In my ethics class the other day, we ended up discussing the nature of the moral law. Inevitably, we came across the Euthyphro dilemma. Briefly, it can be summarized as such: does God command what is good because he wills it to be so? Or does God command it to be good because it is, in fact, good? If God commands what is good because he wills it to be so, then it is the case that morality is really arbitrary and not objective at all. If he commands what is good because it is good, then God is not the standard of objective morality. The way to resolve the dilemma, as many readers already know, is to postulate a third horn for the dilemma; namely, it is postulated that the good just is God’s nature.
However, one astute student asked the professor about God’s nature. He said, “If God’s nature were to be different, would there be different moral laws and commands?” The professor’s response was something like, “Well, I suppose there would be, but because of God’s nature being what it is, these other types of different moral laws do not obtain.” In my opinion, however, the question cannot even get off the ground. For we must ask: what is the explanation of God’s nature? Why is it the way that it is? It is either because it is necessarily the way it is, or it is due to some external cause. God, being God, cannot have an external cause. So, the only other option is that the nature of God is necessary. Now, necessity holds across all possible worlds in which it is instantiated. As it turns out, God is instantiated in all possible worlds (that is, there is our God, in all possible worlds). Hence, the antecedent of the question (“if God’s nature were to be different…”) is impossible.
So the “kicked-up” Euthyphro dilemma, where one wants to know why God’s nature is the way it is, and if morality really could be any different than it is, is itself a non-starter. Objective morality is the way it is because it depends for its existence on an all-good, all-loving source of good—that is, God.
 Some may complain that this solution appears to be just the second horn; God commands what is good, his nature is good, God commands his nature. But even if we grant this, the force of the dilemma is so diluted as to be a non sequitur.
 Some counterfactuals with impossible antecedents can effectively be discussed, such as “if God were not to exist, then it would be the case that objective moral values would not exist.” However, this is not one of them. The reason is that because of the dependency relationship for existence; whatever derives its existence from God can be meaningfully discussed in the case of God’s absence. However, in discussing this counterfactual, we’re actually discussing the opposed categories of “good” and “evil,” which are arguably not interchangeable, on pain of incoherence.