Introduction
On the popular level, the issue of
intuitions has been quite contentious. Most people tend to think of intuitions
as a kind of “sixth sense,” ESP, or other type of supernatural or unusual
insight into certain situations (or types of situations). This has, in some
ways, carried over into philosophical debates over epistemology. Because of
this, appealing to intuitions in a philosophical debate can be met with
derision or incredulity. It is important to understand that I shall be
considering “intuitive knowledge” to be a type of knowledge not gained via some
process or experience with the world, or even gained from reasoning itself. It
is something with which knowers “come to the table;” they must already have it
in order to know anything from it at all. In this paper, I will defend the idea
that intuitive knowledge is generally reliable, necessary for any knowledge at
all, and leads to a kind of foundationalism. I will explain my concept of
intuition, construct and apply an argument for foundationalism, consider
various objections that can be lodged against this approach, and provide
tentative responses. The conclusion will be that foundationalism survives, and
intuitive knowledge appears necessary for any knowledge at all. First, we must
explain intuition.
The
Explanation of Intuition
No account of intuition is complete
without a discussion of a basic definition. I am using “intuition” in a very
broad sense. This sense covers Richard Swinburne’s use of what it means to be a
basic belief. He writes, “Some beliefs are what I shall call ‘rightly
basic’—that is, ones that we are justified in holding without their needing
other beliefs or other mental states as grounds, in the sense that,
intrinsically or merely in virtue of our having them, they are probably true.”[1] In
other words, these beliefs are not based on other beliefs; they are not
justified by anything outside of themselves.
These beliefs can be called “basic”
beliefs. They are called this not only for the aforementioned reason, but also
because they can serve as “foundations” for other beliefs that gain their
justification from these basic beliefs (these beliefs, incidentally, are
referred to as “based” beliefs). Because these basic beliefs are not derived
from any others, Plantinga describes them in nearly perceptual terms. He claims,
“I simply see that they are true, and accept them.”[2]
These intuitions are the building blocks for all other types of knowledge.
There are four types of examples of this intuitive knowledge that will be
addressed.
First, there is the example of a priori knowledge. An a priori claim or piece of knowledge is
something that can be known independently of any empirical truths or
investigation of the world.[3]
Here, then, we can see the difference between an intuition and an a priori belief: while intuitions are
these types of beliefs, a priori is
being used as a category or way of knowing; the other areas will include
examples of this intuitive knowledge. Some a
priori truths are self-evident—that is, once all of the relevant terms are
understood, then one comes to see and believe the truth of the entire claim.[4]
However, what is behind that claim is intuition. There are a priori claims that are not self-evident (think of complex
mathematical equations), but all intuitive claims are self-evident in this way.
Second, there is the example of
inferential knowledge. Inferential knowledge is of the form, “If p, then q; p;
therefore, q.” Such an argument demonstrates one of the laws of argumentation
in logic known as modus ponens.
Another example of inferential knowledge concerns mathematical claims: “If
1+1=2 and 2+2=4, then 2+4=6.” Suppose Jim wanted to show that intuitions of the
inferential variety were in fact grounded in other beliefs that supported or
justified the intuitions in question. How would he go about doing this? In the
case of the mathematical belief, perhaps Jim could claim something like the
following: 2+2=4 is only true in cases where 1+1=2, so that 1+1=2 serves as a
basis for grounding 2+2=4. First, it is unclear that Jim, or anyone else, actually
obtains their belief (or maintains it, for that matter) by reasoning in such a
manner. Rather, with Plantinga, Jim (and others) simply sees such a belief is
the case. Second, Jim has only put the problem off by one step: even if we
accept that 2+2=4 is a based belief, that still leaves 1+1=2, and Jim has not
justified this belief by way of another. Indeed, it seems he cannot.
Jim is worse off still when it comes
to basic laws of reasoning, such as modus
ponens or the law of non-contradiction (LNC).[5]
With respect to these, Jim will not even be able to appeal to any other
beliefs. Suppose he tries to argue that in all cases where modus ponens has been observed in the real world, it is successful.
