Tuesday, August 16, 2011

What exactly does it take to be a Molinist?

What exactly does it take to be a Molinist? Not as much as one might think. I have often encountered objections to Molinism based on doctrines that Molinists hold, but that are nonetheless non-essential to Molinism itself.

As an example, consider the doctrines of transworld depravity and transworld damnation. These doctrines are held by many Molinists, but not all. They say that in every world in which man is instantiated, he would sin, and those who actually to go to Hell would refuse Christ in every feasible world in which they exist. Some find this unwarranted or incorrect for one reason or another, and hence conclude Molinism is false. But that itself is unwarranted. I myself have come to no conclusion concerning transworld damnation, and in fact suspect it may be false. Yet I am a Molinist. So what does it take?

1. One must believe God knows everything that could happen, will actually happen, and would happen in any other set of circumstances.

This is the basic idea of Molinist middle knowledge. Rather than a reducing of God’s omniscience, it is a more robust explanation of it. It covers not merely what could happen and will happen, but what would have happened had things gone differently. Molinists believe God has a perfect knowledge of this.

2. One must believe God’s knowledge of “would counterfactuals” is located logically subsequent to natural knowledge and prior to free knowledge.

This can be quite complicated, but I’ll try to be succinct. These divisions are merely logical and not temporal, nor do they differ in importance or level at which God comprehends them. They are all together the total of God’s undifferentiated knowledge, and merely serve as logical divisions. God’s natural knowledge is just God’s knowledge of all necessary truths; since whatever is possible is so necessarily (that can take a while to explain, and I will in a footnote), then natural knowledge contains everything that could happen.[1]

From the set of all things that could happen are the things that would happen and the things that will actually happen (free knowledge). Now if one believes that the things that would happen are true logically subsequent to the divine decree (free knowledge; the things that will actually happen do so precisely because God has decreed this to be so), then she believes that God has decreed that such-and-such would be true in such-and-such circumstances; that is, the things which would be true are only so because God caused them (for what purpose, I’m not sure). However, a Molinist believes these things are true independent of God’s decree. That doesn’t mean that they happen or obtain without God’s power. That is quite impossible. But it does mean that the things that would be true in other circumstances are so logically prior to God’s decree to actualize a particular world.

3. One must believe in some form of libertarian free will.

This last point is a little controversial, especially as compatiblist-Calvinists like Bruce Ware essentially espouse Molinism. Dr. Ware himself refers to “compatiblist middle knowledge.” However, I believe libertarian freedom is a logical entailment of the other essential premises of Molinism, and so necessary to believe in order to be a true Molinist.

For instance, if one believes in compatiblism, he must believe that the will is causally determined (yet free; hence the term). Yet middle knowledge, which we have seen is essential to Molinism, has postulated that the will is not causally constrained. If it is, it is very difficult to see by what, if it was true that it was constrained independently of and logically prior to God’s decree.

Libertarian creaturely freedom was precisely what got Luis de Molina thinking about middle knowledge. He wanted to be able to reconcile the truth of God’s sovereignty with free choices made every day. In Molinism, he set us down the path—not to be able to explain everything God does, but rather to explain how it is at least in principle possible for man to be free and yet God actualize and control every event. It is because of libertarian freedom that Molina reasoned that knowledge must be in the middle of God’s natural and free knowledge. Hence, if would counterfactuals must be known logically prior to the decree it is only because of libertarian freedom.

Notice what was not said. One does not have to believe in circumstantial causation and he does not have to believe in transworld damnation. He does not have to believe a Molinist’s answer to the problem of evil. He does not have to accept a Molinist’s account for why God chose this particular world. I mention this last one in particular because a common complaint against Molinism is that it reduces God to focusing all of his attention in actualizing this world on us, his creatures. But as we have seen that is not at all essential to Molinism! Rather, that is a rejection of a particular explanation of why God has actualized this actual world (one which I have never actually seen by a Molinist anyway) over and against others. In any case, I firmly believe that most people without a dog in the fight are intuitively Molinists, based on the three points above, even if they have not worked it out theologically.


                [1] When we say something is possible, we are saying that “there is a possible world in which X is exemplified.” But if that is the case, then it is true in every possible world that “there is a possible world in which X is exemplified.” The definition of something’s being true in every possible world is called logical necessity. Consider if we said it was possible in this world but impossible in others (maintaining the unequivocal, logical sense of the term “possible”).  This would mean that in some possible world, the proposition “there is a possible world in which X is exemplified” is false. In that case, however, it is true instead that “there is no possible world in which X is exemplified.” This blatantly contradicts the original assertion. Hence we see if something is possible, it is so in all possible worlds, or necessarily. If it is impossible, it is so in all possible worlds, or necessarily false.

