It is sometimes asserted that while God may not be able to prevent all instances of evil because of free will, nonetheless a loving and good God would seek to minimize every evil he could. This means some proposition is asserted as a moral fact, such as: “every instance of moral evil ought to be prevented, if it can be.” Yet this is patently false. Consider the scenario of a man who intends to run over an innocent old lady in the middle of the street. Another man pushes the old lady out of the way only to be killed himself by the truck. While the man running over the old lady was an evil prevented, the man running over the other man was an evil carried out. We wouldn’t think the man acted in poor moral form by saving the life of another even though he could have prevented the moral evil that did happen. In any case, it’s not at all clear that every instance of moral evil ought to be prevented, even if it can be. The objector needs something else to succeed.
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