tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post2830589877387163378..comments2024-02-29T19:21:32.831-05:00Comments on Possible Worlds: The Modal Ontological ArgumentRandy Everisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comBlogger61125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-11822583231569221322016-12-12T12:01:23.840-05:002016-12-12T12:01:23.840-05:00Hello,
Yes, this is just a consequence of deducti...Hello,<br /><br />Yes, this is just a consequence of deduction in modal logic (the conclusion is contained in the premises); if it didn't, just as in literally every deductive argument, it would be manifestly invalid.<br /><br />However, you do ask a really good question, in that: what is the support for premise 1? It seems to me that as long as it seems to someone that this kind of being could exist, then this is prima facie support for (1). Intuitions, is what I'm getting at. These aren't defeasible, by any means, but they are helpful.Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-23623390078906213032016-12-12T02:08:40.408-05:002016-12-12T02:08:40.408-05:00I have not studied Modal Logic or Metaphysics, but...I have not studied Modal Logic or Metaphysics, but have a basic understanding. I also understand that which is sometimes called Axiom S5. I am not questioning the logic of the argument - just the premise. I am not referring to God but the MEB and the MGB. Your piece omits the two definitions normally included:<br /><br />1. A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and<br />2. A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.<br />3. It is possible that there is a being that has maximal greatness. (Premise)<br />4. Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being exists.<br />5. Therefore, (by axiom S5) it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.<br />6. Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.<br /><br />(from 1 and 2) A being has "maximal greatness" if it "is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in every possible world".<br />(by definition) "it is possible" means "it is the case that in at least one possible world".<br />(hence 3) "It is the case that in at least one possible world" that there is a being that "is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in every possible world"<br /><br />This makes little sense. In any case, your statement "it is metaphysically possible" means nothing in actuality - a problem of context.<br /><br />The other issue with this premise is that Maximal Greatness is a label/name that is applied as a consequence of the Maximally Excellent Being existing in all possible worlds, including ours. The Maximally Excellent Being must exist in all possible worlds before this argument is considered. This existence is established in one of two ways (1) empirically or (2) pre-supposition. It has not been established empirically so it is by pre-supposition unless you have another way in which it has been established?<br /><br />My issue remains with the premise (your statement 1). To ask my question another way - how was the premise thought of? What prompted the claim? Is it pre-supposition? It certainly was not empirical. Whatever the source of the statement, it must be true to be a premise, thus it must be provable in its own right. It must be provable prior to its usage in this argument. <br /><br />Now I guess you will respond that this is all in the Modal Logic. But at some point this has to relate to actuality. It is my contention that any construct or tool that is used in Modal Logic (and Metaphysics) to "prove" the existence of the MGB/MEB must be valid to the same extent in actuality; otherwise in this case Modal Logic (and Metaphysics) is of no use for actuality. Do we have a problem of context - an attempt to impose a conclusion of Modal Logic on actuality? (sorry if I seem to rant...)ignorhttp://aa.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-20958295343244151432016-12-11T14:09:07.459-05:002016-12-11T14:09:07.459-05:00Hello, thanks for the comments! I think there'...Hello, thanks for the comments! I think there's a fundamental modal confusion going on. As you note, "possibly" can reference existence in at least one possible world (minimally, it means it is metaphysically possible that God exists), and from that we eventually derive the conclusion that God necessarily exists. But it's a modal mistake to thereby claim God doesn't exist possibly. On that, you're using "possibly" to mean "contingently." But the problem is that by negating God's possible existence, based on the initial definition, this is contradictory to God's necessary existence. Think about it this way: if God exists in all possible worlds, then he exists in at least one. Given modal logic, if God exists in at least one world, then he exists in all of them--but this is because of what it means to be maximally great, as we discover.<br /><br />You don't have to know the mode of existence in order to affirm the first premise. You can, of course, but it's not needed. Further, you can always "go back" if you think it's not really possible that God exists after all; or you can refrain from affirming the first premise if you're not sure whether or not it's possible. But one caveat: if the only reason you do so is because you feel the conclusion is undesirable or that you don't know it, that would be an instance of question-begging. It's just a matter of deduction and modal logic that yield the conclusion, so if one is inclined to accept the first premise, he must have a good reason for rejecting or refraining later on!Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-85185282475932335562016-12-09T03:40:10.811-05:002016-12-09T03:40:10.811-05:00My concern is with the usage of the word "pos...My concern is with the usage of the word "possible" in statement 1. In this statement, "possible" means "in at least one possible world". But the Maximally Great Being either exists or does not exist - and if the Maximally Great Being exists, it exists in all possible worlds. Thus the Maxiomally Great Being exists "necessarily" if it exists at all. The Maximally Great Being cannot exist "possibly". So because the word "possible" is referring to the Maximally Great Being, it must be replaced with the word "necessary" because the Maximally Great Being cannot exist "possibly, only "necessarily".<br />ignorhttp://aa.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-61675012987518165512016-10-25T18:18:51.974-04:002016-10-25T18:18:51.974-04:00Thanks for commenting! Now, there are two ways one...Thanks for commenting! Now, there are two ways one can construe the possible/possible worlds relationship. One: something X is possible if X appears in a possible world. Two: Something X appears in a possible world if X is possible. I subscribe to the latter account (that is, something has its modality <i>de re</i> and doesn't somehow gain it from being in a possible world (in other words, I'm not a Lewisian modal realist).<br /><br />Now with that out of the way, I do wonder if you read the article, since I say, "By (1), Plantinga means to say such an idea involves no incoherence, and is intuitively possible. That is, it really could be the case such a maximally great being exists. Most people would agree with this."<br /><br />Now you may not think this is successful, but it <b>is</b> indeed an explained basis (i.e., it is an intuitive belief). I've written a little more about intuitions and the ontological argument specifically, so you can always use the search feature to check that out. I hope this helps!Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-65787123550226246812016-10-18T07:52:40.597-04:002016-10-18T07:52:40.597-04:00The first statement of the Ontological Argument is...The first statement of the Ontological Argument is:<br /><br />"It is "possible" that a maximally great being exists".<br /><br />If we substitute the meaning of the word "possible" as it is used in this argument ("possible" means "true in some possible worlds"):<br /><br />"It is "true in some possible worlds" that a maximally great being exists".<br /><br />This is a statement of supposition. The basis for the assertion needs to be explained. ignorhttp://aa.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-35840045887246555292013-08-19T19:27:34.959-04:002013-08-19T19:27:34.959-04:00Normally I don't allow anonymous comments, but...Normally I don't allow anonymous comments, but I would like to take your critique, which I have heard before, and make it a blog post. I'll reply to this again when it is up. Thanks for the interaction!Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-21334498653785095752013-07-12T03:56:38.023-04:002013-07-12T03:56:38.023-04:00I think there is a problem with premise 1; or more...I think there is a problem with premise 1; or more specifically the notion of 'greatness' or even 'excellence' used here. Namely, you have to justify the possibility that two objects can be compared for how much greatness they have in any sense.<br /><br />Imagine if I asked 'which is greater, an apple or a Porsche'. How would you even attempt to answer that question without appealing to contingent facts or relative factors?<br /><br />The notion that some things are greater then other *sounds* intuitive, but I've never seen an account that wasn't basing this claim on human prejudices.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-62773656805025928992012-12-10T15:16:10.646-05:002012-12-10T15:16:10.646-05:00Well, it seems obvious that to say "God's...Well, it seems obvious that to say "God's existence is indisociable from his nature" seems to say something about his other properties as well (namely, that they are all identical). But that aside: the objection only works if we accept the presuppositions behind them. At worst, all that follows is that a Thomist cannot accept the modal ontological argument. But as there are plenty of non-Thomists (myself included), namely atheists, I think they aren't provided a way of escape.Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-40044099518621912992012-12-09T12:56:35.876-05:002012-12-09T12:56:35.876-05:00Granted, but I tend to take a thomistic stance on ...Granted, but I tend to take a thomistic stance on this. I believe in the doctrine of divine simplicity and think that God's existence is indisociable from his nature. So this would mean that for your argument to work we would have to conceive of the nature of God, yet this means we would have to know of his existence (Since his existence must be indisociable from his nature). And this seems rather a dubious entreprise. If God's act of existence was different from its nature then we would need ''something'' else to actualize this act of existence, because nothing that is ''form'' can cause its own act of existence. In short the argument fails because for it to work we should know of the nature of God to be able to conceive of it, which is just to say ''knowing his existence''. Alexnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-75443854302642978532012-11-14T18:56:40.323-05:002012-11-14T18:56:40.323-05:00Hello Alex, thanks for the comment!