This claim itself will crucially rely both on modus ponens and LNC. If it attempts to jettison the two, then any
claim to showing these two will either be subject to contradictions or unable
to be used as anything more than an unfounded probabilistic claim. It therefore
seems inferential knowledge is a type of intuitive knowledge.
Next, non-inferential knowledge can
also be intuitive knowledge. This is not the claim that all non-inferential
knowledge is intuitive; that would be demonstrably false. It is simply the
claim that there are some types of non-inferential knowledge such that they are
intuitive in nature. Consider memory beliefs, for an example.[6]
While it is not the case that particular memorial beliefs are intuitive (after
all, I remember what I ate for lunch today; the belief of what I had for lunch
today is not broadly intuitive), the belief that memorial beliefs are reliable
is intuitive. There is no non-circular way to prove that one’s memories are
reliable, for virtually every claim one makes will assume that memory works in
such a capacity. Intuition, however, does provide such a belief.
The final type of knowledge
supported by intuition is modal knowledge. Modal knowledge comes from the idea
of modal logic. Harry Gensler explains modal logic as a “logic [that] studies
arguments whose validity depends on ‘necessary,’ ‘possible,’ and similar
notions.”[7] If
something is necessary, then it could not fail to be the case. If something is
possible, then it could either be the case or not be the case. While some of
modal logic is inferential (that is, the beliefs are derived from other, more
fundamental beliefs), what we take to be possible and/or impossible is often
the result of our modal intuitions. How we know what seems to be possible to us
just is the general intuition at work in our doxastic structures. Now that some
examples of intuition have been shown, an argument for foundationalism shall be
developed.
An
Argument for Foundationalism
The idea of intuition naturally
leads to the idea of foundationalism. Robert Audi describes foundationalism by
defining it as follows: “[Foundationalism is] the thesis that the structure of
a body of justified beliefs is foundational, where this is taken to imply that
any indirectly (hence non-foundationally) justified beliefs there are depend on
directly (thus in a sense foundationally) justified beliefs.”[8]
These directly justified beliefs are intuitive beliefs, as this paper has been
using the concept of intuition. The argument for foundationalism will be stated
in explicit fashion, and then defended. It is as follows:
1. If there is no relevant intuitive
knowledge for p (where p is some proposition), then there is no knowledge of p.
2. There is knowledge of p.
3. Therefore, there is relevant intuitive
knowledge for p.
This argument is
a successful one for foundationalism because of the word “knowledge” in the
premises. Certainly (1) does not require one to commit to the idea that the
knowledge of p itself is intuitive (as would be the case if the claim was that
knowledge of p just is intuitive knowledge), but rather that p stands in
relation to a chain of justification that terminates in an intuition that is
sufficient for knowledge. (1) makes a claim of necessity: without a relevant
intuition counting as knowledge for p, p cannot be known. This premise will be
defended more fully in a later section. For this point, there are three
considerations that must be taken into account.
First, this assumes the relevance in the justificatory chain for
p of the intuitive knowledge. That is, it will not do any good to have an
intuition that seems irrelevant to the transmission of justification to the belief
that p. If Jim claims to have an intuition that the sun will rise tomorrow,
this particular belief is not relevant to the belief that “All men are mortal.”
It may be the case that the two beliefs ultimately share a similar intuition,
but then it will be that intuitive belief that is relevant, not the belief that
the sun will rise tomorrow (if such a thing can even properly be intuited,
rather than inferred from intuitions).
Second, (1) assumes that, while one
need not know that he knows that p in order to know p, in order to be justified
in believing p, the justification
must be itself justified. This does not mean one has to show the justification
of what justifies p (for instance, the prior belief q). I am assuming an
internalist account of justification (I am not, at this juncture, taking a
position with respect to knowledge).
