Saturday, October 22, 2011

Craig, Law, and Evil God: Oh My!


The recent debate between William Lane Craig and Stephen Law has sent what amounts to shockwaves through the Christian community. Law’s “Evil God” argument is certainly interesting. The atheists are typically touting the victory of Stephen Law (as is Law himself). Interestingly, depending on what criteria one uses, there is a sense in which Law may be regarded to have won the debate hands-down, there is another sense in which he may be regarded to have lost the debate hands-down, and at least one other sense which claims it was a draw (for the record, I lean towards a “draw.”). I will spare you a full review of the debate, as J.W. Wartick has done an excellent job on his blog: http://jwwartick.com/2011/10/20/craig-vs-law/ These are some thoughts about Stephen Law’s Evil God argument.

The argument is

1. If gratuitous good exists, then Evil God does not exist.

2. Gratuitous good exists.

3. Therefore, Evil God does not exist.

It is important to understand, in the context of the Craig-Law debate, how this argument arose. Law’s original argument is that God does not exist if there is gratuitous evil; since there is gratuitous evil, it follows God does not exist. Craig’s objection is that we simply do not have an epistemic position to warrant that claim. Craig’s objection is not in fact a defeater of the premise that there is gratuitous evil, but rather an undercutter of that premise. This means that it undermines the warrant for saying that there is in fact gratuitous evil. In response, Law offered up, essentially, (1-3) above. His point was that Craig’s objection can be run in a parallel sense. Namely, Evil God could have some overridingly evil reason to permit the good. Law rejects this as sound reasoning, and thinks others will too. But in that case, we are essentially allowing the many apparent acts of good in the world to count as evidence against an Evil God. Since there appear to be many more acts of good than would be necessary for an all-Evil God to permit, we thus can conclude Evil God does not exist. However, we therefore admit, mutatis mutandis, that the argument against God is warranted, and hence the objection fails. Does Law here succeed? I think not.

First, it should be noted this does not actually counter Craig’s objection at all. After all, which part of that overcomes the undercutter that we are not in an epistemic position to be able to judge which acts of evil are in fact gratuitous? It is here Law offers no rebuttal. In fact, his parallel argument may be more one of psychological, rather than epistemological, significance.[1] It seems to me, and to Craig, that no one who does not already agree with Law’s method should agree with this parallel argument. If you think whether or not God’s existence is justified is not done on an inductive survey of goods, you should not be persuaded by this parallel argument (since it relies on the exact same reasoning). It is here I wish Craig had pressed forward, when it became apparent Law did not understand what was being said in its fullest. This failure on Craig’s part is most of what I think contributed to the perception Law had concerning his performance and whether or not he won.

Since the argument was to be parallel, if the methods of arguing are not truly parallel, then the proposed “counterexample” fails in its intended purpose. However, once again, we ought to reiterate that because we have no idea of any of the consequences of certain evils, we cannot say God has absolutely no purpose for them. Law implied this was an unjustified skepticism, but what, exactly, is unjustified about it? Justification is the ability to claim something as true (whereas “warrant” is the cumulative amount of evidence). Does Law think we can justifiably say certain evils fulfill no good? If he does, how does he overcome the cognitive limitations of our points in space and time? How can he know the ultimate consequences serve absolutely no ultimate good? To say Craig’s objection is unjustified is to say there really isn’t a good reason to think we do not know these ultimate consequences. But for that we have been given no argument. Hence, it seems the objection really does stand, and hence it is hasty to assume the second premise of the original argument is true, and thus the argument fails.

Part 2, dealing with a parallel moral argument for Evil God, comes later tonight.


                [1] For instance, perhaps it is the case that, psychologically, most sane individuals do not wish there to be an Evil God. Hence, an inductive survey of goods tells them there probably is no Evil God. Whether or not one is in an epistemic position to judge this is exactly Craig’s point, however.

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22 comments:

  1. Randy,

    Technically, Craig failed to establish the affirmative, which constitutes a loss. (Though, as usual, Craig was clear, concise, and well-prepared, in both the debate and the ensuing discussion.) That Craig lost the debate, however, may not be clear to you, I conjecture, because you misconstrue Law's argument.

    E.g., you write:

    'If you think whether or not God’s existence is justified is not done on an inductive survey of goods, you should not be persuaded by this parallel argument (since it relies on the exact same reasoning).'

    But, as Law states, in both the debate and elsewhere, his argument for a perfectly evil god does not begin with an inductive survey of evils, and neither does he assert that one holds to the existence of a perfectly good god on the basis of a moral inventory.

