Saturday, October 29, 2011

The Role of Intuition



What role does intuition play in an argument? What about in a debate? Are there good reasons to trust our intuition? All of these are good questions. In the recent William Lane Craig-Peter Millican debate, the issue of whether or not we can trust intuition was raised. Millican thought rational intuition to be unreliable, whereas Craig supported it.

The role of intuition, as Craig mentions often, is that of knowing some premise to be true rather than showing that premise to be true.[1] Once I understood this principle, along with the value of intuition as knowledge, I have come to recognize its power. We do not have to then show a particular intuition as true, but instead it is how we know it is true. As for its role in debate, this does mean that if a particular person does not share the intuition, he or she may not accept our argument or premise. This is where discernment is needed. In the setting of an “offensive” argument, intuition should only be used where it is a highly-regarded or shared intuition. This is what is at work, primarily, in the second premise of the moral argument. That objective moral values exist, is, for most people, intuitively known and perceived as true. This makes it a valuable tool to use.

This brings us to our next point. Sometimes intuitions, though strongly held, should be abandoned. When should an intuition be abandoned as knowledge? When there is evidence sufficient to overcome that intuition supporting the falsehood of that intuition. Notice what this entails: in order for us to say, for example, that objective moral values do not exist (even if we strongly intuit there are such values), we must have some strong evidence suggesting this intuition is false. What could that be? The only thing I can think of that is plausible is God’s non-existence. Since that is the very issue in the question of the moral argument, however, this would be question-begging.

Some people, like Millican, find intuition to be either non-existent or untrustworthy. But why think so? Millican offers the following as a critique: some people have been incorrect regarding intuitive beliefs, therefore intuition cannot be trusted. The problem with this is that it does not follow because one particular belief is incorrect, then my belief is incorrect. Imagine criticizing thinking because some people have had thoughts that are incorrect! Not only is it incorrect to say that because some people have had false intuitions that my intuitions are untrustworthy, it does not follow that even if some of my intuitions turn out to be false, that other of my intuitions are incorrect or untrustworthy. Only if some issue of dependence could be constructed (like, for instance, if I were known to be totally insane, or if there was no a priori knowledge possible. For a treatment of the latter claim, please see my article on intuition here.) would we have some reason to think intuitions are untrustworthy. Each intuition must be dealt with on its own merits. If one intuits something, only in the case there are reasons to think the intuition is false should he abandon it.

One last issue: what of two competing intuitions? Remember, we do not “show” via intuition (except in cases of commonly-held intuitions, which is not applicable here). Secondly, both cannot be said to know these things. If they are truly in competition, then only one of them can be true, and hence only one of them knows. Which one is wrong? Let the evidence decide. Intuitions can be validated or discredited by the evidence. But in the absence of such external justifiers or defeaters, one is justified if he truly holds the intuition (that is, the belief held independently of experience).


                [1] William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith 3rd ed., (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008), 43. Here Craig appeals not as much to intuition as he does the biblical concept of the witness of the Holy Spirit (cf. Romans ). I agree with this assessment as well, and apply the distinction as similar because of the internal nature of the knowledge.


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13 comments:

  1. "Notice what this entails: in order for us to say, for example, that objective moral values do not exist (even if we strongly intuit there are such values), we must have some strong evidence suggesting this intuition is false. What could that be? The only thing I can think of that is plausible is God’s non-existence. Since that is the very issue in the question of the moral argument, however, this would be question-begging."

    Wouldn't the non-existence of God, combined with the first premise of the moral argument, simply deliver the conclusion that objective moral values don't exist? I'm not sure how the intent of the moral argument factors into the logic.

    "Millican offers the following as a critique: some people have been incorrect regarding intuitive beliefs, therefore intuition cannot be trusted. The problem with this is that it does not follow because one particular belief is incorrect, then my belief is incorrect."

    You appear to have palmed a card, here. The question is not whether any particular intuition is trustworthy, but rather, is intuition generally trustworthy. The judgement of trustworthy (or reliable) is one that is inextricably bound to context. Take the following example:

    John is a trustworthy employee because he always shows up to work with all of his faculties intact.

    Now, it depends on what his job is. If he is a cashier at the local supermarket, 'always' could be replaced with 'almost always', and the judgement holds. However, if he is an on-call surgeon, 'almost always' doesn't cut it. Lets look at another:

    Bishop Smith is a trustworthy priest because he never molests the boys in his parish.