All posts, and the blog Possible Worlds, are the sole intellectual property of Randy Everist. One may reprint part or all of this post so long as: a) full attribution is given (Randy Everist, Possible Worlds), b) all use is non-commercial, and c) one is in compliance with the Creative Commons license at the bottom on the main page of this blog.

14 comments:

  1. I'm not clear on why this is libertarian. I remember reading two papers a long time ago. The first was by Nelson Pike, I think, called something like God's Foreknowledge and Human Freedom are Incompatible. And the Plantinga wrote the response paper called God' Foreknowledge and Human Freedom are Compatible.

    If I remember correctly, Plantinga argues that if God knows that Jones is going to cut his grass at time t, that doesn't mean there is not some other possible world where Jones does not cut his grass at time t. This is certainly oversimplified, but you get the idea - a compatibilist defense. But he certainly wasn't invoking any causal role for God. It just so happened that God had foreknowledge, and it would make sense to expand that into the other possible worlds.

    In other words, the compatibility in Plantinga's solution doesn't seem to be between causal determinism and freedom, but between foreknowledge and freedom. That seems to be the same thing going on with Molinism. But I don't really know that much abotu Calvinism, so there could be more to it than that.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Dr. Mike, looks like you nailed it with your last paragraph as far as I can tell. Compatiblism asserts that there is no discrepancy between causal determinism and freedom, whereas Plantinga and other Molinists will claim that such is incompatible. What they defend is that God's foreknowledge is compatible with free actions. So you've completely got what they believe, as far as I can tell.

    ReplyDelete
  3. Yeah, after I read my own comment I thought "well Plantinga isn't even a compatibilist" based on this essay and his free will theodicy. I guess I was thinking of the Calvinism comment you made and I seem to recall Plantinga being a Calvinist.

    ReplyDelete
  4. I'm not quite sure what you mean by point #1 and how it's related to Molinism. It sounds more like the third level multiverse...

    ReplyDelete
  5. Mike, that is because Plantinga taught at Calvin College and is well-known for espousing Reformed epistemology. However, most contemporary Calvinists do not accept him, and I think Plantinga himself does not self-designate as a Calvinist, but as Reformed (and it's arguable he means specifically in epistemology and not with respect to causal determinism).

    ReplyDelete
  6. Hi Max. I am just stating the simplistic descriptions for God's natural knowledge (what could happen), his free knowledge (what will actually happen), and his middle knowledge (what would happen in any other various counterfactual circumstances). Whether or not this obtains in a multiverse, or something like modal realism (a la David Lewis), is up for debate, but not essential to Molinism as a whole. Does that help?

    ReplyDelete
  7. I only just now realized how you must've read #1 above Max! With "will happen" and "would happen" as descriptions of "could happen"! I will write more clearly next time to avoid that problem. I definitely do not want to say everything that could happen would in fact happen :)

    ReplyDelete
  8. Nice post. Like you, I'm not sure whether or not I believe in transworld damnation, but I do think Molinism answers a lot of questions.

    I consider myself a Wesleyan-Molinist or a non-OSAS Molinist : )

    ReplyDelete
  9. Hi Peter, thanks for the comment. I am definitely a Molinist, and I see the merit of transworld depravity more and more all the time. I honestly just struggle with having to reinterpret Scripture to get there. They could be right, but I don't find TWD as necessary, and hence I'm not sure where to go with it. I am in fact an OSAS Molinist, kind of in the style of Ken Keathley (great writer, btw), but that of course is not essential to Molinism. :)

    ReplyDelete
  10. I'm sorry, please read "transworld depravity" as "transworld damnation." I actually do believe in the former for sure. :)

    ReplyDelete
  11. Thanks for the summation of Molinist positions! As a Christian who finds the Many Worlds interpretation of quantum theory fascinating, I really appreciate this particular school of theology. Good stuff.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Thanks David! I'm so sorry it took me so long to reply to you. God bless and thanks for the comment!

      Delete
  12. When I think about things I've said and written in the past, I can now see there was an underlying assumption of Middle Knowlege. I think I've been a Molinist for a long time even though I clamed the title "Arminian" because I believed in libertarian free will, resistible/prevenient grace, unlimited atonement, God's universal salvic will etc. I still believe in these things of course, I just also have a Molinist understanding of God's knowledge and how He can use that knowledge to achieve His ends. I believe God has 3 logical moments of knowledge, not just two.

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Hey Evan, thanks for the comment! I hope you're doing well, and glad you're a Molinist! :)

      Delete

Please remember to see the comment guidelines if you are unfamiliar with them. God bless and thanks for dropping by!