Audi explains an internalism about justification as being the state in which
one has access to the elements that justify a belief—in this case, those
elements being intuition. He defines this internal accessibility as “that to
which one has access by introspection and reflection.”[9]
For Audi, introspection is examining what is within one’s own consciousness,
while reflection is simply rationally considering the truth of some proposition
or set of propositions. The knower then has access, and hence, justification,
by reflecting on the thoughts of his own consciousness.[10]
Therefore, if, upon reflection, some relevant intuition is accessed within
Jim’s consciousness, Jim is justified in taking it to be true, absent some
defeater.
A question presents itself: even
though Jim must be justified in believing p, and the transmission of
justification must continue on uninterrupted, does Jim have to know or show
what justifies q, if q justifies p? At least when it comes to intuition, it
does not seem so. Part of the reason this is the case is due to what is called
an epistemic chain. An epistemic chain is something where a belief is justified
by another belief, and that belief is justified by a further belief, and so on.[11]
There are four possible “ends” to an epistemic chain. The first end is to claim
that there really is no end; the epistemic chain goes on infinitely, with an
infinite number of beliefs justifying an infinite number of beliefs. The second
end is to say that some belief is simply unjustified, and has no reason for
which it should be regarded as true. The third end is the foundationalist end,
which is to say that the epistemic chain terminates in direct knowledge (that
is, a belief which is not justified by any further belief but is justified in
itself). The final end is to say that the chain terminates in a “circle . . .
[or] web of justification by claiming that P, Q, and R all justify each other
in a mutually supporting pattern of interaction.”[12]
Jaakko Hintikka implicitly
recognizes these types of responses to epistemic chains. In his work, what he
calls “ultimate presuppositions” I call intuitions. Hintikka claims of these
intuitions that “They are not answers to any prior questions.”[13]
For Hintikka, then, an infinitely long chain of justifications is out, and it
terminates with some intuition. Whether that intuition is justified,
unjustified, or circular need not be adjudicated with respect to whether or not
Jim must trace back his justification by showing how each belief is justified. On
any of the other three accounts, Jim may not know what justifies q, even if he
knows q justifies p. Consider Jim’s knowledge that the sun will rise tomorrow.
He justifies this by the inductive principle. Jim does not know what justifies
the inductive principle. Yet it would seem false to say Jim lacks justification
for the sun’s rising tomorrow. It therefore follows one does not have to know
or show what justifies a belief q that justifies p.
In addition to other assumptions,
this premise (1) also assumes something very much like the justified true
belief (JTB) account is the correct analysis of knowledge. While I am aware of
Gettier cases, it should at least be noted that in the usual sense (especially
considering intuition), justification at least appears necessary for knowledge.
If JTB is even remotely accurate, then (1) stands a chance at leading us to
foundationalism.
Another important point to consider
is that intuition is a generally reliable source of knowledge. This is
important since if, upon investigation, intuition is generally unreliable (or
not reliable at all!), then what we know will be drastically reduced. If
intuition is necessary for knowledge, but generally does not deliver true
beliefs, then most of our beliefs are false. It may even be that we have a
defeater for our beliefs, depending on what the account of intuition and its
reliability is. Roderick Chisholm, in defending a Kantian view of the a priori, argues that intuition is
generally reliable. By “generally reliable,” I do not mean a kind of
enumerative comparison, whereby we see that a high percentage of intuitive
beliefs are true, and therefore generally reliable. I mean intuition is a
belief-forming process by which we can expect beliefs to be true, in the
absence of a defeater. Chisholm wants to defend the idea of the a priori in terms of necessary truth,
but it does establish that intuition is a source of belief that is generally
reliable (otherwise we could not know the meaning of statements such as
“nothing is red and green all over,” or at least not know whether or not such a
statement were true).[14]
If intuition is the basis of the argument for foundationalism, and if intuition
is generally reliable, then this argument must be applied to four areas of
knowledge.
