tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post7544232568796311815..comments2024-02-29T19:21:32.831-05:00Comments on Possible Worlds: Questions about Middle KnowledgeRandy Everisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comBlogger6125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-56435222654714319982011-04-27T10:02:02.235-04:002011-04-27T10:02:02.235-04:00Hi Jake. I see now you're saying Molinism enta...Hi Jake. I see now you're saying Molinism <i>entails</i> this, rather than that Molinists <i>claim</i> this (since of course they would reject this. Molinists (such as William Lane Craig and Thomas Flint) believe there are such possible worlds where if P were in A, then P does C instead of B, even if it is true if P were in A, then P <i>would</i> do B; they preserve the distinction between possible and feasible worlds. With the standard resolution, this is an epistemic judgment; for an omniscient being, he by definition would not need to employ the standard resolution. So while I think the standard resolution is quite good and accessible for us finite knowers, its being merely epistemic instead of an ontological guide need not trouble us here. That is, a Molinist may freely embrace all of the closest worlds P does B (because a world in those precise circumstances P would not do C; yet there is a world in which P does C). This is why I object to the use of the necessary modal operator (as will any and every Molinist, in fact!).Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-47092336186315452572011-04-26T20:45:43.052-04:002011-04-26T20:45:43.052-04:00The Molinist is committed to the truth of counterf...The Molinist is committed to the truth of counterfactuals of the form, "If P were in A, then P would B". This is what I'm signifying as (P in A []-> P B's), namely because there is a fact of the matter about how I would act under situation A under this view (at least as I understand it). But this cannot be true under the standard resolution of vagueness together with contra-causal free will. This is because contra-causal free will, under the standard resolution, entails "If P were in A, then P could B" and "If P were in A, then P could C", which I'm signifying as (P in A <>-> P B's) and (P in A <>-> P C's), respectively. But (P in A []-> P B's) is incompatible with (P in A <>-> P C's), at least if it is non-vacuous (and likewise for the other pair). This is because, under the possible worlds semantics, the first says something to the effect of, "From the closest possible world at which P is in A, all of the nearest worlds are such that P B's" while the latter says, "From the closest possible world at which P is in A, some among the nearest worlds are such that P C's." It's open, perhaps, to the Molinist to accept some other resolution of vagueness for the Molinist counterfactuals, but this would be to say that their counterfactuals are not of the usual sort (by failing to track causal relations). I don't have too much of a problem with that, as long as it could potentially be independently motivated.Jakehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01731177345815382468noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-24468915531140523742011-04-26T07:56:41.263-04:002011-04-26T07:56:41.263-04:00Hi Jake! I knew this was for adjudicating which co...Hi Jake! I knew this was for adjudicating which counterfactuals were correct in virtue of their being closest to the actual world; I just wasn't sure how to respond (it was late for me after all!). However, I am curious: why think the Molinist asserts that P in A necessarily B's or P in A necessarily C's? As I see it, if B and C are not compossible, then really the Molinist only asserts []P B ∨ P C; but Molinists would not distribute the necessity to P's doing one or the other simply because he in fact would do it. Many Molinists do in fact believe if different counterfactuals were true, then different results would ensue, and not at all that necessary entailments are in view with respect to their choices. I hope that helps!Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-2116968647555868802011-04-26T03:09:01.408-04:002011-04-26T03:09:01.408-04:00Hey Randy,
Thanks for the late reply. I think th...Hey Randy, <br /><br />Thanks for the late reply. I think that my general point got missed, but I think I was perhaps unclear. The standard resolution of vagueness, as discussed by Lewis in "Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow", provides an ordering of possible worlds and determines the truth-value of counterfactuals based upon the make-up of the "closest" worlds under this ordering. Under this resolution, contra-causal free will entails (P in A <>-> P B's) and (P in A <>-> P C's) in a situation where P is free to choose between B and C in situation A. But the Molinist must deny at least one of these counterfactuals because either (P in A []-> P B's) or (P in A []-> P C's). Thus, the Molinist, it would appear, must deny either contra-causal free will, the standard resolution, or Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals. I think the easiest point to deny would be the standard resolution and instead opt for a sort of backtracking resolution, but I wonder if there's an independent reason to do so. Perhaps there is. But without an appropriate resolution for Molinist counterfactuals, I'm a bit worried about their truth-values and their interplay with counterfactuals of the usual sort.Jakehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01731177345815382468noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-7289926433490909082011-04-26T00:59:18.686-04:002011-04-26T00:59:18.686-04:00Hi Jake, thanks for commenting. It's late, so ...Hi Jake, thanks for commenting. It's late, so perhaps I am misunderstanding you, but are you arguing that if the counterfactual "if P were in A, then P would do C" is true, then it is necessarily false that P does B in A? It seems Lewis would not argue this way, precisely because he believed in the type of modal realism which meant that all logical possibilities existed in parallel type universes, so that the standard semantics for Lewis would not have entailed this (else this is the only possible world, which Lewis did not hold). <br /><br />Of course, perhaps instead of meaning that it is necessarily false P does B, you mean it is necessarily false P <i>would</i> do B in A? In this case, we must distinguish between the necessity of a statement (such as invoking the law of noncontradiction) and the necessity of the <i>content</i> of that statement. The former is just an application of the law of noncontradiction: If X is true, it is necessarily false that not-X is true; so that if B and C are mutually exclusive, then it is necessarily false B and C are done. But I see no reason to move from that bit of tautology to apply the modal necessity to the content of that choice, even if P only does C in A and not B; it is contingent upon the will.<br /><br />So to answer directly, I see no reason to reject Lewis counterfactual semantics out of hand, nor do I think the Molinist must. But a very interesting question indeed!Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-55743913646438064102011-04-25T22:45:08.807-04:002011-04-25T22:45:08.807-04:00These kinds of Molinist counterfactuals seem to re...These kinds of Molinist counterfactuals seem to require a rejection of either the standard resolution of vagueness of counterfactuals (as discussed by David Lewis) or the rejection of contra-causal free will, namely because the conjunction of these two entail that P in A[]-> P B's is false when P has a choice to B or C in situation A. Or, at least this is the way it seems to me. Would you prefer to reject Lewis' standard resolution? What alternative vagueness resolution scheme would you find more appropriate for the Molinist?Jakehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01731177345815382468noreply@blogger.com