We must never forget that there are people who are new to apologetics (whether they be new believers, unbelievers, or longtime believers who are coming to the arguments). When they come, they may bring up arguments, objections, or other questions/concerns that we have heard before. We must always be willing to answer these with patience and clarity. Today we have another one of those situations. I enjoy these!
This is the age-old logical problem of evil. The quote is as follows:
Either God wants to abolish evil, and cannot; or he can, but does not want to. If he wants to, but cannot, he is impotent. If he can, but does not want to, he is wicked. If God can abolish evil, and God really wants to do it, why is there evil in the world?
- Epicurus
- Epicurus
The premises are really quite simple.
1. Either God wants to abolish evil and cannot or he can but does not want to.
2. If God wants to and cannot, then he is not omnipotent.
3. If God can and does not want to, then he is not omnibenevolent.
Assuming the truth of the premises, then regardless of which way the theist moves, he gets a God who is somewhat less than maximally excellent. This is an unacceptable scenario for the Christian. But what premise should be denied?
I think the disjunction should be denied. A disjunction is true only in the case that at least one of the disjuncts is true. A traditional answer is that “God wants to abolish evil and cannot” is not true, and “God can abolish evil but does not want to” is not true. The truth of the matter is that God desires for there to be no evil, but desires also free, morally responsible creatures to exist and make choices. Even in the case of God’s wanting or desiring free creatures that do sin more than robots who do not sin, it doesn’t at all follow that God does not want to abolish evil.
But suppose we accept the first premise anyway. Is the second premise true? Not at all! For God, being the ground and foundation of logic and truth, cannot do the logically impossible. Now it seems as though allowing free creatures to act morally means that it is logically impossible that one can be forced to do a free act. In that case, then, God can want to abolish evil but not be able to do so in the cases of individual acts where free creatures are making morally-responsible choices—on pain of contradiction—without being defined as impotent.
Further, “abolish sin” is a bit of an ambiguous phrase. What’s interesting about the justice and goodness of God on Christian theism is that God himself rectifies the injustices of the world. He does so not only through eternal life, but eternal punishment as well. A good case can be made that, ultimately, God does indeed abolish sin from the universe (Revelation 21:8), and “the Lord God giveth them light: and they shall reign for ever and ever.” There is no logical problem of evil. A good, omnipotent God can and does exist, even in the presence of sin in this world.
---------------------------------All posts, and the blog Possible Worlds, are the sole intellectual property of Randy Everist. One may reprint part or all of this post so long as: a) full attribution is given (Randy Everist, Possible Worlds), b) all use is non-commercial, and c) one is in compliance with the Creative Commons license at the bottom on the main page of this blog.
It isn't clear from your presentation how free will is supposed to solve the logical problem of evil. You point out that it is impossible to force a free individual to do what is good, but this itself doesn't solve the problem of evil because one can ask why there are any free agents in the first place. The assumption must be that the world is better with created free agents, in spite of their potential to commit Holocausts for example, than without it.
ReplyDeleteAlso, we can certainly notice the incompatibility of God's requiring free agents to do what is Good, but God is also capable, with his exhaustive foreknowledge and omnipotence, of realizing a world (perhaps intervening as necessary) at which external circumstances are such that no free agents *actually* choose evil things, though it's always in their power to do so.
If we interpret the dichotomy here in premise 1 as a metaphysical (broadly logical) disjunction, rather than a strictly logical one, then the injection of a *conceivable* third option (namely that having free entities is better than not and that the nature of free will is such as to require the possibility of evil) doesn't demonstrate that the (broadly) logical problem *isn't* a problem. Rather, all it does is undercut the claim that it *is* a problem, to the degree that conceivability can be expected to track metaphysical possibility in this case. Whether it is or is not a problem depends upon the metaphysical claim that free agency in creatures requires the possibility of evil action.
This might seem plausible until we consider the parallel problem of Heaven where (presumably) free agents do not produce evil in the sight of God. (If one want's to consider the case of Lucifer's rebellion, we can instead talk about the eventual state of God's kingdom wherein evil is utterly destroyed.)
In any case, the point I'm getting at is that the logical problem of evil isn't clearly *solved* by the introduction of free will. Rather, it just becomes unclear whether or not it is, in fact, a problem, so atheists will have to find some other argument to be convincing (which reminds me of the ontological argument). Theists, knowing that the logical problem of evil fails *as an argument*, shouldn't, on those grounds, feel as though evil doesn't pose a problem for them as such a conclusion would be hasty.
Hi Jake, thanks for your response! I would like to comment quickly on a few of these here: having any free creatures at all of course does not affect the omnipotence premise, and as to the goodness of the premise, just as a parent bears neither the causal nor moral responsibility for any evil X done by their offspring (just on virtue of choosing the offspring), so I see no reason God would bear any moral responsibility simply for creating.
ReplyDeleteAnd of course, if God intervenes, he's not preventing evil (for in order for them to retain true freedom, they must have intended to do the evil, which is itself evil). So what you're requiring is really the power of abolished consequences or suffering. But that is a different ballgame! Suffice it to say that, since our actions do have consequences, it's entirely reasonable that we have learned such things are destructive and so do not do them (as opposed to what we would in fact do were there to be literally no consequences whatsoever).
As to Heaven, let's not forget there are a number of options available to the theist. 1. One may (as many do) simply assert that once in the final, eternal state, there is no free will given to creatures. They are conformed to the image of Christ and so have no free will. 2. One may point out the eternal state is simply not distinct from this possible world; thus, the onus is on the objector as to why we should expect such a part of this actual world to be itself a separate possible world that is feasible for God.
Finally, if the premises are shown to be less probable than not, then while I do not proclaim them logically impossible, I nonetheless see no reason to call them anything but false, given that they seek to establish the logical impossibility of the Christian God. Demonstrating a possible (and indeed probable with respect to internal consistency) alternative effectively negates the argument. :)
New here, quick question: What is the "disjunction"? Also, where is it?
ReplyDeleteHi Aaron thanks for the question! A disjunction is an "either/or" statement; hence a disjunct is either side of the statement. A disjunct is true if at least one side is true (both sides can be true in some cases). A dilemma is different than a disjunct. A dilemma is an either/or statement where one is true, but not both.
ReplyDeleteIn any case, the disjunction above that I am referring to is: "Either God wants to abolish evil and cannot or he can but does not want to."
Thanks! I appreciate it ;)
ReplyDelete