The
Argument Applied
A good area in which to explore
intuitive knowledge is in the area of morality or ethics. Certainly, some
ethical knowledge can be inferred (such as “it is wrong to kill unjustifiably; abortion
is killing unjustifiably; therefore, abortion is wrong”), but other moral
propositions cannot be inferred from “more basic” moral principles. They simply
are the basic moral principles, and it can be argued that they are known
intuitively. Premise (1) of the foundationalism argument claims if there is no
relevant intuitive knowledge for p, then there is no knowledge of p. Within
this context, then, if there are no intuitions backing some moral proposition
p, then there is no knowledge of that moral proposition p. Chisholm argues that
“The philosophical significance of the particular examples we have considered
lies partly in this fact: if some of them must be acknowledged as exemplifying
the . . . a priori, then, in order to defend skepticism . . . it will not be
sufficient merely to point out that some such statements, if they are known to
be true, are . . . a priori.”[15]
If moral judgments are taken
seriously, then, whichever metaethical theory triumphs, intuition is necessary for
these basic moral judgments. In speaking of this, Moreland and Craig remark that
there are four areas in which intuitions are needed for moral thinking:
specific cases of moral judgment (e.g., “You ought not to lie tomorrow morning
to the teacher”); moral rules and principles (e.g., “You should not lie”);
normative theories (deontological concerns); philosophical or religious
background beliefs.[16]
All of these rely crucially on intuition and could not be justified, and hence
not known, otherwise.
The next area to which intuition
shall be applied is in the area of scientific knowledge. It is clear that
scientific advancements have been extremely beneficial in the pragmatic areas
of life. In the theoretical and intellectual areas of life, scientific endeavors
have made great strides. Could this really be possible without intuitions?
Popularly, many defenders of science think so. This, however, is not possible.
Consider the words of Immanuel Kant: “It is possible to show that pure a priori principles are indispensable
for the possibility of experience . . . For whence could experience derive its
certainty, if all the rules, according to which it proceeds, were always
themselves empirical?”[17]
The idea is that if science attempts
to justify itself, then there is an insurmountable problem with justification.
In order to use the inductive principles that are at work (the uniformity of
nature, the principle of parsimony, etc.), the scientist cannot attempt to
prove them by the scientific method (or methods). If he does, he will be
engaging in circular reasoning; he will be using induction to prove induction.
Many scientists are not deterred from their work by this knowledge, but that is
because there is a very strong intuition that allows us to know that these basic
principles are true. This is what Kant means when he writes, “Such rules could
hardly be regarded as first principles.”[18]
For Kant, the particular empirical procedures were guided by intuitions that
could not be shown, in some cases, at all.
The third area for which intuition
is necessary is the area of perceptual knowledge. Perceptual knowledge refers
to knowledge gained from the five senses. Audi argues that perceptual beliefs
have the property of justification independently of any process through which
they might be justified.[19]
What he refers to as “prima facie justification” is simply the kind of
justification whereby it is rational to hold such a belief in the absence of
defeaters; this is the type of justification Audi grants to perceptual beliefs.[20]
Why is it important that such beliefs be supported in such a way?
First, if they are to be supported,
they will be supported in a circular way. This assumes that a justification
will be given that does not appeal to intuitions of any kind. If one wants to
show perception to be reliable, he could try to argue that we have evidence
that perception yields true beliefs in a generally reliable way, and thereby
infer on that basis that perceptual beliefs are justified. Aside from relying
on intuitions concerning induction, there is a further problem. The evidence
gained for perceptual beliefs is itself gained by perceptual belief. A group of
scientists see such reports that perception is successful; they hear such
reports at a conference; they experience such-and-such an experiment. All of
these ways of verifying perception are themselves perceptual beliefs, and so
cannot be non-circularly counted toward the justification of perceptual
beliefs. However, belief in the basicality of perception is justified. Again, Audi
writes on this subject: “There is apparently no good reason to doubt that these
perceptual beliefs are commonly justified.”[21]
That kind of justification can only come from intuitions.
