I was speaking with a friend last night who was not very familiar with the modal ontological argument, and I decided to try something. I wanted to see how the argument would go over if I explained, in detail, each premise, to someone who was not already familiar with it. While there was undoubtedly some bumps in the road, I nevertheless felt that my particular view of it was vindicated: unless someone can show incoherency in the concept of a maximally-great being (MGB), then one is justified in affirming he exists. The following is an outline of our conversation, with occasional comments.
1. Possibly, MGB exists.
1a. An MGB is one who possesses all great-making properties.
1b. A great-making property is one that is better to have than to lack, for any being.
1c. The great-making property must be taken in a maximal way (i.e., knowledge of all propositions, or omniscience).
1d. One can affirm this possibility if he has at least one great-making property taken in a maximal way that it seems at least possibly exemplified, or if there is no incoherence in such a concept.
One who isn't already familiar with the argument, as my friend was not last night, will probably accept all of the above.
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