equal, you should,” then Craig can plausibly claim this just is what is
meant by general commands from God. Preserve
life. Love people. These two
general commands clearly find application here.
What about, finally, Wielenberg’s claim
that in order to be obligated by an authority one must recognize that
authority? Craig quite accurately pointed out this isn’t true. He appealed to
an example by Matt Flannagan that I will paraphrase loosely here: suppose you
are walking along a large farm and come to a gate. This gate is closed, and has
a sign that says “No admittance. Violators will be punished.” You don’t know
who placed the sign, but you are aware that there is a rule and there is a
rule-giver, and this is plausibly enough to place an obligation on you not to
enter (it would be disingenuous to enter on the grounds that you weren’t
familiar with the authority who wrote it, and so didn’t find the sign to be
conveying obligatory acts). The same goes for morality.
In the final analysis, I found Wielenberg
to be a nice guy who has some interesting thoughts, and he did better than your
average Craig opponent. With the exception of the EAAN (where he appeared to be
dealing with it for the first time, at places), he appeared to be familiar with
Craig’s arguments and responses. However, Craig countered almost every single
objection, and provided devastating (I think) objections of his own. He further shared the Gospel message in the Q-and-A portion! I enjoyed
it, and I hope others did, too!
Almost done watching this now. Wielenberg seems to just say the same thing over and over.
ReplyDeleteSorry I didn't see this earlier! Yes, that does seem to be the case!
DeleteThanks for your comments. Highly entertaining debate, glad they could prepare response ahead of time. I wanted to point out one of your comments and disagree with your interpretation of Craig's position: "If you do evil (value), you should be punished. But God’s commands constitute your duties, so God gives a command (duty)." Craig's view is not that evildoers should be punished, but that wrongdoers should be punished. But God imposes moral obligations on evildoers to hold them accountable so that they can recognize their need for grace and thus achieve union with God. Craig explained this during the Q&A period.
ReplyDeleteThanks for your thoughts, here, and the clarification!
Delete
ReplyDeleteThe one objection I found interesting was Wielenberg's drawing a parallel between the interaction problem Craig brought up for Wielenberg's view (that it is impossible to see how moral value supervenes on physical circumstances i.e. Kid on fire and bucket of water example)with Craig's own problem as a dualist in the philosophy of mind. The problem with Wielenberg's alleged parallel is that the theist has a way out if the interaction problem was in fact fatal which Wielenberg wouldn't have. The Theist can simply take the idealist route, and ala Berkeley dispose of the mind body problem. Wielenberg has no such option that I can see, and in my opinion this undercuts his claim that his view can account for things better.
Thanks for this and sorry for the late reply, Blake! Yes, idealism would work. I think that'd be a bit too esoteric, and unnecessary, for Craig's audience, especially given Craig points out the asymmetry in that at least we appear to have the experience *that* it works! However, you're surely right: if idealism is true, a theistic observer should work in a way not available to an atheist.
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