tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post4216066273111247347..comments2024-02-29T19:21:32.831-05:00Comments on Possible Worlds: More Answers on MolinismRandy Everisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-11784030743293402192013-01-27T00:39:34.485-05:002013-01-27T00:39:34.485-05:00Hi James, I would say that such a question is more...Hi James, I would say that such a question is more emotionally loaded than it is logical. It all depends on what you mean by "dependent" and what you mean by "in charge." It's true that if the counterfactual (we'll call it CF1) "If Randy were in C, then he would not freely do A" is true, then God cannot create Randy, place him in C (where C is the entire history of the world up to the point of the counterfactual), and have Randy freely do A. In that sense, what God does (namely, creating Randy, actualizing C, wanting Randy to do A or refrain from doing A) in this specific sense delimits God's actions, and so what he does "depends" on the relevant counterfactuals being true.<br /><br />However, consider this: even if CF1 were true, God could still actualize Randy in C and have him do A. How? Simply remove the aspect of free will. "If Randy were in C, then he would do A." (We'll call that CF2). CF2, along with any counterfactual of non-logically contradictory status, can be actualized (at the price of freedom). But note something else, something vitally important. Suppose that C, along with CF2, contain some state of affairs that render a further state of affairs (CF3, which we will leave unspecified) logically contradictory to it. Then, even without free will, we still have delimiting factors on counterfactuals that can be compossibly true to form a complete possible world.<br /><br />"Yes," says the objector, "but this limitation is <i>logical</i>." Yes, but there's the rub: they're <i>both</i> logical limitations! The only reason God cannot actualize Randy's freely doing A in C is because it is in logical contradiction to CF1. So the first part of the objection only succeeds if one believes that God can overcome logical contradictions, in which case just anything follows, and I can insist it's perfectly reasonable to conclude God's decisions are and are not dependent upon man.<br /><br />As to the second part, it's still entirely up to God as to whether he allows man to have free will at all, or in some circumstances, or most, or all. Any freedom man actually is allowed to use is granted and given by God.<br /><br />I hate to psychoanalyze (mostly because I think it's unhelpful in these debates), but I would have to say I think this type of objection is brought up because people want to uphold the most reverence for God. In doing so, they somehow see God-given freedom as an inherent evil in itself. That man always uses it for evil should be an indictment against him, not freedom!Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-57658112891989604112013-01-24T11:41:47.120-05:002013-01-24T11:41:47.120-05:00Randy,
Regarding Molinism, what would you say to a...Randy,<br />Regarding Molinism, what would you say to an objector who responds that middle knowledge makes God's decisions dependent on man, thereby suggesting that man is somehow in charge ?Jameshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01188876219389875421noreply@blogger.com