    Think of Law's argument in the following light:

    The arguments offered to establish the existence of a perfectly good god can also be used to establish the existence of a perfectly evil god: the Kalam cosmological argument, Leibniz's cosmological argument, the argument from morality, Godel's ontological argument, etc., even the argument from miracles. In other words, the arguments for god underdetermine the moral nature of the god in question and thus the type of god in question. (Note how many times Law says 'Yes, but your other arguments do not get you the existence of the type of god you are arguing for' or something similar to that effect.)

    Of course, one may point to revelation and religious experiences as evidence for a perfectly good god. But one may likewise point to revelation and religious experiences as evidence for a perfectly evil god. So, again, there is an underdetermination problem here.

    Now, just as one could run a problem of evil against belief in a perfectly good god, one could run the problem of good against belief in a perfectly evil god. Of course, proponents of a perfectly good god run theodicies in response to the former; but, as Law observes, proponents of a perfectly evil god can construct mirror theodicies in response to the latter.

    But, Law says, we are inclined to reject, or not to take too seriously, the evil god hypothesis * because * there just seems to be too much good in the world for it to be true. Therefore, we ought to reject the good god hypothesis as being similarly implausible.

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  2. However, I believe Law's argument works only to bring the matter to a general state of agnosticism. That is to say, if (1) we have reason to believe in a personal, omni-type god(s) and (2) we really are epistemically limited in such a way that we cannot discern gratuitous evils and goods, then we can make no pronouncements on the moral nature of god(s).

    But this general state of agnosticism poses as many problems for the Christian as for anyone else. Moreover, there are other, more intractable problems with the state of agnosticism: moral actions and improvement become moot. Take, for instance, the following as an illustration.

    If you see a child being attacked by ravenous dogs, then, given the state of agnosticism, you cannot, rationally, act in such a way that you can be confident will bring about a moral good. If you do not save the child, your inaction cannot, rationally, be blameworthy because, due to our epistemic limitations, we simply cannot know that had you acted a greater evil would have ensued (the child could grow up to be the next Hitler or Pol Pot). If you save the child, your action cannot, rationally, be praiseworthy because, due to our epistemic limitations, we simply cannot know that had you not acted a greater good would have resulted (the child's family's grief would lead the parents to dedicate their lives to charitable causes, such as funding anti-malarial research which results in saving tens of thousands in Africa).

    Of course, you cannot respond that you can act in accordance, say, with Scripture, because, mind you, we are in the state of general agnosticism: we simply do not know whether there is an evil god(s) or a good god(s) [or an amoral god(s)] in charge in these parts. Due to your limited epistemic context you simply do not know that abiding by Scriptural maxims will not lead to greater evils.

    Now, Law finds the mysterious argument proffered by theists (and evil theists) to defend their gods to be bosh, and so should you.

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  3. "But, Law says, we are inclined to reject, or not to take too seriously, the evil god hypothesis * because * there just seems to be too much good in the world for it to be true. Therefore, we ought to reject the good god hypothesis as being similarly implausible."

    Aaron, how is this not an inductive survey of morality in the world? Second, did I not represent accurately the argument as it was presented relative to the particular context? So again, in any case, if we aren't already convinced of Law's reasoning, we shouldn't be here.

    As to this next part, "That is to say, if (1) we have reason to believe in a personal, omni-type god(s) and (2) we really are epistemically limited in such a way that we cannot discern gratuitous evils and goods, then we can make no pronouncements on the moral nature of god(s)," I would argue that just doesn't follow! :) All that follows is we cannot say something like "gratuitous evil exists," and hence we can make no pronouncements concerning the problem of evil. As opposed to an all-evil being grounding morality, an all-good being seems to be much more consistent with the ideas of good and evil, as mentioned in my other post on the issue.

    Your final paragraph is against some kind of ethical/moral utilitarianism, which is not under consideration (nor entailed by the discussion). We're not saying an action is good or right (in accordance with duty fulfillment) if it contributes to the greater good. Therefore, on an agnostic setup concerning greater goods, we still can call an evil action evil, and thus this objection, as far as I can tell, is irrelevant.

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  4. Just finished the debate and wanted to respond to Aaron. My overall feeling is there was some rhetorical flourish on both sides ("yank the other one" had me laughing). Law kept insisting that "we can all obviously see" that the Evil God hypothesis is false, but to me that wasn't rationally compelling at all. He also kept insisting that because "Craig's God" was what he was interested in, that he needn't respond to other arguments which are neutral with respect to God's moral properties. I think they should have communicated more before the debate if that was going to be the agreed on strategy. And then there was that bit about how theists shield their beloved (false) beliefs by dragging atheists into complex disputes over the cosmological argument. It left me feeling like Law was, well...kind of a jerk. But he did show that Craig's moral argument wasn't properly supported.