    In this example, 'never' cannot be replaced with 'seldom' while the judgement holds.

    What I took Millican's point to be is not a critique of each intuition on a case-by-case basis, but a general evaluation of intuition as a whole. You wouldn't say, for example, that you would judge John as trustworthy by sampling a single instance of his attendance, rather you would evaluate it on the basis of a collection of past experiences regarding his attendance. The same holds for the Bishop in that his actions towards one particular boy, or one particular day, are not sufficient for evaluating whether he is trustworthy.

    If our intuitions are not always accurate, the best we can do is take all of the verified intuitions, both true and false, tally them up and assign a probability to the next. However, what we cannot do is call intuition 'trustworthy' on the basis of even a 99.999% chance of it being right. If the stakes are high, and I would consider questions of knowledge, certainly knowledge about morality and god, as very high, then the judgement's context renders intuition untrustworthy.

    "But in the absence of such external justifiers or defeaters, one is justified if he truly holds the intuition"

    How can one be justified in the absence of justifiers?

    Thanks,

    Lee.

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  2. Hi Lee. :) Yes that's right, an objector could run an argument that:
    1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
    4. God does not exist.
    5. Therefore, objective moral values do not exist.

    But it nonetheless remains that simply asserting (4) is begging the question against(i.e., assuming the conclusion is false)the conclusion in denying (2) of the moral argument. What the objector would have to do in this tact is to create a deductive argument that entails that God does not exist, and then he must have at least as much (or more) warrant and/or justification for thinking that all of said argument's premises are true as he does for thinking (2) is true. Such an argument is, I think, not forthcoming from the objector.

    The next part doesn't seem to address the reliability of my intuition at all. So long as it does not follow that I cannot trust my intuition, it just seems irrelevant. That some people make some intuitive mistakes does not necessitate that I do, and even that I make some does not necessitate that I have made a mistake in any particular intuition, which is exactly what is at stake. Changing the level of warrant required is pragmatic, not metaphysical, and hence we need not do that as well. In fact, so long as intuition is defined as knowledge independent of experience, I don't see how anyone can credibly deny intuition exists.

    As to your last question, you forgot one thing my friend! I said "external" justifiers. Intuition just is justification, but of an internal kind, independent of experience.

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  3. Hello again, Randy! Your post looked lonely :)

    The conclusion of the argument in your last post is the nonexistence of objective moral values, not the non-existence of God, and therefore premise 4 is not assuming the conclusion. The question of supporting premise 4 is irrelevant to the topic at hand.

    "Since that is the very issue in the question of the moral argument, however, this would be question-begging."

    It is not question-begging, nor is it assuming the conclusion. It doesn't matter whether a form of the moral argument delivers the conclusion that god exists. Perhaps it would be helpful to rename the argument from your last comment as the 'A-moral argument' for clarity's sake.

    "That some people make some intuitive mistakes does not necessitate that I do, and even that I make some does not necessitate that I have made a mistake in any particular intuition, which is exactly what is at stake"

    It doesn't necessitate it, but that's not the question. The question, to my mind, is whether your intuitions can be trusted. This argument of yours cuts both ways: the fact that intutions can be true, and have been true in the past, does not necessitate that they will be true in the future, precisely for the reasons you have given on the contrary. The fact that intuitions can be false, and have been false in the past, does not necessitate that they will be false in the future. Neither formulation renders intuitions trustworthy.

    I don't recall denying that intuition exists, nor do I see the justification for defining it as knowledge. You can hold to a belief as knowledge, you can know it to be true, sans external justification, and you can be wrong. This is an all-too familiar phenomenon, we have all experienced it, it has a long, long history.

    Lee.

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  4. Hi Lee, I appreciate the help and discussion! ;)

    We must remember the context in which the alternative argument is offered: in denial of (2) of the moral argument. It may help to put this in a "dialogue" context. Fred and John are speaking, and Fred says, "If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist. Objective moral values do exist. Therefore, God exists." John replies, "I can accept your first premise, but there's just one problem. God does not exist. Therefore, objective moral values do not exist. Therefore, God does not exist." This latter example is blatantly circular reasoning, which differs somewhat from begging the question (though in this dialogue context, he's committing both). If you wish, cut out John's final therefore, and there's still the problem of begging the question. To clarify: one begs the question for/against an argument's conclusion when his reason for accepting/rejecting a premise is stating a conclusions's truth/falsehood.

