1. Justice is an objective moral value.
2. Whatever is an objective moral value is so in all possible worlds.
3. If some morally evil act X goes unpunished or is not rectified, then justice has not been served for X.
4. If there is no God, then there are possibly some X's that go unpunished (justice is not served).
5. If justice is not served for X, then there is a possible world in which justice is not served.
6. Whatever is necessarily-construed that fails to exist in at least one possible world exists in none of them.
7. But justice is possibly exemplified (i.e., there is some possible world in which justice exists).
8. Therefore, justice is served for X (from [5, 7]).
9. Therefore, God exists (from [4, 8]).
The first premise should be accepted except in the case one denies objective moral values. The second premise may sound controversial, but it makes complete sense (at least it does to me) when one considers that these objective moral values are so independently of (created) persons, and hence it seems they are true across all possible worlds. (3) is virtually definitional for "justice." With (4), by "God" we mean the locus of objective moral values. In any case, it should only be denied in the case that one thinks if there were no God, it would still be the case that it is impossible for any X's to go unpunished.
Now the astute reader will note that (5) seems to rely on the idea that there is a possible world such that all of the X's are unpunished, something that seems to be at odds with (1-2). So really we have a reductio. One may deny (5) by insisting that any such world, even ones with only one X that goes unpunished, is impossible. But on the absence of God (or a God-type being) this seems highly implausible. What accounts for X's being rectified or punished so as to render its lack of punishment logically impossible? It seems nothing. Moreover, in light of (4), there are probably many, if not virtually all, X's that can avoid justice. What would make it the case that X, being possibly unpunished, suddenly becomes not-possibly unpunished in some other world? I think we actually have reason to think (5) is true in the absence of these cases.
(6) is definitional to necessary truths and so cannot be denied. (7) should only be denied if one is convinced objective moral values are necessarily false. (8-9) are conclusions and hence cannot be denied on their own. What do you all think? Does this argument from justice succeed, or fail? Are there better versions (there probably are)? Let me know!------------------------------
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