In the previous blog post, we discussed why doxastic voluntarism (DV) is true. This post aims to discuss the pertinent applications for apologetics. The main application for apologetics is for the atheist’s claim that “one cannot choose her beliefs.” This is often said in reply to some version of Pascal’s Wager (or just a layman offering the old “what have you got to lose?” line).
However, as we have seen, there are at least some beliefs over which rational agents have control. Is belief in God one of the ones over which we do have control, or one over which we do not have control? We are not typically offered a reason as to why we should think that belief in God (in a salvific or soteriological way) is the type of belief over which we have no control.
In fact, biblically, we are given reason to suggest that the power to have faith in the Christian God resides within each individual (Jos. 24:15; Rom. 10:9-10). Of course, the objector can simply say he does not believe in the Bible, and thus he still has no reason to think faith in God is one of those beliefs. However, there is another argument that one must be cognizant of in order to recognize the correct answer to this question.
- If one ought to do some act X, then he can do some act X.
- If God does exist, then it is the case that one ought to believe in him.
- God exists.
- Therefore, it is the case that one ought to believe in him.
- Therefore, he can believe in him.
A few notes on this argument: First, “God” refers to the Christian God. Second, “believe in him” means not just to believe his existence, but trusting in him for salvation from sin. Third, I am well aware that (3) will not be accepted by any objector. However, the dialectical progression is in response to the idea that “even if God exists and wants me to believe, it is unfair for me to be condemned because I cannot control my response to believe in him,” or some problem of evil that states if God wanted everyone to believe, then everyone would believe (since people cannot control their doxastic states). Thus, (3) is a kind of assumed hypothetical.
(1) is the ought-implies-can principle (a well-accepted principle, even if not universally so). (2) seems rational enough, especially since objectors will usually rely on this premise to proclaim God’s punishment for unbelief as unjust. To be more explicit: (2) should only be denied in the case that you think God does exist and yet you have no obligation to believe in him.
(4) is an entailed conclusion from (2) and (3). (5) is an entailed conclusion from (1) and (4). Thus, we can see that, under our dialectical scenario, there are some truths that can be controlled voluntarily, and very plausibly the truth of the plan of salvation of the Christian God is one of them.
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Hi Randy,
ReplyDeleteAs an idle atheist, I thought I'd give you my response.
"Third, I am well aware that (3) will not be accepted by any objector. However, the dialectical progression is in response to the idea that “even if God exists and wants me to believe, it is unfair for me to be condemned because I cannot control my response to believe in him,” or some problem of evil that states if God wanted everyone to believe, then everyone would believe (since people cannot control their doxastic states). Thus, (3) is a kind of assumed hypothetical."
If (3) is a hypothetical, it should be expressed as such. Or, you could remove it entirely:
1. If God does exist, then it is the case that one ought to believe in him.
2. If one ought to do some act X, then he can do some act X.
3. So, if God does exist, it is the case that one can believe in him.
This captures your response to the objection that “even if God exists and wants me to believe, it is unfair for me to be condemned because I cannot control my response to believe in him”, because the conclusion is what the atheist here denies. But I think it also shows that this will not be an adequate defense of Pascal's wager: if one does not believe in God, then one is not obliged by it to believe that one can believe in God, and so the argument does not give the atheist qua atheist reason for believing that his objection is false.
"(2) seems rational enough, especially since objectors will usually rely on this premise to proclaim God’s punishment for unbelief as unjust. To be more explicit: (2) should only be denied in the case that you think God does exist and yet you have no obligation to believe in him."
I don't know why I'd believe (2), and don't really understand why you think an atheist would believe (2). I don't see the argument from it to the injustice of punishing unbelievers; in fact, this conclusion seems to require that (2) be false. Perhaps you can say more on this?
Hi, thanks for your comments! I will address them briefly. Since (3) is explained to be an assumed hypothetical (something done in logical constructions all the time), I don't think there's any damage done. Moreover, the point is not to defend Pascal's Wager, but rather to address the claim that the atheist cannot choose to believe in God.
ReplyDeleteNext, as is the case with material conditionals, one ought only to deny the conditional in the case he affirms the antecedent and yet denies the consequent; you would need to believe God exists and yet there is no obligation to believe in him (which seems odd). The second reason (listed first) is that usually people proclaim there should be no punishment because they cannot choose to believe in God. These typically would argue that it is not the case that one ought to believe God because he cannot choose to believe God exists (usually followed up by, "If God did exist, then I could choose" or some variant of thinking). I suppose one could insist that "if God exists, I have no obligation to believe in him," on the basis of (1) and "I cannot believe in God;" but that begs the question against the conclusion.
Hi Randy,
ReplyDelete"Since (3) is explained to be an assumed hypothetical (something done in logical constructions all the time), I don't think there's any damage done."
Using assumptions is fine if your opponent agrees with them, for then an otherwise sound and valid argument will be rationally coercive for them. But when your opponent disagrees with an assumption, then (presuming it is not redundant) the argument will not be coercive and must be thought a failure. So the inclusion of (3) strictly makes your argument a failure.
"Next, as is the case with material conditionals, one ought only to deny the conditional in the case he affirms the antecedent and yet denies the consequent; you would need to believe God exists and yet there is no obligation to believe in him (which seems odd)."
Yes, if it's a material conditional, then I think it's trivially true. However, if you were to construct an argument without the assumption of God's existence, such as my 1-3, then you'd need to use a strict conditional, i.e. one that says "Necessarily, if God exists, then one ought to believe in him". This conditional could be denied by an atheist, since an atheist could maintain God's possibility, but not his actuality. I mean: the argument (1)-(5) fails though your point here is supportive of it; but a better argument than (1)-(5) would not be supported by that same point.
"I suppose one could insist that "if God exists, I have no obligation to believe in him," on the basis of (1) and "I cannot believe in God;" but that begs the question against the conclusion."
I was more looking for a positive reason to believe (2), which I think your argument needs to be persuasive. This is instead a reason to reject a purported justification of the denial of (2), a different thing.
Well, I'll say no more, but thanks for your response.
Hello, thanks for the response! Concerning hypotheticals, people allow them all the time; it's a common usage to see what follows. The point of the article is to find out whether or not belief in God is the type of thing one can choose; this is presumably also in the context of someone's insistence that even if God existed, he has an excuse--for he cannot believe in him.
ReplyDeleteNext, if God exists, one ought to believe his existence seems quite rational (as I mentioned in the article). After all, if God exists, he is also paradigmatic of morality and other such metaphysical perfections so that he would want people to be saved from sin, etc. The article makes this clear with respect to salvation, and the dialectical progression. So one could deny the dialectical progression, but then we're just not talking about the same thing!