tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post1689952375838333948..comments2024-02-29T19:21:32.831-05:00Comments on Possible Worlds: Can a Calvinist be a Molinist?Randy Everisthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-588873230315725402015-04-22T23:13:48.728-04:002015-04-22T23:13:48.728-04:00Hello, thanks for commenting! I think I see the is...Hello, thanks for commenting! I think I see the issue: counterfactuals are indeed propositions concerning what *would* happen in particular circumstances. However, what makes these counterfactuals located within *middle knowledge* is not their grammatical form, but because they (that is, their truth values) are neither necessary nor decreed by God. With respect to the first quote you give, I'm evaluating counterfactuals *given compatibilism*, which makes these counterfactuals contingent only in the sense of God's choice--this is incompatible with middle knowledge.<br /><br />So, to sum up, the confusion lies within the definition of what makes knowledge "middle." I always tell people studying Molinism (since many lay-Molinists do not understand this distinction) and middle knowledge that they must ask themselves, "In the middle of what?" and satisfactorily answer it.<br /><br />I hope this helps guide you in your study! :)Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-8723289758120655592015-04-20T14:55:56.231-04:002015-04-20T14:55:56.231-04:00(I chose to be anonymous so I don't have to go...(I chose to be anonymous so I don't have to go through the hassle of all the other options I don't quite understand)<br /><br />I don't follow paragraph 5. Middle knowledge, as I've heard William Lane Craig explain it, is the knowlege of what Would Happen given certain circumstances, while free knowledge, is the knowledge of what Will Happen.<br /><br />It seems to me that this definition would make your statement false. "If the truths that are of the saved are contingent, they are only contingent upon God’s choice; hence, they belong to God’s free knowledge."<br /><br />"If God chooses world A, the person A' will share the gospel with person B', and person B' will be saved, but person C', who always disagrees with person B', will not be saved. If God chooses world B, then person A' will share the Gospel with person C', but person B', who always disagrees with person C', will not be saved."<br /><br />This is a statement of God's middle knowledge, where all possible worlds are contained. Notice, God has the power to choose will be elect and who will be reprobate. These are true statements that are contingent on God's choice, whether He will pick world A, or world B.<br /><br />"God has chosen world A', therefore, person B' will be saved, and person C' will not be saved."<br /><br />This is a statement of God's free knowledge, but it does not contain every possibility. Middle knowledge is contingent on what God can choose, while free knowlege is contingent on what God will choose, but both are contingent on God's choice. In this case, God has chosen that person B' will freely accept Him and be save.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-44543746876616615492015-03-01T18:02:38.962-05:002015-03-01T18:02:38.962-05:00Hello, I'm glad to hear from you! Sorry I took...Hello, I'm glad to hear from you! Sorry I took so long in responding. I don't have time to read the entire thing, but I can see quickly he's off to a bad start. Consider this part, that he wrote, "Another way of making the fallacy disappear is to argue successfully that necessarily, God foreknows x. Molinists agree in the validity but not the soundness of the following argument (in other words, they agree with the form of argument but not with all the premises):<br /><br />1. Necessarily, if God foreknows x, then x will happen<br />2. Necessarily, God foreknows x<br />3. Therefore, x will necessarily happen"<br /><br />Molinists do *not* in fact agree that the preceding argument is valid. In fact, what follows is not (3) but:<br /><br />3*. Therefore, necessarily, x will happen.<br /><br />This can make a huge difference.<br /><br />But he's right that Molinists will typically deny (2). Why think the content of God's foreknowledge is necessarily what it is? He relies heavily on Edwards as if he were representative on standard Reformed thinking--when he is clearly not. On Edwards' view, God creates of necessity. On most Reformed thinkers, God's creation is a free act of God. This dude is taking a radical fringe line. I've heard of him before. Let me know if you have any other specific questions!Randy Everisthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06870605678781409126noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1433428682510068517.post-56398837597437445872015-02-25T15:46:31.115-05:002015-02-25T15:46:31.115-05:00Hello. I'm from Brazil and here's a Reform...Hello. I'm from Brazil and here's a Reformed Theology site translated a post from a site in English refuting Molinism. I would like to see an analysis that could neutralize the objections raised. Here is the original link:<br /><br />http://reformedapologist.blogspot.com.br/2007/12/molinists-and-calvinists-agree-in.html<br /><br />God bless you!Edcleihttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15730182049956882142noreply@blogger.com