Consider the following argument:
1. If one cannot sin, then one has not sinned.
2. If one has not sinned, then one cannot be held morally responsible for sin.
3. Therefore, if one cannot sin, then one cannot be held morally responsible for sin.
(1) is true as a matter of course; if something is impossible for a being, then it certainly cannot be said that being has performed that action. (2) seems to be somewhat uncontroversial as well. For how can we hold someone morally responsible for an act they have not performed? Instead of “sin,” replace it with any form of wrongdoing or reprehensible act (such as “lying” or “cheating on one’s taxes,” etc.). (3) is just a conclusion from a logical rule of inference that allows us to say “if A, then B; if B, then, C; therefore, if A, then C,” and hence cannot be denied. But then consider:
4. For any sin act X, if one cannot perform X, then one cannot be held morally responsible for X.
5. To hold someone morally responsible for X is to hold one guilty of X.
6. Therefore, for any sin act X, if one cannot perform X, then one cannot be held guilty of X.
(4) is little more than a restatement of (3). It just makes it explicit that one is meaning any specific act of sin. (5) also seems quite plausible, for to be morally responsible for X just means either to be praiseworthy or blameworthy, and since X is specified to be an act of sin, one cannot be praiseworthy. (6) follows as an entailed conclusion from (4-5), and hence cannot be denied. So, finally consider:
7. There are at least some created persons who are, at this moment, incapable of performing a sin act.
8. Therefore, there are at least some created persons who, at this moment, cannot be held guilty of X.
9. [Original Guilt Premise]: For every created person A, A is held morally responsible for (and hence guilty of) X. (OGP)
10. Therefore, either (8) or (OGP) is true, but not both.
11. (8) is true.
12. Therefore, OGP is false.
(7) is true when we consider the mentally handicapped, babies, etc. It seems truly odd to think that all people so described are in fact capable of sin while in those states. (8) follows as an entailed conclusion from (1-6), and hence cannot be denied. (9) is the premise of original guilt, and specifies X as Adam’s sin. But (8) and (9) are contradictory, for since we did not actually exist, we could not perform X. But if we cannot perform X, then we did not perform X, and hence cannot be held morally responsible for X. This means original guilt, where the guilt of Adam’s sin is imputed to all persons at conception, is false.
I do believe in original sin, however. Original sin teaches that the consequences and effects of Adam’s sin are passed on to the entire human race. This includes death (cf. Romans 5), the proclivity or inclination to sin, etc. One need not worry as to when, precisely, guilt is imputed. If Genesis 3 is any hint, it comes with the knowledge of good and evil. This knowledge comes experientially and with the resisting of temptation. Philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga have made the case that any non-divine, libertarianly free being will not successfully refrain from choosing sin over a course of time (even though it is logically possible). In that case, with the will inclined toward sin, it is both metaphysically and anecdotally possible that persons only come to realize the knowledge of good and evil in the relevant sense when they realize they have committed wrong! What begs to be written on (and it probably has) is a good exegesis of Romans 5 from this perspective.
 This is not to be confused with “original sin,” which will be discussed later. Original sin (OS) states the effects and consequences of Adam’s sin are passed on to his descendants, while original guilt (OGP) states the guilt of Adam’s sin is imputed to all persons. OS seems to be obviously taught in Scripture, while OGP seems to be a theological outworking.
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