The final area for which intuitions
are necessary is reasoning itself. While Nicholas Rescher certainly has
different intuitions about knowledge than I have, he nonetheless maintains that
intuitions drive the justification of basic beliefs.[22]
For an example, take the famous syllogism, “All men are mortal; Socrates is a
man; therefore, Socrates is mortal.” In virtue of what is this syllogism, taken
as a whole, justified? Certainly we could find justification for the individual
premises. But what justifies the inference? The only intelligible response we
can give is that it just seems to us to be the case that such an inference is
correct, and, indeed, could not be false. If this intuition were to be removed,
there would be nothing supporting reason itself—at least, nothing
non-circularly. This means basic intuition is necessary for justification of
reason. Since the argument has now been made, and applied, some objections
ought to be considered.
Objections
Although many individual objections
could be lodged against the argument for foundationalism, or against
intuitions, only four shall be considered. There will be objections from
skepticism, moral non-realism, Coherentism, and Arationalism. After these
objections are presented, some responses shall be given.
Skepticism
There are really two varieties of
skepticism being discussed: global skepticism and foundational skepticism.
Global skepticism is the idea that if a skeptical hypothesis can be posed for
p, then one does not have knowledge of p. There is a skeptical hypothesis for
p. Therefore, one does not have knowledge of p. This works for most, if not
all, propositions p. A skeptical hypothesis is any logically possible scenario
that cannot be ruled out against p. Audi explains it as being an issue of
fallibility: if someone could possibly be mistaken about p, then there is a
skeptical hypothesis for p; if there is a skeptical hypothesis for p, then one
does not know p. Certainty is required in order to ensure knowledge.[23]
Foundational skepticism is that while certain things can be known (or at least
not ruled out by skeptical hypotheses), nonetheless no one can be justified in
taking these things as pieces of knowledge. In either case, intuitions as the
terminal link in an epistemic chain are ruled out by skepticism.
Moral Non-Realism/Cultural Relativism
One of the evidences this paper
considered for intuition was in the area of moral intuitions. There are two
ways a skeptic can respond to these types of intuitions. First, he can deny
that there are any moral truths. If there simply are no moral truths, then
intuitions are not getting at the truth of the matter. This would be what I
mean by “moral non-realism.” Moreland and Craig point out this means a
non-realist denies that, “moral statements have ontological implications.”[24]
The second way to avoid these moral
intuitions is to claim a kind of cultural relativism (CR). CR maintains that
what is right or morally obligatory will be different from culture to culture.[25]
If CR is true, and one’s moral intuitions tell him that X is morally
obligatory, and if another culture does not perceive this obligation, then it
undercuts that our moral intuitions really are getting at the matter. If that
is the case, then premise (1) of the argument for foundationalism can be
regarded as false.
Coherentism
Perhaps the most powerful objections
to the argument for foundationalism come from Coherentism. Laurence BonJour
attempts to take the foundationalists’ critique and use it against them.
Essentially, the idea is that a basic belief (or intuitive belief) constitutes
a good reason in itself to accept a further empirical belief. From this, an
argument can be developed such that a belief which is putatively basic is
accepted because beliefs of the basic kind are highly likely to be true. But
that second condition is itself an empirical belief. BonJour concludes, “We get
the disturbing result that B [the belief] is not basic after all.”[26]
Additionally, he argues that in order to be justified in holding a belief, the
person must possess that reason. If this is true, an anti-foundationalist
conclusion will follow.[27]
Arationalism
The final objection to be considered
is what I call “Arationalism.” The idea is that the rationality that supports
the foundationalist argument is not actually rational, after all. Two major
proponents shall be considered. First, there is A.J. Ayer. Ayer thought it was
absolutely pointless to attempt intuition, as it committed one to a metaphysic,
as well as being entirely a backward epistemology. He queried, “Must he not
begin, as other men do, with the evidence of his senses?”[28]
While he does grant that the reply concerns intuition, Ayer thinks that this
too can be dispensed with. For him, it is the criterion of verifiability, which
he states here as saying a proposition is meaningful if “he knows how to verify
the proposition.” Since intuitions themselves cannot be verified (and certainly
not in the empiricist sense Ayer wants), foundationalism must fail.