    Now, you seem to want to say the argument offered is done so independently of the moral argument (which, in the context of my article, it's plainly not). So let's suppose you offer that "a-moral" argument. Why would anyone think this is a good argument who did not already believe God does not exist? And why could I not simply just repeat the moral argument? Since it is impossible for both arguments to be true (view them both as one giant proposition. The moral argument is: "If it is true that if God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist, and objective moral values do exist, then God exists," and the a-moral argument as "If it is true that if God does does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist, and God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.") we must see if there are any ways to distinguish the plausibility between them. Since the major premise is agreed upon in this scenario, it will be the minor premises which tilt our acceptances. Most everyone shares a strong intuition that objective moral values exist, informing them they do know it. So how can this intuition be overcome? Simple. One must have equally strong (or better) reasons to think God does not exist as he does for thinking objective moral values exist. In fact, in order to accept the a-moral argument, those reasons must in fact be stronger (if they were merely equal it would warrant us only being an agnostic between the two arguments). This would require, most plausibly, a deductive argument entailing God's non-existence, which means that one must find all of the premises equally or more plausible than the premise that objective moral values exist. I haven't seen anything even remotely like that, from anyone. But suppose we did see that. Then, the a-moral argument really becomes superfluous, as it is the argument that entails there is no God that is doing all the work!

    Regarding your comments about intuitions: "This argument of yours cuts both ways: the fact that intutions can be true, and have been true in the past, does not necessitate that they will be true in the future, precisely for the reasons you have given on the contrary. The fact that intuitions can be false, and have been false in the past, does not necessitate that they will be false in the future. Neither formulation renders intuitions trustworthy."

    Right! That's precisely my point. We don't take an inductive look to find out if people's intuitions are true to know if ours are true, and that's not the track I take to know if an intuition is true. But since you apparently accept my reasoning (else you cannot say my currect intuitions are justified by my prior ones), the objection lodged against intuition cannot get off the ground.

    If knowledge is justified true belief, I don't see how anyone can "know" something and be wrong (since then it would not be true), but that I think is incidental to our subject.

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  5. Within the above article I have linked to a previous one I wrote justifying knowledge independent of any experience inherently (that is, offering that at least some such knowledge exists). I would also like to reiterate that I don't use intuition to show something is true to someone who does not share that intuition. So, for instance, if you did not at all intuit any objective moral values, then while you would be the extremely rare bird, I would not use this moral argument with you. Please note: I am not suggesting that the number of people who hold objective moral values intuitively and those who believe in objective moral values are identical. I think there are plenty of people who intuit these objective moral values who do not think they actually exist (although the majority still do). That's why I feel comfortable appealing even to atheists who deny objective moral values exist: chances are they intuit, and powerfully so, objective moral values exist. Hope that helped! :)

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  6. "This latter example is blatantly circular reasoning, which differs somewhat from begging the question (though in this dialogue context, he's committing both). If you wish, cut out John's final therefore, and there's still the problem of begging the question. To clarify: one begs the question for/against an argument's conclusion when his reason for accepting/rejecting a premise is stating a conclusions's truth/falsehood."

    You are trying to defend the existence of God when I am not actually challenging it! I am only pointing out that the first premise of the moral argument, combined with the premise that God does not exist, logically entails the conclusion that objective moral values do not exist, and there is nothing invalid about that argument. You may very well reject the second premise, as I am inclined to reject the first, but this is a discussion of the validity, not soundness, of the resultant syllogism. Validity which you called into question in your original post:

    "Notice what this entails: in order for us to say, for example, that objective moral values do not exist (even if we strongly intuit there are such values), we must have some strong evidence suggesting this intuition is false. What could that be? The only thing I can think of that is plausible is God’s non-existence. Since that is the very issue in the question of the moral argument, however, this would be question-begging."

    My contention is that the conclusion of the moral argument is wholly irrelevant to the validity of the A-Moral Argument, any more than the conclusion of the A-Moral Argument calls the validity of the Moral Argument into question. They can't both be right, but it also cannot be so that only one of them is question-begging; it is neither or both. I'm going with neither.

