We must never forget that there are people who are new to apologetics (whether they be new believers, unbelievers, or longtime believers who are coming to the arguments). When they come, they may bring up arguments, objections, or other questions/concerns that we have heard before. We must always be willing to answer these with patience and clarity. Today we have another one of those situations. I enjoy these!
This is the age-old logical problem of evil. The quote is as follows:
Either God wants to abolish evil, and cannot; or he can, but does not want to. If he wants to, but cannot, he is impotent. If he can, but does not want to, he is wicked. If God can abolish evil, and God really wants to do it, why is there evil in the world?
- Epicurus
- Epicurus
The premises are really quite simple.
1. Either God wants to abolish evil and cannot or he can but does not want to.
2. If God wants to and cannot, then he is not omnipotent.
3. If God can and does not want to, then he is not omnibenevolent.
Assuming the truth of the premises, then regardless of which way the theist moves, he gets a God who is somewhat less than maximally excellent. This is an unacceptable scenario for the Christian. But what premise should be denied?
I think the disjunction should be denied. A disjunction is true only in the case that at least one of the disjuncts is true. A traditional answer is that “God wants to abolish evil and cannot” is not true, and “God can abolish evil but does not want to” is not true. The truth of the matter is that God desires for there to be no evil, but desires also free, morally responsible creatures to exist and make choices. Even in the case of God’s wanting or desiring free creatures that do sin more than robots who do not sin, it doesn’t at all follow that God does not want to abolish evil.
But suppose we accept the first premise anyway. Is the second premise true? Not at all! For God, being the ground and foundation of logic and truth, cannot do the logically impossible. Now it seems as though allowing free creatures to act morally means that it is logically impossible that one can be forced to do a free act. In that case, then, God can want to abolish evil but not be able to do so in the cases of individual acts where free creatures are making morally-responsible choices—on pain of contradiction—without being defined as impotent.
Further, “abolish sin” is a bit of an ambiguous phrase. What’s interesting about the justice and goodness of God on Christian theism is that God himself rectifies the injustices of the world. He does so not only through eternal life, but eternal punishment as well. A good case can be made that, ultimately, God does indeed abolish sin from the universe (Revelation 21:8), and “the Lord God giveth them light: and they shall reign for ever and ever.” There is no logical problem of evil. A good, omnipotent God can and does exist, even in the presence of sin in this world.
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It isn't clear from your presentation how free will is supposed to solve the logical problem of evil. You point out that it is impossible to force a free individual to do what is good, but this itself doesn't solve the problem of evil because one can ask why there are any free agents in the first place. The assumption must be that the world is better with created free agents, in spite of their potential to commit Holocausts for example, than without it.
ReplyDeleteAlso, we can certainly notice the incompatibility of God's requiring free agents to do what is Good, but God is also capable, with his exhaustive foreknowledge and omnipotence, of realizing a world (perhaps intervening as necessary) at which external circumstances are such that no free agents *actually* choose evil things, though it's always in their power to do so.
If we interpret the dichotomy here in premise 1 as a metaphysical (broadly logical) disjunction, rather than a strictly logical one, then the injection of a *conceivable* third option (namely that having free entities is better than not and that the nature of free will is such as to require the possibility of evil) doesn't demonstrate that the (broadly) logical problem *isn't* a problem. Rather, all it does is undercut the claim that it *is* a problem, to the degree that conceivability can be expected to track metaphysical possibility in this case. Whether it is or is not a problem depends upon the metaphysical claim that free agency in creatures requires the possibility of evil action.
This might seem plausible until we consider the parallel problem of Heaven where (presumably) free agents do not produce evil in the sight of God. (If one want's to consider the case of Lucifer's rebellion, we can instead talk about the eventual state of God's kingdom wherein evil is utterly destroyed.)
In any case, the point I'm getting at is that the logical problem of evil isn't clearly *solved* by the introduction of free will. Rather, it just becomes unclear whether or not it is, in fact, a problem, so atheists will have to find some other argument to be convincing (which reminds me of the ontological argument). Theists, knowing that the logical problem of evil fails *as an argument*, shouldn't, on those grounds, feel as though evil doesn't pose a problem for them as such a conclusion would be hasty.