    "Technically, Craig failed to establish the affirmative, which constitutes a loss."

    The proposition to be affirmed was that God exists, which may or may not necessitate that a maximally good God exists. Law did not respond to the historical bits regarding the resurrection. He also didn't really deal with Kalam. I think he was correct that Craig didn't properly support his premises for the moral argument.


    "The arguments offered to establish the existence of a perfectly good god can also be used to establish the existence of a perfectly evil god."

    These arguments don't attempt to establish God's moral properties. So essentially what Law accomplished here is pointing out again that Craig didn't offer enough support in favor of a good God. But that isn't a failure to offer support for God's existence. Otherwise, we might as well fault craig for not establishing God's aseity.

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  5. Hi David, thanks for the comment! I largely agree with you. I can see it from both sides, one understanding the debate to be whether or not God exists just simpliciter, and whether or not God is truly good. I also believe people are correct to point out if a being has some property necessarily, then if that property is shown to be lacking then that particular being construed in that particular way necessarily does not exist. However, Law didn't really explicitly make this argument, and even if we grant he did, it was nonetheless not the topic of debate (though I thnk it should have been). The reason the whole "not the topic of debate" thing is important is because of what was to be discussed. You had WLC on one side giving arguments, and Law all but ignoring them. That's not conducive to a good debate.

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  6. David,

    The motion of the debate was not whether there is an ultimate creator of the universe. Rather the motion of the debate was whether there is a god which is suitably similar to the Christian god. Otherwise, Law could demolish each argument advanced by Craig and yet still lose since one could argue that Law has not shown that there is *no* viable conception of god.

    Thus, the motion, as it stood, was on the existence of a god which approximates the traditional Christian god: An (1) ultimate, (2) perfectly good, personal creator who (3) desires to place himself in a salvific relationship with humans.

    In order to establish the affirmative, Craig needed to establish (1) - (3). Law rejected (2) quite well and addressed (3) adequately. Thus, Law did not need to address (1).

    Personally, Law did well in his strategy since, more often than not, Craig's opponents often fail to address the four arguments he usually throws out.

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  7. Perhaps I should clarify (and re-emphasize). The debate was not about whether *a* god, however conceived, exists. The debate was about whether a *certain* type of god exists, viz., the god Craig worships.

    Thus, Craig needed to establish the conjunction of (1), (2), and (3). If *any* of the conjuncts is false, then the entire conjunction is false. Thus, in order to reject Craig's *entire* argument, Law needed only to show either (1), (2), or (3) is false. In the debate, Law certainly showed (2) was not established and presented a good enough reason to deny (3).

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  8. Where did you see the debate advertised or mentioned this way? I thought the topic was simply "Does God exist?"

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  9. David,

    Which god exists? Krishna? Allah? Ahura Mazda? Zeus? The context in which the debate occurs specifies the debate topic. That is, the context specifies which *conception* of god is to be debated. So, e.g., if the debate occurred in Mecca, the theist would argue for the existence of Allah.

    Since the debate was on the existence of a god which approximates the Christian god, Craig needed to establish (1) - (3). He did not. Thus, he lost.

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  10. "Otherwise, Law could demolish each argument advanced by Craig and yet still lose since one could argue that Law has not shown that there is *no* viable conception of god."

    This is exactly what Craig aimed to do, by framing the debate in his opening speech the contentions that there are good arguments for theism and no good arguments for atheism. Depending on who you ask, we heard one argument for atheism with a defense-as-parody-argument, or we heard one argument for atheism which was immediately abandoned in favor of a critique of Craig's moral argument. In either case, it seems Law lost the debate in a technical sense. However, I think Craig did not push him well enough on the parody argument. But the fact of the matter is each man seemed to be having his own debate, and that is truly disappointing.

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  11. Hi Aaron, one more thing. He barely addressed (3), and if he were being graded on his response by a group of his philosophical peers I'm afraid he wouldn't have done much better than a D. He didn't even develop a proper a priori objection to the evidences brought forth by the Resurrection hypothesis, disputed none of the facts, and his response bordered on an appeal to ridicule. At the most charity I can muster, I think Law was hinting at a serious argument against evidential testimony. That is a worthwhile exploration, but it was woefully underdeveloped. Anyway, that's taking us too far afield. I just wanted to see a better argument or objection from Law on that one.