    ----

    "Right! That's precisely my point. We don't take an inductive look to find out if people's intuitions are true to know if ours are true, and that's not the track I take to know if an intuition is true. But since you apparently accept my reasoning (else you cannot say my currect intuitions are justified by my prior ones), the objection lodged against intuition cannot get off the ground."

    I think you misunderstood me. The question is not whether any particular intuition is true, but whether our intuitions as a whole are trustworthy, which is, as far as I can tell, the intent of Millican's remark. I accept your reasoning insofar as it goes, but I'm trying to point out that your reasoning is largely orthogonal to the question at issue.

    "If knowledge is justified true belief, I don't see how anyone can "know" something and be wrong (since then it would not be true), but that I think is incidental to our subject."

    Sure, but intuition is neither "knowledge" or "justified true belief". I was pointing out that while you may intuit that a proposition is true, and consider it knowledge, it can still be wrong. You believing that it is knowledge doesn't make it so. There are other intuitions that can help justify such a belief, but a belief is not justified simply by virtue of being "held truly".

    Lee.

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  7. Hi Lee, there's some misunderstanding here. Begging the question is not always a formal fallacy, at least not the way commonly used (nor in the way used here), and thus I am not calling into question the validity of anything. Next, if all you are doing is raising a separate argument, you are, a) not operating within the original context of the article, in which case yours is not a critique of the article but of some other proposition, or b) ignoring the statements made above in my prior comment.

    A similar misunderstanding arrives when you say: "They can't both be right, but it also cannot be so that only one of them is question-begging; it is neither or both. I'm going with neither."

    This isn't quite right either. Remember how we (and most analytic philosophers) have been using question-begging: one begs the question for/against an argument's conclusion when his reason for accepting/rejecting a premise is stating a conclusions's truth/falsehood. So I ask you: are you siding with the objector of the article's referent, and merely asserting God does not exist as your objection? If so, you are begging the question. If not, and you are merely listing another argument, then it fails as a critique of the article for it is irrelevant to the section at hand. If the other argument contains a contradictory premise/conclusion than the moral, then the prior critique applies in that one will have to substantiate another argument whose premises are all equally or more plausible than the premise that objective moral values exist. Just assuming its truth is question-begging, and if you argue for it with that argument, the further argument for God's non-existence will be doing all the work, not the a-moral argument. So to sum up: either the critique is irrelevant to the article or it falls into the same fallacy!

    When you say intuition is not knowledge, that's simply question-begging. So far, I have seen no non-fallacious arguments against intuition. Again, why does it follow that if someone else's intuition is false, mine is too? If it does not follow then what, precisely, is the point? If it is supposed to be that I cannot trust my intuition because it is probably false, on what basis is it probably false? It certainly cannot be on the basis of all other people's intuition, for it is mine, not theirs (and I don't gain intuitive knowledge from any of them, or anything else). If all it says is that this knowledge is not infallible, that is quite uninteresting. My argument for intuition is so far untouched (the article in the link) and the particular intuition held has also been untouched.

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  8. This is really very simple. It seems clear to me, from your original post, that when you posited the non-existence of God as "strong evidence" against the existence of OMVs, you weren't speaking of simply assuming it is true. If you were, you weren't very clear about it. Judging from what you have since written, it appears we are on the same page, but both of us are disagreeing with your original post.

    "If all it says is that this knowledge is not infallible, that is quite uninteresting."

    You may be bored, but it is germane to the judgement of "trustworthy", as I have repeatedly pointed out. If intuition can, or has been, false, then while it does not follow that any future intuitive belief will be false, it cannot be trusted to be true simply on the basis of being what it is. It must be verified independent of itself in order for it to be knowledge, rather than just intuitive belief.

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  9. Hi Lee. :) Please do not be offended by this, but I think I am in a better position than you are to know what I was thinking when I wrote the post! ;)

    As to intuition, that standard of justification (infallibility) renders most things unknowable, and I would have to reject that claim without some justification (that, incidentally, would have to be infallible). I assumed you weren't going that radical route. :)

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  10. Right. Do you understand where my apparent misconception came from in the wording of your post? Not offended in the least, by the way, these discussions are always fascinating!