Hi Jake, thanks for your response! I would like to comment quickly on a few of these here: having any free creatures at all of course does not affect the omnipotence premise, and as to the goodness of the premise, just as a parent bears neither the causal nor moral responsibility for any evil X done by their offspring (just on virtue of choosing the offspring), so I see no reason God would bear any moral responsibility simply for creating.
ReplyDeleteAnd of course, if God intervenes, he's not preventing evil (for in order for them to retain true freedom, they must have intended to do the evil, which is itself evil). So what you're requiring is really the power of abolished consequences or suffering. But that is a different ballgame! Suffice it to say that, since our actions do have consequences, it's entirely reasonable that we have learned such things are destructive and so do not do them (as opposed to what we would in fact do were there to be literally no consequences whatsoever).
As to Heaven, let's not forget there are a number of options available to the theist. 1. One may (as many do) simply assert that once in the final, eternal state, there is no free will given to creatures. They are conformed to the image of Christ and so have no free will. 2. One may point out the eternal state is simply not distinct from this possible world; thus, the onus is on the objector as to why we should expect such a part of this actual world to be itself a separate possible world that is feasible for God.
Finally, if the premises are shown to be less probable than not, then while I do not proclaim them logically impossible, I nonetheless see no reason to call them anything but false, given that they seek to establish the logical impossibility of the Christian God. Demonstrating a possible (and indeed probable with respect to internal consistency) alternative effectively negates the argument. :)
New here, quick question: What is the "disjunction"? Also, where is it?
ReplyDeleteHi Aaron thanks for the question! A disjunction is an "either/or" statement; hence a disjunct is either side of the statement. A disjunct is true if at least one side is true (both sides can be true in some cases). A dilemma is different than a disjunct. A dilemma is an either/or statement where one is true, but not both.
ReplyDeleteIn any case, the disjunction above that I am referring to is: "Either God wants to abolish evil and cannot or he can but does not want to."
Thanks! I appreciate it ;)
ReplyDeleteHi Randy
ReplyDeleteI understand how much of the suffering in the world is a result of man's free will but what about suffering caused by natural disasters? From a Christian perspective I've always explained this to non believers by saying that when sin entered into the world, somehow its effects were also felt in nature. For example God tells Adam that the ground will be cursed and this seems to indicate that from that point nature was somehow against man. Then of course, there is the verse in Romans 8 which says that creation is in bondage to decay, which shows that even nature was affected by the fall.
However, it may be that the atheist will not accept Biblical 'proofs' such as the ones I have suggested above. In that situation, can you think of any reasons using natural theology/philosophy alone to explain suffering due to natural disasters.
Many thanks
There are a lot of good answers (and interesting ones). Plantinga, for instance, has remarked that it's possible such things are done by demonic forces. Dembski believes natural evil is a reflective part of the sin of man done retrocausally (or possibly God arranged it this way precisely because he knew man would commit evil). I like a kind of hybrid that suggests that part of it is because of a regular natural economy. Animal death, for instance, is actually necessary in order to avoid overpopulation and to feed certain animals (as well as grow plants, etc.). and so it may be that these animal deaths were pre-programmed and as such are not really evil (since no *personal* suffering is going on). Second, as to natural disasters, I tend to go with Dembski in that, while I don't think each natural disaster is punishment for some specific sin, I do think that God, in his infinite knowledge, knows counterfactually what the world would be like with and without those specific disasters on those specific times, and that sin brings about death. As a theodicy (or an offense type move) this might not convince atheists (since they'd have to accept that these are the actual reasons for evil, which they may not be inclined to do), but as a defense, it's great. It's plausible and even quite true that we have no way of knowing what the world would be like without these events. That doesn't make the events good; they're tragic. It just means that good can come out of them.
DeleteHI Randy,
DeleteIn your response to another poster here you write: "Dembski believes natural evil is a reflective part of the sin of man done retrocausally (or possibly God arranged it this way precisely because he knew man would commit evil). I like a kind of hybrid that suggests that part of it is because of a regular natural economy. Animal death, for instance, is actually necessary in order to avoid overpopulation and to feed certain animals (as well as grow plants, etc.). and so it may be that these animal deaths were pre-programmed and as such are not really evil (since no *personal* suffering is going on)."