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  12. Randy,

    I agree in part. Law could have done more to address the resurrection argument, though there are good reasons why he refrained from concentrating too much time on that front.

    When I wrote this

    "Otherwise, Law could demolish each argument advanced by Craig and yet still lose since one could argue that Law has not shown that there is *no* viable conception of god."

    what I meant was that if the debate was so broad in its scope that it included every possible conception of god (from A to Z)- even those conceptions not yet conceived-, then the debate would be utterly futile: If the atheist rebuts all of the theist's arguments, which are designed to establish a particular type of god, then one can always say, 'Well, yes, but Mr Atheist did not show that Krishna does not exist, or that any of the thousands of other gods and goddesses do not exist.'

    A debate on the existence of a god absolutely must be framed within a certain definitional context, with he who takes the affirmative accepting the burden of proof. Of course, if the theist presents arguments for the god at issue, the atheist must present an argument(s) which denies the theist's conclusion.

    As I pointed out, Craig presented four arguments with the intent of establishing the existence of the Christian god. Thus, he attempted to establish (1) - (3) above. *All* Law needed to do was deny *one* of (1) - (3) and present an argument to that end. He did that. He showed that Craig has not established the desired moral nature of his god. In nuce, Craig provided no good reason why we should believe god is perfectly good. (Craig's 'It's a Mystery' response to the logical and evidential problem of evil was turned against him.)

    *If* Law took the affirmative, I would agree: His performance would not have established a rational belief in atheism. But he didn't take the affirmative, Craig did.

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  13. Hi Aaron, I just find it odd that Law didn't seem to recognize (or maybe he did but was being disingenuous) that a negative proposition just is the affirmation of its opposite! Hence, he required a burden of proof. Also, I don't see how it follows if one argument is denied, the others fail. How is it the case that if God did not resurrect Jesus, then no God can be said to exist? Seems to be a non-sequitur.

    What it comes down to is that it seems to be argued that "it should have been the topic," but it wasn't.

    Finally, I just have to say Law's counterargument didn't provide us with any reason to believe it, that is, unless we already believed the argument from the problem of evil. Since I don't, and since he relies on the same exact reasoning, I found it easy to reject. No one I know rejects an evil god because they see good in the world (except for, now, some atheists). Theists reject an evil god because they believe in a good God; atheists typically hold some properties of an omni-God to be mutually exclusive and the thought of an evil god to be morally nonsensical, and the same for the rest of us. :)

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  14. Randy,

    Re: 'I just find it odd that Law didn't seem to recognize (or maybe he did but was being disingenuous) that a negative proposition just is the affirmation of its opposite!'

    The burden of proof lies squarely on Craig's shoulders. Consider:

    If S asserts p, there are unicorns, S asserts a particular (aka existential) statement:

    (1a) (∃x)(Ux)

    In words, there exists at least one x such that x is a unicorn.

    Now, the negation of (∃x)(Ux) is a universal statement:

    (2a) ¬(∃x)(Ux) = (∀x)¬(Ux)

    In words, (∀x)¬(Ux) reads: It is not the case that there is at least one x such that x is a unicorn, which is to say, for every x it is not the case that x is a unicorn.

    Establishing the truth of (1) is easy: We observe a unicorn. However, establishing the truth of (2) is not easy. In fact, it is impossible. [There are particular exceptions. If one limits the domain of discourse, one can prove a universal statement true: (∀x)¬(Ux ∧ Rx). In words, for every x it is not the case that there is a unicorn and it is in this room.]

    Though (2a) cannot be established as true, it can be shown to be false: We can falsify (2a) by observing a unicorn. Thus, if we replace p above with g, there is a god(s), we find that (2a) also cannot be established as true, but rather only as false. So, given any particular statement concerning the existence of a certain conception of god, one can falsify and verify the claim in the usual ways.

    What this amounts to, however, is that in a debate on the existence of god, one must affirm the existence of a particular conception of god and not just a god (of whatever flavor).

    Thus, Craig accepted the burden of establishing that there exists a god such that it is (1) – (3) above. Law rejected Craig's particular statement by denying one of the conjuncts: (2). Thus, Law addressed Craig's affirmation.

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  15. Randy,

    Re: 'How is it the case that if God did not resurrect Jesus, then no God can be said to exist?'

    Given my previous comment, you should see that this is not what I asserted. I asserted that if Jesus were not bodily resurrected, then it follows that the Christian god does not exist. Krishna, Allah, Yahweh, Ahura Mazda, etc., are all unaffected.