In Plantinga&...Hello Alex, thanks for the comment!<br /><br />In Plantinga's formulation, premise 3 is, "3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world."<br /><br />It's important to note that premises don't beg the question; people do. So, the crucial question is whether or not I can assert (3) on grounds independent of, epistemologically, the conclusion that a maximally-great being exists. And in fact, we may do just that.<br /><br />For we define a maximally-great being (MGB) as a being who possesses all great-making properties taken in a maximal way (where a "great-making property" is a property it is metaphysically better to have than to lack). In my above article, I say, <i>"Why should it be so that if a maximally great being exists in one possible world, he exists in all? Because such a being holds its greatness and excellence in a maximal way, it would do so in every possible world (else there would be a greater being displaying more excellence—namely, the one who existed in all possible worlds)."</i><br /><br />Now then, knowing this definition, we can proceed forward and realize that we have a necessary being. But the epistemological flow does not state "necessary being, therefore necessary being," but rather "MGB, therefore all GMP; X is GMP; therefore MGB has X," where X is ultimately turns out to be necessary existence. Now one can go back and deny (1), but in order to avoid begging the question <i>against</i> the argument, one would have to have a reason to deny that MGB is possible, after all.<br /><br />Moreover, it is simply a feature of deductive argumentation for the conclusion to be within the major premise. In fact, if it is not contained within the premise, then the argument is patently invalid! So the so-called "reductionist objection" against the MOA ends up either misunderstanding the reasons for affirming (3) or misunderstanding deductive arguments (or both). Does that help at all?Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-40700106001740245242012-11-13T14:05:18.339-05:002012-11-13T14:05:18.339-05:00Hi Randy!
According to Richard M. Gale premise th...Hi Randy!<br /><br />According to Richard M. Gale premise three, the "possibility premise", begs the question. He stated that one only has the epistemic right to accept the premise if one understands the nested modal operators, and that if one understands them within the system S5—without which the argument fails—then one understands that "possibly necessarily" is in essence the same as "necessarily". Thus the premise is invalid because the conclusion is embedded within it.<br /><br />What do you have to answer to this?Alexnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-5990684870877926852012-08-01T23:36:33.146-04:002012-08-01T23:36:33.146-04:00Hello.
Do you know how I could contact Graham Opp...Hello.<br /><br />Do you know how I could contact Graham Oppy, if he's not too busy?<br /><br />Thanks.Atomsk's Sanakanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06075386707195252260noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-68244333170196085502012-08-01T21:16:48.874-04:002012-08-01T21:16:48.874-04:00Hello, this was kind of a drive-by, and some of th...Hello, this was kind of a drive-by, and some of these were addressed above. As to (1) it doesn't beg the question, for it doesn't demand that one accept the maximally excellent being exists ("maximally excellent" for Plantinga refers to a being that has all great-making properties exemplified in a maximal way); moreover arguments don't beg any questions. As to #3, people can use whatever modal rational intuitions they would need to affirm (1); if they find some reason later to go back and deny it, they may. #2, none are offered, so we needn't worry about that, and #4, dialectically, is subject to the modal argument's conclusion (apply this standard to literally every other modal argument, for instance). After all, if the MOA is successful, then whatever atheistic arguments there are, unless they demonstrate incoherence we shouldn't prefer them over the MOA; it is whatever is the most plausible. Finally, you overstate the case that the first premise cannot be justified; what you may mean is that no one would be compelled to accept (1). But that is no problem of the argument.Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-51148073856539572832012-08-01T20:40:51.828-04:002012-08-01T20:40:51.828-04:00Comment nickname: "Fran and Kengo #1."