I was just thinking something over which might be complete nonsense but I just thought I'd run it by you :) : Regarding the part where you talk about animal death and overpopulation, could we also say that maybe stuff like free will and divine hiddeness come into play with animal death in that we could imagine - at least from the YEC viewpoint for sure - that God allowed the death of animals to occur after the fall because having animals that could not die via disease, old age, etc, might lead humans to conclude that something supernatural was going on since it'd seem remarkably odd to us from a random evolution point of view that all animals on earth lived on and on but us humans were the odd one out being subject to death? In other words, it'd seem too obvious that God was involved in the process and maybe that would take away too much from our free will in that that God was not hidden enough. Hope that makes sense.
That could possibly be the case. I'm not sure, but it is interesting! :)
DeleteI was listening to a radio show earlier where they were discussing the power of prayer and the atheist host asked the old 'Why doesn't God make the legs, arms, etc., of amputees grow back" question. She wasn't really focusing on the "Why doesn't God alleviate their pain" angle but, rather, her angle was "this would prove God exists since it can't be done naturally". My response to her was to say that maybe part of the answer (I did make clear it was only part of it) could relate to the concept of divine hiddenness and that it's possible that it would be too obvious a miracle for God to do, akin to God levitating a table or house in response to prayer. I noted that God gives us enough to believe in him though not enough to force us to accept him and maybe that's what's in play here in part.
ReplyDeleteOf course there are reports of limbs regrowing in response to prayer (I hear Craig Keener alludes to a handful of these in his book which I have not read), but assuming there are none or at least very few true cases, I'd be interested in how would you address this sort of objection.
I address it mostly as a dodge. It implies that God would do so, when we have every reason to believe that, normally, he would not do so (after all, God created the natural order, and once sin is involved, all bets are off). Moreover, many atheists sincerely believe, and I'm not being sarcastic, that the main goal of God is to get as many people to believe He exists as possible. That's just not the case. While it's surely a necessary condition of salvific faith to believe that God exists, it's not sufficient: perhaps no amount of non-coercive action for them results in a conjunction of belief in God and salvific faith. Any speculation, even from the subject, is just speculation: even they do not know the relevant counterfactuals. And finally, there are hundreds of reports of miracle cases, many of which involve the lengthening of legs, the healing of club foot (which is only ever done by surgery, but the non-Christian doctors witness it), etc. Many of which is documented by Gary Habermas. But since most of these atheists are not inclined to take miracles seriously, their question strikes me as a dodge. However, it might be a good opportunity to raise the question as to how she would come to accept the miracle. If she concedes that she wouldn't accept it, under any normal or feasible circumstances, then she ought to stop pressing the objection--at least without assuming it can't happen. That's like my being upset that married bachelors aren't around! :)
DeleteHi Randy, Thanks for the reply.
DeleteYou wrote: "It implies that God would do so, when we have every reason to believe that, normally, he would not do so"
I think she might say, "Well, you believers say God supposedly heals almost all other illnesses/handicaps so why make this the one exception?" Obviously you already noted, Randy, that there are cases documented by Habermas (do you recall which book or article of his does this?) so I guess I'd note that to her.
You wrote: "Moreover, many atheists sincerely believe, and I'm not being sarcastic, that the main goal of God is to get as many people to believe He exists as possible."
Yes, they do seem to. Though in the cases of healing diseases/handicaps, I guess they could say "Well, if I prayed to one specific deity like Jesus and he healed my sick kid then not only would I believe he exists but I'd be grateful too, and would thus come to God in love (which is what God wants) as opposed to just believing he exists.
"However, it might be a good opportunity to raise the question as to how she would come to accept the miracle. If she concedes that she wouldn't accept it, under any normal or feasible circumstances, then she ought to stop pressing the objection--at least without assuming it can't happen."
I might try that via twitter, though I don't hold out a lot hope for a reply since most of these radio hosts haven't engaged with past tweets I've sent, though maybe that's partly because they'd rather people phone in. Anyway, without speaking for her, maybe she'd say, "Well, I'd accept it if it happened on live TV straight after someone prayed to Jesus, and it'd also have to happen to a group rather than an individual". Your thoughts?