Next, there is David Hume. Hume’s
argument is even more severe than Ayer’s. He argues that reason itself is not
to be trusted. This is because even our process of reasoning is fallible and
not true rationality, as we have thought. Instead, Hume thought that reason was
forced by nature. “Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has
determin’d us to judge.”[29]
In his mind, then, any attempt to refute this was just an exercise of nature,
and so held no more force than anything else. In effect, reason was arational.
If that is the case, again, foundationalism cannot be true.
Responses
Each
of the four major objection categories will have responses. These responses are
not intended to be comprehensive; indeed, much could be written on each
objection alone. Instead, this section is intended to show how a
foundationalist would respond to the various objections. First, it might be
thought that global skepticism (or the second type of skepticism) is
self-defeating. This is because it seems that there really is a skeptical
hypothesis available for the principle that if one is fallible, he does not
know p. Perhaps an evil demon is stimulating one’s faculty of reason in just
this instance. If this skeptical hypothesis cannot be ruled out, then the
conditional can be said not to be known. If that is true, then there is no
reason to hold the skeptical claim.
William Alston has further argued that it
is not really possible to go through life without affirming some statements as
true (any affirmation is a rejection of global skepticism, at the least).[30]
Further, this results in what Alston calls “undue partiality,” whereby we are
skeptical of some beliefs in an absolute way but not others, and for literally
no reason.[31] If this is true, he has
further undermined the skeptical conditional.
With respect to the argument from moral
non-realism, no definitive argument has been advanced such that we should think
our intuitions regarding morality are false. Moreover, this is subject to what
I call the Interconnectedness Response (IR). IR states that any use of
reasoning against moral intuitions will rely on intuitions, so that this
actually proves what it seeks to undermine (in the larger sense). In addressing
CR, Harry Gensler suggests that, on CR, the good is what is socially approved,
and society cannot be mistaken about what is socially approved.[32] If
that is so, then it follows that no moral progress is possible. But it seems
there has been moral progress. It therefore follows that CR is false.
As to Coherentism, there are at least two
things to be said against that. First, Alston argues cogently for the idea that
coherence is not sufficient for truth. This is because there is a large number
of sets of propositions or beliefs that are logically incompatible with each other with respect to the
truth, but which are all internally coherent. If this is the case, it carries
with it the unhappy result that each of these exclusive sets of beliefs are
justified in the appropriate way.[33]
Second, BonJour’s first argument against foundationalism misses the mark. One
does not take the intuition and say, “In a majority of cases, these intuitive
beliefs have been correct.” Instead, one finds himself believing the intuition.
Alston describes this as belief in an immediately
justified way.[34] Next, even BonJour
himself has essentially given up his argument that in order to be justified in
believing p, one must have the reasons for being justified in believing p. He
now writes, “They do not require or involve a distinct second-order mental act
with the propositional content that I have the belief in question . . . There
is no comparable issue of justification that arises for the intrinsic awareness
of this content.”[35]
As such, these challenges are overcome.
Finally, the arational objections shall
be considered. First, Ayer’s principle of verification is self-defeating.
Despite Ayer’s objections, this principle does
seem to go beyond the limits that he has set. If the verifiability criterion is
true, then it must be shown from the five senses and the physical world.
Unfortunately, this criterion cannot be shown from the empirical method. As
such, if it is true, it should be regarded as false; this renders it
self-defeating.
Next, the lesson Hume derives from his
determination of nature argument does not show what he thinks it does. For a
refresher, Hume believed that nature fully determined the reasoning process of
man, and as such, it was not rational. But it seems Hume’s declaration of this
argument is, or at least is supposed to be in some sense, rational. Therefore,
it seems Hume’s discussion is really a virtual reductio ad absurdum against arationality. If that is the case,
foundationalism still stands.