    The reason it would have to be infallible for it to be knowable in this instance is because you seem to think it can be trusted for it's own sake. You want intuitive knowledge to be trustworthy merely on the basis of it being held truly, which would absolutely require that it be infallible, not just in all previous cases, but necessarily in all future ones. Intuition doesn't get a free pass just because it isn't necessarily false.

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  11. I assume this is Lee and not anonymous! :)

    I just don't see how the epistemic reasoning behind it doesn't collapse into something worse. At first, it seemed you meant "in order to know X, the justification must be infallible." But it seems as though you now mean "in order to know X by only one means, the justification must be infallible." But why think that unless you already believe intuition is untrustworthy? And what is the justification for saying this is a necessary truth? And how does it avoid the justification provided in my linked article for requiring some knowledge independently of experience? And why think that because someone else's intuition is false, mine is as well?

    At this point, I fear we are simply repeating ourselves. But to sum up: no charge has been made suggesting objective moral values do not exist, no argument has been given against intuition (only the assertion that intuition not only must be certain, but could not fail to be true, and/or the idea that because some people have false intuitions I cannot trust mine), the argument for intuitive knowledge in the linked article on which the above article is based has not been challenged, and the specific role of intuition has not been challenged.

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  12. BTW, my summary and remark about repeating ourselves will probably necessitate the end of this particular discussion, though I do appreciate it. If you wish, I will allow you to have the last word on the subject, and I will post your comment (assuming it conforms to the comment policy, which you always do!) as soon as I see it! :)

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  13. "no charge has been made suggesting objective moral values do not exist"

    Absolutely true! But say we were to attempt to counter our strong intuitive belief that objective moral values exist, by using a hypothetical scenario to determine what this would require(which was what I took your intent to be). We would need strong evidence indeed to overcome this intuition, so what might qualify? Well, lets say we had good reasons, perhaps a deductive argument, that God does not exist. Lets call that argument 'P'. Now, how would we construct an argument, using the non-existence of God proven by 'P', to counter our intuition that objective moral values exist? I imagine something like the A-Moral Argument would suffice.

    IF we accept premise 1, and if premise 2 is justified by P, the conclusion follows, and our intuitions are overcome.

    You have made two claims about this process which I have objected to. The first is to say that premise 2 is question-begging, but as should be clear by now, premise 2 is justified by P and is therefore not merely assumed to defeat the existence of objective moral values. The second is to say that P is doing all the relevant work, but notice that P's job is merely supporting premise 2, and that in order to show that objective moral values do not exist, P is not sufficient.

    My original comment pointed out that the first premise of the moral argument, combined with the premise that God does not exist (assuming we accept both premises, which is different from assuming both premises), yields the conclusion that objective moral values do not exist.

    You could only have meant one of two things in your original post. Either you were echoing a basic fact of logic, that you can't simply deny a conclusion in order to defeat a premise, or you were making a more interesting (yet false) point, that even if we had very good reasons (P, for example) for the premise 'God does not exist', the subsequent A-Moral Argument would still be question-begging and/or superfluous, simply by virtue of the antithesis of premise 2 being the conclusion of the moral argument. A fair reading of your original post (which I always strive for), indicated to me that you meant the second, not the first, of the above options. Twelve or so posts later, I'm still unclear on your position, but I hope mine is made plain.

    "But it seems as though you now mean "in order to know X by only one means, the justification must be infallible." "

    In order for X to be self-justifying, in order for it to be trustworthy as a faculty for knowledge without any other justification, it must be infallible. We have all had false intuitions in the past, things we held to be true in all earnestness, which leads me (and should lead you) to be skeptical of the truth of any future intuition absent any justification other than that you intuit these beliefs truly.

    "only the assertion that intuition not only must be certain, but could not fail to be true, and/or the idea that because some people have false intuitions I cannot trust mine"

    Intuition must be certain, and necessarily true, in order for it to be trusted as an independent source of knowledge absent further justification. It's nearly tautological, this point. That's a far different bird from saying that it must be certain, and necessarily true, for any one future intuition to be true. It's perfectly valid to say that past false intuitions do not necessitate that future intuitions will be false, but it is a fallacy to say that the possibility of an intuition being true, even the plausibility of it being true, renders intuition trustworthy.

    If you're just saying that intuitive beliefs are probably true, and therefore trustworthy, I would ask whether a priest who probably won't molest another child can be trusted with your children. I see the stakes as, if not merely identical, higher for knowledge.

    Lee.

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