...Comment nickname: "Fran and Kengo #1."<br /><br />I've already offered a detailed rebuttal of ontological arguments elsewhere. There are 4 core problems with Plantinga's version of the argument: 1) it un-informatively begs the question, 2) it is susceptible to Gaunilo-type counterexamples (especially examples involving deities that are more likely to exist than the God theists normally wish to argue for), 3) the phrasing of the first premise misleads people into applying the incorrect epistemic standards, and 4) every positive and negative atheist argument serves as a rebuttal of the argument's first premise, while virtually no theistic arguments (even purely epistemic arguments) can adequately support premise 1.<br /><br />Of course, there are other issues (ad hoc theistic definitions of "greatness", maximal greatness may be incoherent, arguments against possible world semantics as an accurate model of modality [a criticism I do not subscribe to, by the way], theistic equivocations between the "maximally excellent being" and the "maximally great being", theistic equivocations between metaphysical necessity/metaphysical impossibility and logical necessity/logical impossibility [i.e. conceptual coherence/conceptual incoherence], etc.). But any one of the four main criticisms I mentioned are enough to completely rebut the argument.Atomsk's Sanakanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06075386707195252260noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-56352187958671959262012-05-03T07:17:19.295-04:002012-05-03T07:17:19.295-04:00Well I am glad to have had the discussion! If or w...Well I am glad to have had the discussion! If or when you would want to come by and comment on anything, including this subject again, feel free. :)Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-16919635660219408772012-05-03T00:26:02.244-04:002012-05-03T00:26:02.244-04:00No, I'm still not convinced by it as a whole, ...No, I'm still not convinced by it as a whole, but that third premise was a point of confusion that you clarified well. I do still think there may be some problems with the first premise, however these I my ideas are not clear enough to present at the moment.<br /><br />I apologize for the informality of my questions and thoughts--I am by no means well-versed in philosophy, I merely have an interest in the subject.Quinnnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-85747775241576812002012-05-02T21:55:49.446-04:002012-05-02T21:55:49.446-04:00Hi Quinn. I guess I do not understand what you wer...Hi Quinn. I guess I do not understand what you were getting at, unless you mean that the argument entails God's necessary existence, in which case I wholeheartedly agree.Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-8676166929854992862012-05-02T12:03:45.109-04:002012-05-02T12:03:45.109-04:00That's what I was getting at. Thanks.That's what I was getting at. Thanks.Quinnnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-86530348926387012272012-05-01T19:54:09.512-04:002012-05-01T19:54:09.512-04:00Not upon reflection of what it means to be maximal...Not upon reflection of what it means to be maximally great (maximal greatness means having great-making properties taken in a maximal way; necessary existence is considered great-making; nothing can both necessarily exist and contingently exist).Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-43079476042931532932012-05-01T09:07:44.566-04:002012-05-01T09:07:44.566-04:00So, is it possible to conceive of a maximally-grea...So, is it possible to conceive of a maximally-great being whose existence is contingent?Quinnnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-20635332168851696802012-05-01T07:46:22.943-04:002012-05-01T07:46:22.943-04:00Hi Quinn. With respect to "greatness," w...Hi Quinn. With respect to "greatness," what we mean here is what constitutes a great-making property. This is helpful because it's not as though we think properties themselves have properties. Rather, it is simply a matter of definition. With respect to "greater," we mean metaphysical greatness. Now existence is not regarded (in general) to be a property (although some contemporary philosophers are now questioning what, exactly, Kant uses to get to that conclusion). But let's grant it for now.<br /><br />Now in one sense you are correct: something either exists or it does not. But in another sense you would be incorrect if you mean there are not different modalities of existence. After all, somethings (like you and I) exist contingently. However, necessary existence is quite different. It means it exists across all possible worlds, and could not fail to exist (its existence is impossible to be false). It seems obvious that necessary existence is certainly metaphysically greater than contingent existence, for if we compare two hypothetical beings that both contain all great-making properties (properties it is better to have than to lack, metaphysically) in a maximal way, yet one is contingent and one is necessary, the necessary one displays his maximally great making properties in more and varying possible worlds than the contingent one. This means the necessary one "outshines" the contingent one in this respect.<br /><br />Moreover, any claim of greatness to anything will simply be asserting a fact of an actual state of affairs, so I'm not sure how the criticism follows. Would things only be considered great if what was being described was possible but not actual?<br /><br />So, existence is not what we consider to be a great-making property, but necessary existence is.Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-71812570442377461762012-05-01T01:32:03.252-04:002012-05-01T01:32:03.252-04:00Randy,
I'm having trouble understanding premi...Randy,<br /><br />I'm having trouble understanding premise 3--namely, how can the property of 'greatness' be attributed to the property of 'existence'? Either something exists or it does not. There are not varying degrees of existence or non-existence. Rather, to say something exists is to assert a fact about the actual state of affairs, so it seems silly to attach 'greatness' to 'existence'.Quinnnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-56267827903263293022012-02-13T08:13:09.202-05:002012-02-13T08:13:09.202-05:00Hi Ben! Thanks for the comment and I probably will...Hi Ben! Thanks for the comment and I probably will--so busy over here lately. :)Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-40851819051626006282012-02-12T20:11:27.128-05:002012-02-12T20:11:27.128-05:00Hey Randy! Sorry I have been away for a while! I w...Hey Randy! Sorry I have been away for a while! I won't be making any comments on your post but just wanted to say I have enjoyed reading your comments back and forth, along with Aaron's comments. This is quite a mind expanding discussion! With no intellectual struggle of some sort, I won't grow in this way. So thanks again and feel free to call me sometime :)Benjamin Williamsonhttps://snt136.mail.live.com/default.aspx?id=64855#!/mail/InboxLight.aspx?n=1804678531noreply@blogger.com