Conclusion
In this paper, I first explained
what was meant by the broad sense of intuition. Then, I used this intuition in
an argument for foundationalism. This argument was: “If there is no relevant
intuitive knowledge for p, then there is no knowledge of p; there is knowledge
of p; therefore, there is relevant intuitive knowledge for p.” I then applied
the argument to show that intuition is necessary for moral, scientific,
perceptual, and rational knowledge. Intuition is also generally reliable in the
sense that it is a rational belief-forming process. Some objections were
considered form skepticism, cultural relativism, Coherentism, and Arationalism.
Finally, responses were given to undercut or rebut these objections. It seems
that intuitive knowledge is generally reliable, necessary for any knowledge at
all, and leads to a kind of foundationalism.
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Moreland, J.P. and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian
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Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford, 2000.
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[1] Richard Swinburne, Epistemic Justification (New York:
Oxford, 2001), 26. Swinburne takes “rightly” basic as slightly different than
he takes Alvin Plantinga’s “properly” basic (cf. n. 20); this distinction does
not affect the argument of this paper.
[2] Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York:
Oxford, 2000), 83.
[3] J.P. Moreland and
William Lane Craig, Philosophical
Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic,
2003), 85.
[4] Ibid.
[5] The LNC is not
necessary to this portion of the argument. If there are literally any laws of
logic, they must function as intuitive bits of knowledge and cannot be further
non-circularly justified.
[6] Swinburne, 26.
[7] Harry J. Gensler, Introduction to Logic, 2nd
ed. (New York: Routledge, 2010), 228.
[8] Robert Audi, Epistemology, 3rd ed (New
York: Routledge, 2011), 216. Audi also lists a theory of knowledge along these same lines, but I am here emphasizing the
justificatory aspect. This is because justification is plausibly a necessary
condition for knowledge, and the argument I employ will rely heavily on the
transmission of justification.
[9] Ibid., 272.
[10] Ibid., 273.
[11] Moreland and Craig,
111.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Jaakko Hintikka, Socratic Epistemology (New York:
Cambridge, 2007), 84.
[14] Roderick Chisholm,
“Reason and the A Priori,” in Readings in Epistemology, ed. Jack S.
Crumley II (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield, 1999), 549.
[15] Ibid., 551-52.
[16] Moreland and Craig,
422.
[17] Immanuel Kant,
“Critique of Pure Reason,” in Readings in
Epistemology, ed. Jack S. Crumley II (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield, 1999),
529-30.
[18] Ibid., 530.
[19] Audi, 2. Audi does not
argue here that perceptual belief is a basic source of belief, but he does
elsewhere.
[20] Ibid., 28.
[21] Ibid., 31.
[22] Nicholas Rescher, Epistemology (Albany, NY: State
University of New York, 2003), 7.
[23] Audi, 338.
[24] Moreland and Craig,
398.
[25] Ibid., 409.
[26] Laurence BonJour, “The
Structure of Empirical Knowledge,” in Epistemology:
Contemporary Readings, ed. Michael Huemer (New York: Routledge, 2002), 388.
[27] Ibid., 389.
[28] A. J. Ayer, “The
Elimination of Metaphysics,” in Epistemology:
Contemporary Readings, ed. Michael Huemer (New York: Routledge, 2002), 166.
[29] David Hume, “Of
Scepticism with Regard to Reason,” in Epistemology:
Contemporary Readings, ed. Michael Huemer (New York: Routledge, 2002), 272.
[30] William Alston, Beyond Justification (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell, 2005), 223.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Gensler, 40-41.
[33] Alston, 236.
[34] William Alston, “Has
Foundationalism Been Refuted?” in Epistemology:
Contemporary Readings, ed. Michael Huemer (New York: Routledge, 2002), 404.
[35] Laurence BonJour and
Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 62-63.
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