    Craig needed to establish the existence of a personal, ultimate creator who is both perfectly good and desirous to enter into a salvific relationship with human beings through the resurrected Jesus Christ in order to establish the affirmative. He failed to show that the god is perfectly good and (though Law should have said more about it) he did not establish that Jesus was resurrected.

    Re: 'I just have to say Law's counterargument didn't provide us with any reason to believe it, that is, unless we already believed the argument from the problem of evil. Since I don't, and since he relies on the same exact reasoning, I found it easy to reject.'

    You really should listen to the debate again. Law does not begin with an induction of evils and thence infer that an evil god exists. He begins by saying that all of Craig's arguments also establish the existence of a perfectly evil god. He shows that there is a precise mirror analogy between Craig's god and an evil god: Whatever reason you have for believing that your god is perfectly moral, Law has a perfectly analogous reason for believing that his god is perfectly good.

    Law thinks, though, that the problem of good is detrimental to his belief in his evil god: The responses he would have to make against the problem of good would be too ad hoc, too complicated, that they would cease to be plausible. By analogy and extension, then, he thinks the evidential problem of evil would also pose similar problems for one's belief in a perfectly good god.

    Now, I agree that the good theist can bite the proverbial bullet and maintain his position that he worships a perfectly good god. So, I agree that Law's “Well, an evil god is implausible given the problem of good, so a good god is also implausible under the problem of evil” does not follow necessarily. But, of course, the evil theist bite the same bullet.

    Therefore, what at most follows is that one must remain agnostic about the moral nature of this so-called god that's pulling all the cosmic strings.

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  16. P.S. Check out Stephen Law's debate notes and clarifications here:

    http://stephenlaw.blogspot.com/

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  17. Hi Aaron, of course, even if we grant this, it would be the atheist's problem, not the theist, and hence I see no reason why we should just take their word for their position without some argument, and hence they bear a burden of proof. I'm not sure Craig would agree that he presented the arguments as a conjunct for general theism (though he would say this is the case for Christian theism). Also, claiming Craig did not establish the Resurrection is simply question-begging, as Law discussed UFOs.

    I won't rehash the argument Law presented, but so far all we have seen from you is bare assertion here (with regards to the chronological order in which Law presented the argument), and I cover both usages (as a defeater to Craig's objection and as a parallel moral argument) in both respective articles. I also never claim nor do my claims entail that Law began with the claim that evils exist and therefore an evil god exists. And hence, since Law relies on the same reasoning as with the problem of evil, if I do not already accept his reasoning with the problem of evil, I shouldn't with the analogous use either. Since none of my criticisms in either case or usage have been explicitly denied, we may therefore conclude Law's parallel argument fails, and his parody argument fails.

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  18. Randy,
    Thank you for posting this. I have linked it to my post on the debate and will be tweeting it too.

    http://lukenixblog.blogspot.com/2011/11/stephen-laws-evil-god-argument.html

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  19. Randy,

    Your last remark contains several problems. First, you accuse Aaron of making "bare assertion" when he specifically cited his source (the original debate). Next, you say the atheist has the burden of proof. Aaron has explained very clearly why that doesn't work, and you have not addressed his remarks specifically. Next, you insist that Law "relies on" the same reasoning with regard to gratuitous goods and an evil god as the problem of evil does with gratuitous evils and a good god. This is technically correct but ignores the argument. What Law is pointing out is that you cannot consistently think the evil god hypothesis is unreasonable while the good god hypothesis is reasonable, unless and until you can present either (a) an argument for a good god that does not work just as well to demonstrate an evil god (including parallel arguments), or (b) an argument against the evil god hypothesis for which no parallel can be used with equal force against the good god hypothesis.

    You still have yet to present any reason to think a good god more plausibly exists than an evil one that has not been rebutted in the debate or publications of S. Law, and this is a point you must address to establish your worldview. You must address the arguments from the other side, not duck, dodge, and ignore them and re-assert the same things over and over.

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  20. Hi Nightvid. The point is he just claimed it to be true, there can't (and isn't) any other source listed (the debate is just what is under question). The atheist who purports what Law purports does have the burden of proof. The moral argument just is such an argument, and most people agree they have stronger reasons to believe objective moral values exist and that evil is a derivation of good over an evil God exists and good is a privation of evil--which last part is, by the way, incoherent.

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  21. Here's a very difference kind of response:

    http://sententias.org/2012/01/20/a-response-to-the-problem-of-an-evil-god-as-raised-by-stephen-law/#comment-2093

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